Bifulco v. United States
| Citation | 65 L.Ed.2d 205,447 U.S. 381,100 S.Ct. 2247 |
| Decision Date | 16 June 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-5010,79-5010 |
| Parties | Alphonse BIFULCO, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
Section 406 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (Act) provides that "[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this title is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy" (the "target offense"). Petitioner and others were convicted of violating § 406 by conspiring to violate § 401(a)(1) of the Act by knowingly manufacturing, distributing, and possessing a controlled substance. In accordance with the provisions of § 401(b)(1)(B) prescribing penalties for violations of § 401(a)(1), petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, a fine, and a 5-year special parole term to be served upon completion of the term of imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction, and thereafter he filed an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence, claiming that the sentence was unlawful because § 406 does not authorize the imposition of a special parole term. The District Court held that petitioner had been properly sentenced, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: Section 406 of the Act does not authorize the imposition of a special parole term even though that sanction is included within the penalty provision of the target offense. Pp. 387-401.
(a) A "plain meaning" interpretation of the term "imprisonment" in § 406 does not support the position that the term means a term of incarceration plus special parole made applicable by the target offense's penalty provisions. Moreover, the structure of the Act read as a whole supports the conclusion that § 406 defines the types of punishment authorized for conspirators—imprisonment, fine, or both—and sets maximum limits on those sanctions through reference to the penalty provisions of the target offense, but does not incorporate by reference any provisions for special parole. Pp. 388-390.
(b) Nor does the Act's legislative history demonstrate that Congress intended that the penalties authorized for substantive offenses, and those for conspiracies to commit them, were to be identical, thus authorizing special parole terms for conspiracy convictions. Instead, the history supports the view that § 406 authorizes two types of sanctions—fines and imprisonment—and fixes the maximum amount of each that may be imposed by reference to the target offense's penalty provisions. Pp. 391-398.
(c) A reading of § 406 to include the special parole provisions of target offenses cannot be supported on the ground that Congress' principal objective in enacting the Act's penalty provisions—to deter professional criminals from engaging in drug trafficking for profit—renders it unreasonable to ascribe to Congress the intent to authorize special parole for isolated substantive offenses while withholding this sentencing tool for conspiracies. A comparison of those drug offenses for which Congress clearly authorized special parole terms with those for which it clearly did not, does not reveal a coherent pattern based on the asserted justification for escalated sanctions. Moreover, since § 406 deals with both conspiracies and attempts, and prescribes an identical range of punishment for both, it is not surprising that Congress would provide for less stringent sanctions to be imposed for violations of § 406 than for a completed substantive offense. P. 398-399.
600 F.2d 407, reversed and remanded.
Steven Lloyd Barrett, New York City, for petitioner.
Harlon L. Dalton, New York City, for respondent.
The issue presented in this case is whether § 406 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (Act), 84 Stat. 1265, 21 U.S.C. § 846,1 authorizes a sentencing court to impose a term of special parole upon a defendant who is convicted of conspiracy to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance.
Section 406 provides:
"Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this title is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.
The object of the conspiracy at issue in this case was the commission of the substantive offense defined in § 401(a) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). That subsection reads:
The penalties for violations of § 401(a) are set forth in § 401(b). That subsection authorizes the imposition of terms of imprisonment, fines, and, in some instances, mandatory minimum terms of special parole. The range of permissible punishments varies depending on the nature of the controlled substance involved, and on whether the defendant has been convicted previously of a drug offense. The penalty provision at issue is § 401(b)(1)(B).2 It states:
Section 401(c) describes the operation of the special parole term provisions in greater detail. It states:
The narrow, but important, question presented in this case is whether § 406, which states the penalty for conspiracy as "imprisonment or fine or both," but limits maximum punishment by reference to the penalty provisions of the substantive target offense, authorizes the imposition of a special parole term where that sanction is included within the penalty provisions of the target offense.
In an indictment filed in December 1976 with the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, petitioner Alphonse Bifulco and others were charged with a single count of conspiring to violate § 401(a)(1) by knowingly and intentionally manufacturing, distributing, and possessing substantial quantities of phencyclidine, a schedule III controlled substance. This conspiracy was charged as a violation of § 406. A jury found petitioner and several codefendants guilty of the offense charged, and petitioner was sentenced to a 4-year term of imprisonment, a fine of $1,000, and a 5-year special parole term.3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit subsequently affirmed petitioner's conviction in an unpublished order.
In January 1979, petitioner, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed pro se a motion to vacate his sentence. He claimed that the sentence was unlawful because § 406 does not authorize the imposition of a special parole term to be served upon completion of a term of imprisonment. The District Court held that petitioner had been properly sentenced, and dismissed his complaint. App. 7.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed. 600 F.2d 407 (1979). In a per curiam opinion, that court followed two other Courts of Appeals that had held that § 406 authorizes the imposition of a special parole term. See United States v. Burman, 584 F.2d 1354, 1356-1358 (CA4 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1118, 99 S.Ct. 1026, 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979), and United States v. Jacobson, 578 F.2d 863, 867-868 (CA10), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932, 99 S.Ct. 324, 58 L.Ed.2d 327 (1978). It also relied on the decision in United States v. Dankert, 507 F.2d 190 (CA5 1975), which reached a similar result with respect to the closely analogous sentencing provisions of § 1013 of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 963 ().
Shortly after the Second Circuit's decision in this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reached the opposite conclusion on the issue and held that a special parole term may not be imposed under § 406. United States v. Mearns, 599 F.2d 1296 (3rd Cir. ...
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