Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 May 1953
• Docket Number: No. 526,526
• Citation: 75 S.E.2d 777,237 N.C. 660
• Parties: BIDDIX, v. REX MILLS, Inc. et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 777

75 S.E.2d 777

237 N.C. 660

BIDDIX, v. REX MILLS, Inc. et al.

No. 526

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 6, 1953

Jones & Small, Charlotte, for defendants appellants.

George E. Biddix in pro. per.

BARNHILL, Justice.

The hearing commissioner made his award on the stipulations made at the hearing at a time when the claimant was represented by competent counsel. He correctly concluded that the claim for compensation was not filed with the Commission within the time required by law. A majority of the Commission reversed on the ground that the defendants, by their conduct, lulled plaintiff into a sense of security and are now estopped to plead the statute, G.S. § 97-24. To reach this conclusion, they had resort to matters appearing in the files of the Commission which constitute no part of the evidence in the case or the record in the cause. As the court below affirmed, the exceptive assignments of error raise serious questions which, while perhaps not decisive here, should be decided before the concept of the statute and our decisions evidenced by the majority opinion of the Commission becomes too deeply rooted in the administration of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

The Industrial Commission is primarily an administrative agency of the State charged with the duty of administering the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. As such, it has many ministerial and administrative duties to perform. See Whitted v. Palmer-Bee Co., 228 N.C. 447, concurring opinion at page 453, 46 S.E.2d 109. While it is a special judicial agency, its judicial authority is limited. And these distinctions in the functions of the Commission must always be kept in mind.

The underlying spirit and purpose of the Act is to encourage and promote the amicable adjustment of claims and to provide a ready means of determining liability under the Act when the parties themselves cannot agree. The Industrial Commission stands by to assure fair dealing in any voluntary settlement and to act as a court to adjudicate those claims which may not be adjusted by the parties themselves.

But the Commission has no authority--statutory or otherwise--to intervene and make an award of any type until its jurisdiction as a judicial tribunal has been invoked in the manner prescribed in the Act under which it operates.

The claim is the right of the employee, at his election, to demand compensation for such injuries as result from an accident. If he wishes to claim compensation, he must notify his employer within thirty days after the accident, G.S. §§ 97-22, 97-23, and if they cannot agree on compensation, he, or someone on his behalf, must file a claim with the Commission within twelve months after the accident, in default of which his claim is barred. G.S. § 97-24. Thus the jurisdiction of the Commission, as a judicial agency of the State, is invoked. Lineberry v. Town of Mebane, 218 N.C. 737, 12 S.E.2d 252; Winslow v. Carolina Conference Association, 211 N.C. 571, 191 S.E. 403; Lilly v. Belk Brothers, 210 N.C. 735, 188 S.E. 319; Wilson v. E. H. Clement Co., 207 N.C. 541, 177 S.E. 797; Wray v. Carolina Cotton & Woolen Mills Co., 205 N.C. 782, 172 S.E. 487; Whitted v. Palmer-Bee Co., supra.

There is one further method provided by the Act. Where an employer and employee agree upon a settlement in which compensation is granted before a claim is filed, the Commission must approve the settlement. G.S. § 97-82. This provision was inserted in the statute to protect the employees of the State against the disadvantages arising out of their economic status and give assurance that the settlement is in accord with the intent and purpose of the Act. Therefore, in approving the settlement in which compensation is awarded, the Commission acts in a judicial capacity. The voluntary settlement as approved becomes an award enforceable by a court decree. G.S. § 97-87; Tucker v. Lowdermilk, 233 N.C. 185, 63 S.E.2d 109.

In a judicial proceeding the determinative facts upon which the rights of the parties must be made to rest must be found from admissions made by the parties, facts agreed, stipulations entered into and noted at the hearing, and evidence offered in open court, after all parties have been given full opportunity to be heard. Recourse may not be had to records, files, evidence, or data not thus presented to the court for consideration. It follows that the Commission erred in basing its decision on information it says its files do or do not disclose. Even so, considering all the facts cited in the opinion of the Commission, they neither separately nor in combination support the conclusion reached or the award entered.

It cannot be said that when an employer does what the Act requires or permits him to do, he thereby perforce admits liability and waives the protective provisions of a statute enacted in his behalf. G.S. § 97-25.

There are accidents which produce no injury. Others inflict injuries for which no compensation can be claimed. Still others produce compensable disability within the meaning of the Act. The employer is required to report them all to the Commission without regard to the nature of the accident or the compensability of the injury. He is, however, under no duty to file with the Commission prior to the presentation of a claim for compensation, any formal denial of liability, and his failure to do so is not a circumstance to be considered adversely to him in any hearing before the commission.

A commendably large number of our employers provide prompt medical examination first aid, and hospital care for their employees in case of accident without regard to the nature of the injury, if any, that may result. Frequently, it is purely precautionary. When liability for the medical care of an employee who has suffered an accident is voluntarily incurred by the employer, the bills therefor must be approved by the Commission before the employer can demand reimbursement from its insurance carrier. In this manner such expenditures are kept within the schedule of fees and charges adopted by the Commission. G.S. § 97-26.

This humanitarian conduct on the part of the employers of the State is permitted by the statute. And aside from any statutory provision on the subject, we are committed to the view that such conduct cannot in any sense be deemed an admission of liability. Brown v. Wood, 201 N.C. 309, 160 S.E. 281; Barber v. Southern R. Co., 193 N.C. 691, 138 S.E. 17; Norman v. Porter, 197 N.C. 222, 148 S.E. 41; Patrick v. Bryan, 202 N.C. 62, 162 S.E. 207.

The Good Samaritan placed an injured and unfortunate man upon his own beast, poured wine and oil into his wounds, and paid his maintenance charges at the inn. He generously promised to give even more, if necessary, upon his return. Even so, through the ages, no man has yet suggested that he, by his conduct, impliedly admitted that he was liable for the injuries the poor man sustained. Brown v. Wood, supra.

'It was an act of mercy which no court should hold in any respect was an implied admission or circumstance tending to admit liability. If a court should so hold, it would tend to stop, instead of encourage, one injuring another from giving aid to the sufferer. It would be a brutal holding, contrary to all sense of justice and humanity.' Barber v. Southern R. Co., supra (193 N.C. 691, 138 S.E. 19).

Incidentally, the medical bills in this cause amounted to only $85.55, and although the last amended report was filed 17 August, it was expressly stipulated at the hearing that the last payment was made 16 January 1951.

It must not be understood that we hold an employer may not by his conduct waive the filing of a claim within the time required by law. The law of estoppel applies in compensation proceedings as in all other cases. We merely hold that the facts here appearing, including those found by the full Commission, are insufficient to invoke the doctrine in this case. Wilson v. E. H. Clement Co., supra; Lilly v. Belk...