Biear v. United States Dep't of Justice

Docket Number3:14-CV-1488
Decision Date31 July 2023
PartiesJAMES BIEAR, Plaintiff v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Robert D. Mariani United States District Judge

I. Introduction

This opinion concerns Plaintiff James Biear's Freedom of Information Act[1] (FOIA) request for the production of certain public records in the custody of Defendant, the United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division (the Criminal Division"). The Criminal Division has produced certain records and withheld others on the basis of specific FOIA exemptions. Presently before the Court is the Criminal Division's Second Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (Doc 116). For the reasons that follow, the Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted in part and denied in part.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

This case arises out of a series of FOIA requests that Biear submitted in 2012 and 2013, seeking "Any and all documents and electronic media assembled during any investigation (or review) containing the name James S. Biear (aka J. Steven5 Biear and James C. Biear), DOB [REDACTED], SSN: [REDACTED].” (Eg., Doc. 1-1 at 4.) He submitted these requests to several DOJ components, including the Criminal Division.[2] The Criminal Division replied by requiring him to certify his identity and to submit a specific description of the records sought. (Doc. 29-2 at 10, Ex. 2.) He certified his identity but did not further elaborate on the records he sought. (Id. at 13, Ex. 3.) Before receiving further information from the Criminal Division, Biear filed an administrative appeal with the DOJ's Office of Information Policy (id. at 18, Ex. 5) and ultimately filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief (Doc. 1) when his appeal was denied.

The Criminal Division filed its first motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment on January 30,2015. (Doc. 51.) Magistrate Judge Joseph Saporito issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R"), recommending that Biear's complaint be dismissed with respect to his request to the Criminal Division for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc. 78 at 34-38.) Specifically, the R&R concludes that he “failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he failed to respond to the Criminal Division's request that he refine his facially overbroad request for all investigatory documents containing his name, as well as its request that he specify the particular Criminal Division section or sections where he believed responsive documents might be found.” (Id.) This Court adopted the R&R, and Biear appealed.

The Third Circuit reversed. See generally Blear v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 90S F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2018). The Circuit held that Biear had exhausted his administrative remedies and therefore was entitled to seek relief in district court, because his Criminal Division “request was sufficiently specific” and he “did not need to further narrow it to ‘perfect' it.” Id. at 155. Dispositive was the fact that Biear requested documents “containing” his name and information, not “relating” to him. See id. at 156. This language was sufficiently specific under FOIA because it enabled Criminal Division personnel to locate the requested records “with a reasonable amount of effort." Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 16.3(b)). Accordingly, the Third Circuit remanded.

Thereafter, the Court granted the Criminal Division's motion to stay the complaint, to give the Criminal Division time to process Biear's FOIA request. (Doc. 108.) The stay was lifted on November 4,2019, after the Criminal Division informed the Court that it had finished processing the request and had produced to Biear all non-exempt responsive documents. (Docs. 114,115.) The Criminal Division filed the present motion on November 25,2019. (Doc. 116.) Following several extensions, Biear filed a pro se response in opposition to the Criminal Division's Motion on June 19,2020. (Doc. 136.)[3] The Motion is now ripe for disposition.

III. Legal Standard
A. Summary Judgment [4]

Summary judgment is appropriate “only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Gonzalez v. AMR, 549 F.3d 219,223 (3d Cir. 2008). “An issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and a factual dispute is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418,423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986)). Thus, through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims that do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)., The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,323 (1986). Once such a showing has been made, the non-moving party must offer specific facts contradicting those averred by the movant to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871,888 (1990). Therefore, the non-moving party may not oppose summary judgment simply on the basis of the pleadings, or on conclusory statements that a factual issue exists. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record ... or showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). “Inferences should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true." B/g Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358,1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993). However, “facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party only if there is a ‘genuine' dispute as to those facts." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

B. FOIA

As the Third Circuit explained in Davin v. United States Department of Justice, FOIA was enacted “to facilitate public access to Government documents” and “was intended to create an expedient tool for disseminating information and holding the government accountable.” 60 F.3d 1043,1049 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164,173 (1991)) (citing Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 644 F.2d 969, 974 (3d Cir. 1981)). FOIA requires government agencies to “make promptly available any records requested” unless the requested information falls under one of nine enumerated exemptions. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)). FOIA “creates a strong presumption in favor of disclosure." Id. (citing Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)).

In reviewing a summary judgment motion under FOIA, “a district court must perform a de novo review of a government agency's decision to withhold information” pursuant to FOIA exemptions. See W. Star Hosp. Auth. Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affs., No. 2:18CV1011,2021 WL 9595459, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2021) (citing Davin, 60 F.3d at 1049). “Because the opposing party (generally the requester) does not ordinarily have the factual information upon which the moving party (generally the agency) has relied, summary judgment in an FOIA case ‘takes on a unique configuration.' McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227,1241-42 (3d Cir. 1993).

To transform what might otherwise be an ‘ineffective, inquisitorial proceeding against an agency that controls information into a meaningful adversarial process,' the reviewing court may order the government to prepare a 'Vaughn' index, identifying each document withheld, the statutory exemption claimed, and a particularized description of how each document withheld falls within a statutory exemption.” Davin, 60 F.3d at 1049 (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 644 F.2d 969, 984 (3d Cir. 1981)). The Vaughn index should enable the FOIA requester and the court “to derive... a clear explanation of why each document or portion of a document withheld is putatively exempt from disclosure.” Id. at 1050 (quoting Hinton v. Dep't of Just., 844 F.2d 126,129 (3d Cir. 1988)).

The Government bears the burden of showing that the withholding of information pursuant to a FOIA exemption is justified. See id. at 1051 (quoting McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1241). [A]n agency is entitled to summary judgment if its affidavits describe the withheld information and the justification for withholding with reasonable specificity, demonstrating a logical connection between the information and the claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith.” Id. (quoting American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Dep't of Defense, 831 F.2d 441,444 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).[5]

IV. Analysis

The Criminal Division argues it is entitled to dismissal of the Complaint or, in the alternative, summary judgment, because it has established that it conducted an adequate search and properly applied FOIA exemptions to withhold responsive information. The Criminal Division points to its “declaration detailing the extent of its search for documents, the number of pages located and released, and to the extent any document was withheld or redacted, the applicable FOIA exemptions as set forth in a detailed 66 page Vaughn index.” (Doc. 121 at 1.) Biear's pro se response in opposition generally “challeng[es] the Criminal ...

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