Biddie v. State, 6 Div. 179
Decision Date | 12 November 1986 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 179 |
Citation | 516 So.2d 837 |
Parties | Grover Lewis BIDDIE v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
C. Burton Dunn, Birmingham, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and James B. Prude, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Grover Lewis Biddie was charged in a one-count indictment with the intentional murder of Myrtie Bell Black. During the trial court's oral charge to the jury, the trial judge instructed the jury on the offense of "reckless murder" and on the offense of "intentional murder" even though the indictment contained only the charge of "intentional murder." The relevant portion of the court's oral charge is as follows:
The jury found the appellant "guilty of murder" and he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole as a habitual felony offender.
I
In Ex parte Washington, 448 So.2d 404 (Ala.1984), the Alabama Supreme Court condemned the giving of an oral instruction as "reckless murder" in a case in which the indictment only alleges "intentional murder." In Washington, supra, the defendant was indicted in a one-count indictment on the charge of "intentional murder." During the trial court's oral charge, the judge 1 defined the term "recklessness" for the jury and instructed them that they could find the defendant guilty of murder if they concluded he acted "recklessly."
The Alabama Supreme Court in its opinion in Washington, supra, held that an oral charge on "reckless" or "universal malice murder" constitutes a fatal variance with an indictment which only charges "intentional murder." Such a variance amounts to reversible error because a "[d]efendant has a constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him" as guaranteed by the United States 2 and ALABAMA CONSTITUTIONS. WASHINGTON, SUPRA, AT 4083.
Since the announcement of the decision in Washington, supra, this court has consistently followed the principles set out in Washington, supra, and has reversed convictions on the authority of that case. See Dawson v. State, 449 So.2d 800 (Ala.Cr.App.1984); Hughley v. State, 451 So.2d 439 (Ala.Cr.App.1984); Ponder v. State, 451 So.2d 1382 (Ala.Cr.App.1984); Bell v. State, 455 So.2d 1022 (Ala.Cr.App.1984). Thus, in light of the above authorities, it is clear that the court's oral charge in the case at bar was reversible error.
In Marsh v. State, 461 So.2d 51 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), this court declared that the rule of law set out in Washington, supra, was to be applied retroactively. Therefore, Washington, supra, applies to this case even though the trial of this case took place prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Washington, supra.
However, the question this court must decide is whether we can pass on the error involved in this case at all since defense counsel failed to object to the court's oral charge on "reckless murder" and has not raised this issue on this appeal. The lack of an objection to the court's oral charge seems to preclude our review of this issue according to our holding in Geter v. State, 468 So.2d 197 (Ala.Cr.App.1985).
In Geter, supra, the trial court instructed the jury on "universal malice murder" even though the indictment contained only the offense of "intentional murder." Although this court acknowledged the trial judge's charge in Geter, supra, constituted reversible error under Washington, supra, and that Washington, supra, was to be applied retroactively, we held that this error was not preserved for our review because defense counsel had not objected to the court's oral charge on "universal malice murder."
The decision in Geter, supra, is primarily based on Rule 14, A.Temp.R.Crim.P., which states in pertinent part:
"No party may assign as error the court's giving or failing to give a written instruction, or the giving of an erroneous, misleading, incomplete, or otherwise improper oral charge, unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection."
However, our opinion in Geter, supra, failed to address Rule 45B, A.R.A.P., which seems to allow this court, under certain circumstances to reach an error in the trial court's instructions to the jury despite the lack of a proper objection by defense counsel to such improper instructions.
Prior to June 20, 1983, Rule 45B provided: "In all cases appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, except those in which the death penalty has been imposed, the Court of Criminal Appeals shall consider only questions or issues presented in briefs on appeal."
In Ex parte Hoppins, 451 So.2d 365 (Ala.1983), the Alabama Supreme Court clarified Rule 45B...
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