Bickford v. Denmark Technical College

• Decision Date: 28 March 2007
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 5:05-CV-1457-MBS.
• Citation: 479 F.Supp.2d 551
• Parties: Adela E. BICKFORD, Plaintiff, v. DENMARK TECHNICAL COLLEGE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

479 F.Supp.2d 551

Adela E. BICKFORD, Plaintiff, v. DENMARK TECHNICAL COLLEGE, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 5:05-CV-1457-MBS.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Orangeburg Division.

March 28, 2007.

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James Lewis Cromer, Columbia, SC, for Plaintiff.

Andrea E. White, Duff Turner White and Boykin, Columbia, so, for Defendant.

ORDER & OPINION

SEYMOUR, District Judge.

Plaintiff Adela E. Bickford filed this action against her former employer, Defendant Denmark Technical College,¹ on May 19, 2005, alleging that Defendant discriminated against her because of her national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a), and her age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), see 29 U.S.C. § 623. Complaint, 1-4 (Entry 1). Plaintiff also raised retaliation claims under both statutes. Id. at 4-5. Defendant moved for summary judgment on April 17, 2006. Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry 19). After having been granted an extension of time to respond, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment on May 30, 2006. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition (Entry 24). Defendant filed a reply memorandum on June 6, 2006. Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition (Entry 25).

In accordance with 28 U.S.C § 636(b) and Local Rule 73.02, D.S.C., this' matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Joseph R. McCrorey for pretrial handling. On November 29, 2006, the Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation in which he recommended that Defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part. Report and Recommendation, 17 (Entry 26). Plaintiff filed no objections to the Report. Defendant filed objections on December 13, 2006. Objections to Report and Recommendation (Entry 27). Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant's objections on December 21, 2006. Reply to Objections (Entry 28).

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, The responsibility for making a final determination remains with this court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270, 96 S.Ct. 549, 46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of any portions of the Report and Recommendation to which a specific objection is made. The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the Magistrate Judge or may recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

I. FACTS

The facts are presented in the Magistrate Judge's report. Report and Recommendation, 3-6. In short, Plaintiff is a sixty-three year old Hispanic woman whom Defendant hired in September 1997. Plaintiffs Deposition, 7 (Entry 24-2). Plaintiff's primary role was to provide administrative support to the President of Denmark Technical College, Dr. Joann Boyd-Scotland, at the main campus in Denmark, South Carolina. Plaintiffs Deposition, 8-9 (Entry 24-2). Plaintiff states that, during her employment with Defendant, Boyd-Scotland made derogatory remarks toward Plaintiff concerning her national origin and age;² required Plaintiff to work despite Plaintiff's suffering from back pains, id. at 28; and acted in a physically aggressive manner toward Plaintiff, id. at 22-23, 35. Plaintiff also alleges that, on February 10, 2004, Boyd-Scotland reprimanded her for allegedly giving out confidential information, told Plaintiff to "get out," and instructed Plaintiff to use ten days of her accumulated "comp time" before returning to work. Id. at 35. According to Plaintiff, Boyd-Scotland did not answer Plaintiffs questions about whether she was still employed by Defendant and on two later occasions instructed Plaintiff to not come into work. Id. at 37-38.

On Friday, February 27, 2004, Boyd-Scotland informed Plaintiff via telephone that she had been transferred to the Barnwell campus, which is located in Barnwell; South Carolina. Id. The Barnwell site is used to hold evening classes for students living in the surrounding area. Id. at 39. Aside from Plaintiff, the only other employee working at that site was the maintenance person, who worked during the afternoon. Id. Plaintiff reported to the Barnwell site on February 27; however, due to her being hospitalized with chest pains, she was unable to work from March 1 until March 3. Id. at 41-42.

On March 2, 2004, Plaintiff's attorney wrote Boyd-Scotland a letter stating that, "unless you supercede [sic] the changes you have implemented in her job immediately, we will consider that she has been constructively discharged." March 2, 2004 Letter from J. Lewis. Cromer, 1-2 (Entry 19-2). No resolution was reached, and Plaintiffs attorney informed Defendant's attorney that Plaintiff "considers herself to have been constructively discharged." March 8, 2004 Letter from J. Lewis Cromer to Charles Boykin (Entry 19-3). Plaintiff states that she applied for unemployment compensation on March 10, but that Defendant paid her as though she were still employed on March 15, 2004. Plaintiff s Deposition, 43. Boyd-Scotland wrote Plaintiff a letter on March 25, 2004 asking Plaintiff to advise Boyd-Scotland by March 31, 2004 of her intent to change her status of employment with Defendant. Id. Plaintiff did not respond. On April 15, 2004, Boyd-Scotland wrote Plaintiff again, informing her that. Defendant considered Plaintiff as having abandoned her employment. Id.

Plaintiff avers that her working conditions at the Denmark campus and the involuntary transfer to the Barnwell campus constitute constructive discharge due to her national origin and age, Complaint, 1-4; that Boyd-Scotland's conduct created a hostile work environment, id. at 3; and that Defendant denied Plaintiff opportunities for advancement and retaliated against her for complaining about the discriminatory manner in which Defendant treated Plaintiff, Response in Opposition 17-18 (Entry 24). The Magistrate Judge recommended that the court grant summary judgment as to Plaintiffs claims for retaliation and denial of opportunities for advancement, finding that Plaintiff had failed to provide sufficient evidence that she had engaged in any protected activity or that Defendant prevented her from advancing her career.³ Report and Recommendation, 15, 17. The Magistrate Judge also recommended that the court deny summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs claims for constructive discharge and hostile work environment, finding that Plaintiff had established a prima facie case for national origin and age discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA, respectively. Id. at 6-14.

II. DISCUSSION

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be rendered when a moving party has shown "[that] the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The court must determine whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Nonetheless, in deciding a motion for summary judgment, "the judge's function is not [herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Summary judgment should only be granted in those cases where it is perfectly clear that there remains no genuine dispute as to material fact and inquiry into the facts is unnecessary to clarify the application of the law. McKinney v. Bd. of Trustees of Mayland Community College, 955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th Cir.1992).

A. Prima Facie Case of Discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA

Plaintiff alleges national origin and age discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA. The prima facie case of discrimination under both statutes consists of the same analytical framework:

To demonstrate the prima facie case of [national origin] or race discrimination under the pretext framework, the plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered adverse employment action; (3) she was performing her job duties at a level that met her employers' legitimate expectations at the time of the adverse employment action; and (4) the position remained open or was filled by similarly qualified applicants outside 'Vie protected class. If a prima facie case is presented, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Assuming the employer meets this burden of production ...' the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's stated reasons `were not its true reasons but were a pretext for discrimination.'

Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir.2004) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)). There is no dispute that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class.

1. Adverse Employment Action

Defendant first objects to the Magistrate Judge's finding that Plaintiff satisfactorily alleged an adverse employment action under Title VII and the ADEA. Objections to Report and Recommendation, 1-5. Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs transfer to the Barnwell site does not constitute an adverse employment action because "[Defendant] made no changes to [Plaintiff's] status, pay, benefits, or grade level," id. at 2, and Plaintiff was given "greater autonomy in the performance of her job responsibilities," id. at 3. Defendant asserts that ...