Bielaska v. Town of Waterford

Decision Date07 May 1985
Citation196 Conn. 151,491 A.2d 1071
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
Parties, 24 Ed. Law Rep. 1173 Lori Ann BIELASKA et al. v. TOWN OF WATERFORD et al.

Andrew J. O'Keefe, West Hartford, with whom was Denise M. Phelan, West Hartford, for appellants (defendants).

Dale P. Faulkner, New London, with whom was Thomas B. Wilson, New London, for appellees (plaintiffs).

Before HEALEY, PARSKEY, SHEA, DANNEHY and QUINN, JJ.

QUINN, Associate Justice.

The plaintiffs brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by the minor plaintiff as a result of the shattering of a wired glass panel in a school corridor smoke door. Following a jury verdict for the plaintiffs, the defendants brought this appeal, claiming: (1) that the court erred in permitting the plaintiffs to amend their complaint; (2) that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the verdict; and (3) that General Statutes § 10-235 precluded an action against the defendant board of education. We find no error.

From the evidence presented the jury could reasonably have found the following facts. On June 13, 1978, the minor plaintiff, Lori Ann Bielaska, an eighth grade student, walked through the corridor at Clark Lane Junior High School in the town of Waterford and approached a set of swinging smoke doors that had wired glass windows or "vision panels" in them. The minor plaintiff pushed on the glass to open the door and her hand went through the glass, thereby causing her to sustain severe and permanent injury to her right hand.

There was evidence that the school had two sets of fire doors with two doors each, two sets of smoke doors with two doors each, and one set of smoke doors with three doors. These doors were equipped with wired glass and kept closed at all times. The door involved here had no crash bar attached to it, nor did it have posted warnings not to push the door open by using the window.

Three months prior to this accident, the wired glass window of a smoke door in another corridor broke and was ordered repaired by the school principal. At that time no warnings were issued not to touch the glass nor was any inspection made of the other similar doors. Two weeks prior to the plaintiff's accident, another student broke the wired glass in the same door that injured the plaintiff. Again, no warnings were posted.

The defendants denied all allegations in the original complaint and pleaded the special defenses of contributory negligence and sovereign immunity. After the plaintiffs presented their case to the jury, a substituted complaint, amended answer, and reply were filed. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, from which the defendants appealed following denial of a motion for a directed verdict, a motion to set aside the verdict, and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

At the close of their case, the plaintiffs requested permission to amend the complaint to conform to the proof at the trial. Over objection the court permitted the filing of the amendments. 1

The defendants argue that the amendments were untimely filed and that they were prejudiced by the introduction of the new allegations. The plaintiffs argue that the first two amended allegations, which alleged that the defendants failed to replace a broken glass panel and failed to inspect the corridor door, merely clarified the second paragraph of their original complaint, which alleged that the defendants failed properly to install and maintain replacement glass in the door, and thus in no way caused the defendants surprise or prejudice. As to the third amended allegation, that the defendants failed to install crash bars, the plaintiffs claim that because the defendants introduced the questions of whether there should have been crash bars they cannot now claim to be surprised by the amendment.

The trial court has a wide discretion in acting upon requested amendments. Antonofsky v. Goldberg, 144 Conn. 594, 597-98, 136 A.2d 338 (1957). "It is proper to amplify or expand what has already been alleged in support of a cause of action, provided the identity of the cause of action remains substantially the same." Giglio v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 180 Conn. 230, 239, 429 A.2d 486 (1980), quoting Gallo v. G. Fox & Co., 148 Conn. 327, 330, 170 A.2d 724 (1961). In this matter the first two amendments allowed by the trial court merely amplified what was originally pleaded. The cause of action remained essentially the same. Furthermore, the third amendment included material introduced by the defendants themselves and therefore cannot be claimed to have been a surprise to them.

A trial judge has a unique vantage point that entitles his decision to great weight on appeal. Antonofsky v. Goldberg, supra, 144 Conn. at 599, 136 A.2d 338. A review of the record compels us to find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the amendments to the original complaint.

The defendants' second claim of error concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict. The defendants contend that no evidence was presented from which the jury could have inferred negligence. In the circumstances of this case, the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Zarembski v. Three Lakes Park, Inc., 177 Conn. 603, 604, 419 A.2d 339 (1979). Every reasonable presumption should be given to support the correctness of the verdict. Id. "[J]urors are entitled to draw reasonable, logical and proper inferences from the facts in evidence that it was more probable than not that the defendants had notice of the specific dangerous condition which was responsible for the plaintiff's injury." Id., 607-608, 419 A.2d 339.

The following evidence was presented in support of the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants acted in a negligent manner. The minor plaintiff was walking at a normal pace to her class at Clark Lane Junior High School. In the corridor of the school are...

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25 cases
  • Connecticut Nat. Bank v. D'Onofrio
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 30 Septiembre 1997
    ...in support of a cause of action, provided the identity of the cause of action remains substantially the same." Bielaska v. Waterford, 196 Conn. 151, 154, 491 A.2d 1071 (1985). If a new cause of action is alleged in an amended complaint, it will speak as of the date when it is filed. Keenan ......
  • Constantine v. Schneider
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 14 Julio 1998
    ...a unique vantage point in ruling on such a motion, which entitles the decision to great weight on appeal. See Bielaska v. Waterford, 196 Conn. 151, 154, 491 A.2d 1071 (1985); Antonofsky v. Goldberg, supra, at 599, 136 A.2d The plaintiffs presented the trial court with a motion to amend thei......
  • Kelley v. Bonney
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 7 Abril 1992
    ...within the discretion of the trial court, and this court will rarely overturn the decision of the trial court. Bielaska v. Waterford, 196 Conn. 151, 154, 491 A.2d 1071 (1985); Hanson Development Co. v. East Great Plains Shopping Center, Inc., 195 Conn. 60, 67, 485 A.2d 1296 (1985). It is th......
  • Dimmock v. Lawrence & Memorial Hosp., Inc.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 13 Mayo 2008
    ...494, 496, 493 A.2d 887 (1985); Antonofsky v. Goldberg, 144 Conn. 594, 597-98, 136 A.2d 338 (1957); see also Bielaska v. Waterford, 196 Conn. 151, 154, 491 A.2d 1071 (1985) (recognizing that "[a] trial judge has a unique vantage point that entitles his decision to great weight on appeal" whe......
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