BIC Corp. v. Bean
Decision Date | 01 September 1995 |
Citation | 669 So.2d 840 |
Parties | BIC CORPORATION v. Samuel L. BEAN III, et al. Samuel L. BEAN III and Leigh Ann Bean v. BIC CORPORATION. 1930751, 1930853. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
David P. Whiteside, Jr. and Thomas E. Walker of Johnston, Barton, Proctor, Swedlaw & Naff, Birmingham, for appellant/cross appellee BIC Corporation.
Hobart A. McWhorter, Jr., David G. Hymer, T. Michael Brown and Matthew H. Lembke of Brandley, Arant, Rose & White, Birmingham, for appellees/cross appellants (Bean).
Pursuant to the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine ("AEMLD"), the plaintiffs, Samuel L. Bean III, his wife Leigh Ann Bean, and their minor son Luke Bean, filed this wrongful death and products liability action against BIC Corporation ("BIC") and other defendants following a fire that destroyed the Beans' home on February 26, 1988. The fire, which resulted from the Bean children's playing with a butane cigarette lighter manufactured by BIC, injured five-year-old Luke Bean and killed four-year-old Kristi Bean.
Before commencing this action, the Beans began a collateral action against their mortgagees and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, seeking damages for failure to provide or procure homeowner's insurance on their home. Bean v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 591 So.2d 17, 19 (Ala.1991). Eventually, a jury returned a verdict in that case in favor of the Beans against one of the mortgagees for $80,000. Id. at 20.
In the meantime--on April 25, 1989--this AEMLD action was begun against BIC and others. The trial court granted BIC's motion for a partial summary judgment on the Beans' claims that BIC's lighter design was defective and that the BIC lighter failed to carry an appropriate warning. 1 On appeal, this Court held that the entry of the partial judgment was "premature." Specifically, as to the issue of alleged design defect, the Court stated:
Bean v. BIC Corp., 597 So.2d 1350, 1352-53 (Ala.1992).
As to the claims that BIC had provided inadequate warnings regarding the use of the lighter, the Court held:
During the trial following the remand from this Court, the parties agreed to allow the trial court to determine the issue of the Beans' alleged property damage and the amount of the award therefor, if any. The issue of BIC's liability under the AEMLD was to be determined by the jury.
During its deliberations, the jury asked the court whether it could find in favor of the minor children but against the parents. The judge answered this inquiry in the affirmative, and the jury returned the following verdicts:
BIC moved for a mistrial on the ground that the verdicts were inconsistent. The trial court denied BIC's motion and entered its judgment on the jury's verdicts on September 30, 1993.
On October 5, 1993, the Beans moved the trial court to enter a judgment on their claim for property damage. They sought "an award of $71,843.29," which, they alleged, represented the value "of jointly held real and personal property damaged or destroyed in the fire." On January 14, 1994, the trial court entered a judgment for the Beans in the amount of $70,000. The court, however, citing the Beans' collateral action in which they had already received $80,000, see Bean v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 591 So.2d 17 (Ala.1991), concluded that the $80,000 was due to "be credited against the amount of the [Beans'] recovery against ... BIC ... for damage to the [Beans'] real and personal property." Consequently, it held that the $70,000 judgment entered against BIC was "extinguished by a set-off through the entry and collection of the judgment" recovered in the earlier case. (Emphasis added.)
BIC appeals from those portions of the judgment that are based on the jury verdicts in favor of the injured minor plaintiff, Luke Bean, and in favor of the Beans, as parents of their deceased minor daughter, Kristi Bean. The Beans cross-appeal from that portion of the judgment that effectively awarded them no damages on their property damage claim.
BIC argues that the verdicts are inconsistent. More specifically, it contends:
Reply Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee BIC Corporation, at 29 (emphasis in original).
Were it not for the events that transpired during the jury's deliberations, we would be compelled to agree with BIC. We derive the most accurate and complete account of those events from a post-trial affidavit given by the trial judge and submitted for the record by BIC. The judge's affidavit states in pertinent part:
(Emphasis added.)
Obviously, the inconsistency of which BIC complains arises out of the trial court's affirmative answer to the jury's question. It is undisputed, however, that neither the Beans nor BIC objected to the trial court's answer to the jury before it was given, or, as the trial judge's affidavit suggest, before the jury emerged from the jury room with its verdict. Criticizing, the procedure that was followed, BIC states:
Reply Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee BIC Corporation, at 32 (emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted).
Ala.R.Civ.P. 51, however, does not require an opportunity to object before a charge is given. It merely requires that a party be permitted an "[o]pportunity ... to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury." (Emphasis added.) In Kirkland & Co. of Anniston, P.C. v. A & M Food Serv., Inc., 579 So.2d 1278 (Ala.1991), we explained this aspect of Rule 51, as follows:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
THOMPSON PROP. v. Birmingham Hide & Tallow
...value" in § 8-9A-5(a), that charge is the law of the case. "Unchallenged jury instructions become the law of the case." BIC Corp. v. Bean, 669 So.2d 840, 844 (Ala.1995). Evidence was presented to the jury indicating that when Rockhill purchased the Property in 1988, he paid approximately $3......
-
Thompson Properties 119 AA 370, Ltd. v. Hide, No. 1021411 (AL 7/9/2004)
...value" in § 8-9A-5(a), that charge is the law of the case. "Unchallenged jury instructions become the law of the case." Bic Corp. v. Bean, 669 So. 2d 840, 844 (Ala. 1995). Evidence was presented to the jury indicating that when Rockhill purchased the Property in 1988, he paid approximately ......
-
Horton Homes v. Brooks
...claim should have been sent to the jury and whether mental-anguish damages were recoverable in the present case. In BIC Corp. v. Bean, 669 So. 2d 840, 844 (Ala. 1995), this Court stated: "'Unchallenged jury instructions become the law of the case. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Atkins, 435 ......
-
Polk v. Polk
...comporting with those instructions would not be reversed on appeal).” 630 So.2d at 1017.’ ”997 So.2d at 308 (quoting BIC Corp. v. Bean, 669 So.2d 840, 844 (Ala.1995)).5 In reliance on Rule 51, Ala. R. Civ. P., and Chandler, supra, we cannot address any error in the trial court's refusal to ......