Bidwell v. Toledo Consol. St. R. Co.
| Decision Date | 20 February 1896 |
| Parties | BIDWELL et al. v. TOLEDO CONSOL. ST. RY. CO. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Frank H. Hurd and Orville S. Brumback, for complainants.
Frederick A. Betts, J. E. Hinton Hyde, and Smith & Baker, for defendant.
The complainants have made application to this court for leave to amend their bill by making the General Electric Company, a nonresident corporation, a party defendant to this suit. It is not claimed that said proposed defendant is within the jurisdiction of the court, and amenable to its process, or that it can be brought in by original subpoena. It is sought to hold it as a defendant in this case because it is alleged the counsel who are preparing and conducting the defense for the Toledo Consolidated Street-Railway Company are the general counsel for said proposed defendant. It is further contended that because said counsel have so assumed the defense of this case; have furnished witnesses in the employ of the General Electric Company to testify on behalf of the defendant; that such witnesses, while so testifying, have been under salary from the General Electric Company; and that the latter has in fact agreed to protect the said the Toledo Consolidated Street-Railway Company in the use of the appliances which it is claimed are an infringement of complainants' patent, and that it will conduct any defense which the said railway company may be called upon to make in court by reason of the use of such appliances,-- that by such conduct it has, in legal effect, entered its appearance in the suit.
The court passed upon an application of a somewhat similar character, made in this case, some time ago. From a statement of the facts as above made, it will be observed that the court is now asked to declare that the General Electric Company, by assuming the defense of this suit, as alleged, on behalf of the Toledo Consolidated Street-Railway Company, has in fact entered its general appearance, and made itself a defendant in this case, and is to be bound by the decree, if one should be made in favor of the complainants and against the defendant. It is not claimed that there was any intention on the part of the General Electric Company to become a party to this case, or that there is any such desire on its part. It is sought to make the decree in this case binding upon that corporation because of the acts before stated.
Is it possible for a court to make any orders in this case, under these facts, which would make said corporation a party defendant in this suit against its wishes? Counsel insist that the court has authority to make such an order, and that it should be made to promote justice. It is urgently contended that the plaintiff is now in fact prosecuting this case against both the Toledo Consolidated Street-Railway Company and the General Electric Company; that the latter is giving to its vendee and the user of its electrical appliances the benefit of its great corporate wealth and influence, and the benefit of the experience and ability of its counsel; and that if, as the result of such a contest, the complainants should prevail they should have the benefit of their victory by securing a decree which would be binding and conclusive upon the General Electric Company in any subsequent litigation that may occur between the parties.
In support of this contention, counsel cite the case of Manufacturing Co. v. Miller, 41 F. 351. That was a case in which the complainant filed a bill against the defendants to maintain the validity of the letters patent which it was claimed the defendants had infringed by the use of certain agricultural implements. The defendants were agents for the manufacturing concern of Mast & Co., a corporation created under the laws of the state of Ohio which made and sold the infringing machines. Mast & Co., as its interests required, conducted the defense for its agents and, when the decree was entered in the case in favor of the complainants, the court said:
In that case the defendants had filed an amendment to the original bill making the Mast & Co. Company a party defendant, but no subpoena was issued or served upon the corporation, and the company never answered the bill, nor in its own name did it enter its appearance in the case. But the case cited comes very far from...
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