Biggert v. Memphis Power & Light Co.
Decision Date | 19 March 1935 |
Citation | 80 S.W.2d 90 |
Parties | BIGGERT v. MEMPHIS POWER & LIGHT CO. et al. |
Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Suit by Ruth Biggert against the Memphis Power & Light Company, the Kensinger Chevrolet Company, and Henry B. Frank. Upon a verdict for plaintiff against all the defendants, a new trial was granted to the Power Company and the Kensinger Company, and judgment was entered against Frank. To review a judgment dismissing the suit as to the named defendants, plaintiff brings error.
Affirmed.
Jos. H. Norville and Wallace Lopez, both of Memphis, for plaintiff in error.
Waring, Walker & Cox, of Memphis, for defendant Kensinger Chevrolet Co.
Emmett Braden, of Memphis, for defendant Memphis Power & Light Co.
This suit was brought to recover for personal injuries suffered in an automobile collision on the streets of Memphis on March 8, 1933. Plaintiff sued jointly Memphis Power & Light Company, Kensinger Chevrolet Company, and Henry B. Frank. The jury awarded $250 damages against the three defendants. The court granted a new trial to the Power & Light Company and the Kensinger Company, and entered a judgment against Frank, which was not appealed from.
On the rehearing of the case it was tried before the circuit judge without a jury on a stipulation of facts, and by him dismissed as to both the Power & Light Company and Kensinger Company. Plaintiff appeals.
It is stipulated that the car involved was being driven by Frank at the time of the accident on a personal mission; that Frank was the owner of the car, having purchased it on February 24, 1933, from Kensinger Company, automobile dealers of Memphis; that the car had been owned in 1932 by the Power Company, but had been sold by it to the Kensinger Company on January 26, 1933, and that it had not been used in the business of the Power Company since that date; also that it had not been used in the business of the Kensinger Company, or by it, since its sale of it to Frank on the 24th of February, 1933.
It is further stipulated that the license plate on the car at the time of the accident was for the year 1932, and had been purchased by the Power Company, the then owner; that the Power Company had not notified the county court of its sale of the car to Kensinger Company, as provided by Code, § 1154, and had delivered the car upon its sale with the expired license attached to it; and that the Kensinger Company did not report this purchase at the time to the county court clerk as provided for by Code, § 1154. The stipulation further recites:
It will be seen that we have here a case in which it is stipulated that (1) the driver was the owner of the car, and (2) was using it on a personal mission, not in any agency, permissive or other representative capacity. All questions of both ownership and agency being settled by this stipulation, our statutes establishing prima facie ownership and agency in a registered owner are without application.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Allen, 158 Tenn. 504, 14 S.W.(2d) 724, is not contra or controlling. There the bus was being driven by an agent of the owner and on the business of the owner. The question was who was to be treated as in law the owner. This court denied to the registered owner the right to repudiate its ownership, established prima facie by application of the statutory provisions now contained in Code, §§ 2701, 2702, for the reasons assigned in that opinion. The registered owner being thus held to be in law the owner, and the driver being the agent and on the business of the owner, liability followed.
The determinative distinction is clearly recognized and applied in the recent case of Bright et al. v. Neal et al., 168 Tenn. ___, 73 S.W.(2d) 686, 687. This language of Mr. Justice Cook, speaking for the court in that case, is directly in point here:
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