Bienville Parish Police Jury v. U.S. Postal Serv.

• Decision Date: 29 April 1998
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 97-2214-S.,Civil Action No. 97-1951-S.
• Citation: 8 F.Supp.2d 563
• Parties: BIENVILLE PARISH POLICE JURY v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE and United States of America. and Teresia Gail HOWARD v. UNITED STATES of America and Bienville Parish Policy Jury.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

8 F.Supp.2d 563

BIENVILLE PARISH POLICE JURY v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE and United States of America. and Teresia Gail HOWARD v. UNITED STATES of America and Bienville Parish Policy Jury.

Civil Action No. 97-1951-S.

Civil Action No. 97-2214-S.

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Shreveport Division.

April 29, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Kenneth Mascagni, Julia E. Blewer, Cook Yancey, et al., Shreveport, LA, for Police Jury of Bienville Parish, plaintiff.

Robert W. Sharp, Jr., Sharp & McVea, Ruston, LA, for Teresia Gail Howard, plaintiff.

John Robert Halliburton, U.S. Atty's Office, Shreveport, LA, for U.S. Postal Service and U.S., defendants.

Kenneth Mascagni, Julia E. Blewer, Cook Yancey, et al., Shreveport, LA, for Police Jury of Bienville Parish, defendant.

RULING

NAUMAN S. SCOTT, District Judge.

Before the court by referral is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant, the United States of America, against third-party defendant Bienville Parish Police Jury. The court has jurisdiction over this consolidated personal injury action and third-party demand pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. For reasons discussed herein, the motion is DENIED with respect to the Bienville Parish Police Jury's claim for contribution and GRANTED with respect to he Bienville Parish Police Jury's claim for indemnity.

I. Factual Background

The undisputed facts are as follows. At approximately 1:20 P.M. on Friday, September 1, 1995, Teresia Howard ("Howard"), a private citizen, and Rebecca Hood ("Hood"), a United States Postal Service, ("Postal Service") employee, were involved in a head-on collision at a tight bend on Bienville Parish Road 752. At the time of the accident, Hood was working within the course and scope of her employment as a rural letter carrier for the Postal Service. Hood's automobile liability policy carrier at the time was State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm").

On May 16, 1996, Howard executed a settlement and release with defendants Hood and State Farm for $25,000, which represented Hood's policy limit. The release was executed on a pre-printed form with blanks for the amount of consideration, the names of the released parties, the date of the accident, the date of execution of the release, and the signatures of the releasing party and a witness. In the blank space for the names of the released parties is handwritten "Rebecca L. Hood + State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." The form also contains a preprinted omnibus clause purporting to release the "heirs, executors, administrators, agents, and assigns [of the named parties], and all other persons, firms, or corporations liable or, who might be claimed to be liable, ... from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever [arising out of the accident]." The pre-printed release contained no reservation of rights in favor of Howard.

II. Procedural Background

Howard initiated the primary action in this litigation against the United States, the Postal Service, Rebecca Hood, State Farm, the State of Louisiana, and the Bienville Parish Police Jury ("the Parish") seeking to recover for personal injuries allegedly suffered as a result of the accident. In her complaint, Howard alleges that the United States and the Postal Service are liable under the theory of respondeat a superior for the negligent driving of their employee, Hood, and that the Parish is liable for negligently designing, constructing, and maintaining the road on which the accident occurred.¹ Howard also alleges that the Parish is strictly liable for her injuries.

Since the filing of Howard's complaint, defendant United States has been substituted for defendants Hood and the Postal Service as the only proper party defendant under the FTCA. Furthermore, Hood and State Farm have been dismissed with prejudice after settling with Howard. Thus, the United States and the Parish remain the only defendants. Howard's action, Teresia Gait Howard v. United States of America and Police Jury of Bienville Parish, No. 97-2214 (W.D.La. Nov. 12, 1997), has been consolidated with the third-party demand in Police Jury of Bienville Parish v. U.S. Postal Service and United States of America, No. 97-1951 (W.D.La. Sept. 30, 1997), discussed below.

