Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co.
| Decision Date | 11 October 1991 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 91-1591,91-1614,s. 91-1591 |
| Citation | 953 F.2d 1405 |
| Parties | 57 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1160, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,242, 60 USLW 2495, 15 Employee Benefits Cas. 1769 Walter F. BIGGINS, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. The HAZEN PAPER COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Appellants. Walter F. BIGGINS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. The HAZEN PAPER COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Appellees. . Heard |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
John M. Harrington, Jr. with whom Robert B. Gordon, Ropes & Gray, Boston Mass., Richard D. Hayes, Patrick W. McGinley, Raymond R. Randall and Sullivan & Hayes, Springfield, Mass., were on brief for Hazen Paper Company, et al.
John J. Egan with whom Maurice M. Cahillane and Egan, Flanagan and Cohen, P.C., Springfield, Mass., were on brief for Walter F. Biggins.
Before TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge, and TAURO, * District Judge.
After his employment was terminated at the Hazen Paper Company in June of 1986, Walter F. Biggins sued the company and the two individuals who owned and operated it, Robert Hazen and Thomas N. Hazen. In the district court Biggins obtained an amended judgment against the defendants in the amount of $1.78 million dollars. Both the defendants and the plaintiff appeal this judgment.
The complaint alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140. Pendent state law claims were also brought under Massachusetts tort and contract law and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), Mass.Gen.L. ch. 12, §§ 11H and 11I. The case was jury tried.
The jury, in answer to special interrogatories, rendered the following verdict on the federal claims. It found that defendants violated the ADEA and awarded Biggins $560,775 in damages. It also found that the ADEA violation was willful. On Biggins' ERISA claim, the jury found that defendants discharged the plaintiff in order to prevent his pension benefits from vesting. Biggins was awarded $100,000 in damages on the ERISA claim.
The jury found for the plaintiff on four Massachusetts law claims. First, on the wrongful discharge claim, the jury found that the defendants agreed to compensate Biggins by giving him shares of company stock, and that the defendants wrongfully discharged Biggins in order to deprive him of this promised stock compensation. The jury awarded plaintiff one dollar in compensatory damages on the wrongful discharge claim. The jury also found that the defendants committed fraud by failing to compensate Biggins with the stock he had been promised; it awarded him $315,098 in damages for the fraud. The jury further found that the plaintiff and the defendants had a contract other than of at-will employment, and that the defendants breached this employment contract when they discharged him. Biggins was awarded $266,897 in compensatory damages on this claim. Finally, the jury found that the defendants violated the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act because they interfered with Biggins' exercise of his civil rights through the use of threats, intimidation or coercion. The jury awarded Biggins one dollar in damages on this claim.
The jury was also asked to determine if Biggins was the inventor, developer, and sole rightful owner of a paper coating formula and method that was developed while he worked for the defendants. The jury found that he was not.
After the verdict, both the defendants and the plaintiff filed post-trial motions. Defendants filed a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) for j.n.o.v. or, in the alternative, for a new trial. Defendants also moved to amend or alter the judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Plaintiff moved for an award of costs and attorney's fees under federal and state law. Plaintiff also requested that the district court enhance any award of attorney's fees to an amount equal to one-third of the damages awarded.
The court ordered j.n.o.v. on the jury's finding that the ADEA violation was willful. That finding, if sustained, would have required an additional payment of liquidated damages equal to the amount of damages awarded for the ADEA violation. The court also ordered j.n.o.v. on the finding of a violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. In all other respects the court denied the defendants' motion for j.n.o.v. or a new trial. The court also denied the defendants' motion to alter or amend the judgment.
On plaintiff's post-trial motions, the district court further ruled that Biggins was entitled to prejudgment interest "on his entire award because plaintiff is not entitled to liquidated damages." The court granted plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees in the amount of $175,564.57 and for costs in the amount of $9,760.07. It declined to enhance the award of attorney's fees.
The defendants raise three issues on appeal: (1) whether the district court erred in denying their motions for directed verdict and j.n.o.v. on all the claims submitted to the jury; (2) whether the district court erred in denying the defendants' motion to alter or amend the judgment because the damages awarded were excessive, duplicative, and unsupported by the evidence and because the award of prejudgment interest was erroneous as a matter of law; and (3) whether the district court erred in denying defendants' motion for a new trial because the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence.
Biggins raises three issues on cross-appeal: (1) whether the court erred in granting j.n.o.v. on the jury's finding that the ADEA violation was willful; (2) whether the court erred in granting j.n.o.v. on the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claim; and (3) whether the court erred by applying the wrong standard in determining the amount of attorney's fees and expenses to be awarded plaintiff.
We apply the same standard of review to the district court's grant or denial of motions for directed verdict and j.n.o.v. See Veranda Beach Club Ltd. Partnership v. Western Sur. Co., 936 F.2d 1364, 1383 (1st Cir.1991). The standard is de novo review "which means that we use the same stringent decisional standards that control the district court." Hendricks & Assocs., Inc. v. Daewoo Corp., 923 F.2d 209, 214 (1st Cir.1991). The standard has been elucidated as follows:
The district court may grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict "only after a determination that the evidence could lead a reasonable person to only one conclusion," ... namely, that the moving party was entitled to judgment[.] ...
The district court "may not consider the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, or evaluate the weight of the evidence." The trial court is "compelled, therefore, even in a close case, to uphold the verdict unless the facts and inferences, when viewed in the light most favorable to the party for whom the jury held, point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the movant that a reasonable jury could not have arrived at this conclusion."
Id. at 214 (citations omitted). We review the evidence in our discussion of the issues.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), is the foundation case on the order and allocation of proof in an employment discrimination case, where, as here, there is no direct proof of discrimination. The plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case. If this is done, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's termination. Id. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. If this is done, the plaintiff has the opportunity to show that the reasons advanced were a cover-up for a discriminatory employment decision. Id. at 805, 93 S.Ct. at 1825. See also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575-76, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2948-49, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978).
There is no doubt that plaintiff here made out a prima facie case of age discrimination. He was within the protected age group. He was sixty-two years old at the time of his termination. He was performing his work at a level that met his employer's legitimate expectations. And he was replaced by someone younger than himself with roughly similar qualifications. See Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 823 (1st Cir.1991); Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8-9 (1st Cir.1990).
In Connell v. Bank of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2828, 115 L.Ed.2d 997 (1991), we held that
[i]f a prima facie case is made, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's discharge. The articulation of such a reason nullifies the inference raised by the prima facie case. Plaintiff must then clear the second hurdle by showing that the employer's articulated reasons were only a pretext for age discrimination. The plaintiff is required to "do more than simply refute or cast doubt," on the employer's rationale. He must "also show a discriminatory animus based on age." The key question becomes whether the employer fired plaintiff because of his age. We do not second-guess the business decisions of an employer.
Connell, 924 F.2d at 1172 (citations and footnotes omitted). The defendants in this case articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for Biggins' discharge. The question is whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that defendants fired plaintiff because of his age. We find that there was.
In order to understand the ADEA evidence we must first outline the evidentiary contours of the case. Hazen Paper Company is a small and successful business located in Holyoke, Massachusetts....
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