Biggerstaff v. Biggerstaff
| Decision Date | 17 July 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 3641,3641 |
| Citation | 443 P.2d 524 |
| Parties | Virginia L. BIGGERSTAFF, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. Harold James BIGGERSTAFF, Appellee (Defendant below). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
David D. Uchner of Lathrop, Lathrop & Uchner, Cheyenne, for appellant.
Wade Brorby of Morgan & Brorby, Gillette, for appellee.
Before HARNSBERGER, C. J., and GRAY, McINTYRE and PARKER, JJ.
Plaintiff, Virginia L. Biggerstaff, in October 1966, commenced an action for divorce against the defendant, Harold James Biggerstaff, and in addition to a decree of divorce sought custody and support of a minor daughter, alimony, and a just and equitable division of the property of the parties. The defendant answered, denying plaintiff's grounds for divorce; counterclaimed for divorce; joined in plaintiff's request for an equitable division of the property of the parties; and asked for other equitable relief. The judgment and decree of the trial court granted a divorce to the plaintiff, gave custody of the minor daughter to the defendant, denied plaintiff's request for alimony, directed the defendant to pay obligations incurred by plaintiff during pendency of the action in the sum of $1,796.50, divided the property of the parties, and allowed attorney fees for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,750. Plaintiff has appealed and bases her claim of error on that part of the decree dividing the property and denying alimony. With the exception of plaintiff's request for allowance of attorney fees on this appeal, no other questions are before us.
By way of general information, the record discloses that the parties were married early in life in the year 1943 at a time when both were employed on a ranch owned by the defendant's uncle, J. A. Allison, and in which the defendant was buying a one-fourth interest. Other than a car belonging to defendant, the parties were in meager circumstances. Two children were born as issue of the marriage, namely a son Jon, who was emancipated and self-supporting at the time of the trial, and Janet, the minor daughter above mentioned, who at the time of trial was 19 years of age and attending college. In 1948 the ranch on which the parties lived was sold, but shortly thereafter the defendant, with liberal financial assistance from the uncle, purchased another ranch consisting of some 13,000 acres of deeded land and some 3,200 acres of leased lands. The parties lived on the ranch for some 12 years and then moved to the town of Gillette, Wyoming, where they have since resided. The defendant continued with the management of the ranch until late in the year 1964 when it was leased to third parties. In the meantime the defendant had entered into the insurance and real estate business and other business ventures and at the time of trial had accumulated a substantial amount of property in his own name, in addition of the jointly owned property of the parties consisting of the home, its furnishings and equipment, and two automobiles. It is not disputed that defendant's gross income from his own interests approximated $22,000 per year. The plaintiff, in the meantime and with the financial assistance of the defendant, acquired a one-third working partnership interest in a ladies' ready-to-wear store which opened for business in August 1965, and her income from that source was approximately $3,500 per year. At the time of trial plaintiff was 40 years of age and in good health. The difficulties between the parties that eventually resulted in the unfortunate dissolution of this marriage had been brewing for some time prior to the filing of plaintiff's action; and the trial court, even though granting the divorce to plaintiff, remarked that each of the parties 'share a heavy burden of responsibility for the destruction of this relationship.'
Turning now to the specific questions before us, we commend the parties and their counsel, as did the trial court, in obviously putting aside pettiness in settling their affairs by stipulating the extent and nature of the property involved, its value in most instances, its source, and the financial structure under which the properties were held. By the stipulation it was agreed that the value of the joint property above described was in the sum of $28,800. The value of plaintiff's individual partnership interest was $15,000. The value of defendant's individual holdings-with the exception of the value of the ranch upon which the parties were unable to agree-was fixed in the sum of $312,550. With respect to the ranch, the plaintiff offered the testimony of an expert appraiser who fixed its value in the sum of $355,000. The defendant, as the owner, fixed the value in the sum of $271,000. The trial court, apparently deeming it unessential for purposes of reaching its decision, did not definitely fix a valuation but did take into consideration a value of $240,000, resulting from a capitalization of income approach. Nevertheless, we know from the trial court's memorandum opinion that it declined unqualifiedly to accept the opinion of plaintiff's expert. Consequently, for purposes of illustration only, we take the liberty of splitting the difference between the high and low figures presented to the trial court, which results in a figure of $297,500 as an assigned valuation for the ranch. By doing so we assume-with the exception of the personal effects of each of the parties, which the parties agreed would be retained by each-a valuation of all assets of the parties in the sum of $653,850. Against this value there were liabilities-other than current bills-in the sum of $264,877, and contingent liabilities on loans guaranteed by the defendant in the sum of $215,000. Ostensibly, and without consideration of the contingent liabilities of the defendant, there results an assumed combined net worth of the parties in the sum of $388,973.
In its decree the trial court set over to the plaintiff free and clear of all encumbrances or liabilities the plaintiff's partnership interest and all of the joint property of the parties above described with the exception of the car used by the defendant in his business. In addition the defendant was ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of $39,500 in cash with the privilege of making deferred installment payments of $500 per month, the unpaid balance to bear interest at the rate of five percent per annum and to be secured by a lien upon the ranch property. Defendant was also required to pay plaintiff's current bills in the sum of $1,796 and her attorney fees in the sum of $1,750. Thus, in substance, the plaintiff received or will receive in real and personal property and cash for her share of the parties' assets an amount equal to $85,146. All of the remaining assets, subject to all encumbrances and liabilities, were set over to the defendant.
In presenting plaintiff's claims of error, it is argued that p...
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