Ancillary to the primary litigation, the defendant Parish brought a third-party demand for indemnity or contribution against the United States. The Parish alleges in its demand that the accident was caused solely by the negligence of the United States itself and/or through its employee, Hood. Therefore, the Parish contends, it should be indemnified or given contribution for any damages it is found to owe Howard. With respect to the claim for indemnity, the Parish relies solely on the basis of tort, or quasi-contractual, indemnity, as opposed to contractual indemnity. It is with respect to the third-party demand of the Parish that the United States now moves for summary judgment.

III. Movant's Argument

The United States contends that it is a non-excluded, additional insured covered under Hood's policy with State Farm. "Ms. Howard totally released both the primary insured, Mr. [sic] Hood, and the insurer, State Farm. In doing so, she waived whatever claims she may have against the additional insured under the policy, the United States Postal Service. Since the Postal Service has been released from all liability by Ms. Howard, it cannot be derivatively liable to the Bienville Parish Police Jury on the same cause of action." Memorandum In Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, No. 97-1951, Doc. # 4 at p. 6 (W.D.La. Dec. 29, 1997).

The basis is unclear for movant's contention that, by releasing Hood and State Farm, Howard also "waived whatever claims she may have against the additional insured under the policy, the United States Postal Service." Id. Movant could mean that, without an express reservation being made, its alleged additional-insured status creates a special relationship between it and State Farm whereupon a release of State Farm automatically constitutes a release of all additional insureds. Or, the United States could mean that, without an express reservation being made, the United States was included in the broad, omnibus release of "all other persons, firms, or corporations liable or, who might be claimed to be liable [to Howard]."

Regardless of the basis for the United States' argument, for reasons discussed below, the motion is DENIED with respect to the Parish's claim for contribution, and GRANTED with respect to the Parish's claim for indemnity.

IV. Summary Judgment Standard

A motion for summary judgment will be granted only where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, if any," when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Where the moving party shows that "there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), the non-moving party must then come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine factual issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Should the non-moving party fail to so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e). However, the judge is not to weigh the evidence at the summary judgment phase, but merely determine if there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, summary judgment will not lie. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

V. Law and Analysis

A. Choice of Law

Cases heard under the FTCA are governed by the applicable law of the state in which the incident sub judice occurred. Thus, substantive issues with respect to the Parish's claim for indemnity or contribution will be analyzed under principles of Louisiana law.

B. Solidary Liability

Tortfeasors who collectively owe but a single obligation to a tort victim are liable in solido to the victim. La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 1794 (West 1987). This civil law concept is the functional equivalent of the common law principle of joint and several liability. Touchard v. Williams, 617 So.2d 885, 889 (La.1993). To be obligated in solido, tortfeasors need not act in concert, as "[a]n obligation may be solidary though it derives from a different source for each obligor." La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 1797 (West 1987). "When the actionable negligence of two tortfeasors contributes in causing harm to a third party, each of them is responsible for the damage. They are solidarily liable." Dixie Drive It Yourself System New Orleans Co. Inc. v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d 298, 301 (1962).

In the context of vicarious liability, an employee and employer are not joint tortfeasors, since "[l]iability is imposed upon the employer without regard to his own negligence or fault; it is a consequence of the employment relationship." Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So.2d 326, 328 (La.1981). "Although the employer and employee are not joint tortfeasors, they are nonetheless each obligated for the same thing — total reparation of the damages to the victim. The derivative nature of the employer's liability is of no concern to the victim...." Id. Thus, a vicariously liable employer will be liable in solido with a third-party whose actions contributed to a unified harm.

Applying the above principles, this court holds that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, a reasonable jury could find that the United States (through its employee Hood) and the Parish were both negligent and that their combined...