Biggs v. Board of Educ. of Cecil County, No. CIV. NO. L-00-1003.

• Decision Date: 06 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. CIV. NO. L-00-1003.
• Citation: 229 F.Supp.2d 437
• Parties: Leslie N. BIGGS, et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CECIL COUNTY, MARYLAND
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Page 437

229 F.Supp.2d 437

Leslie N. BIGGS, et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CECIL COUNTY, MARYLAND

No. CIV. NO. L-00-1003.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

March 6, 2002.

Philip B. Malter, Malter & Mickum Chtd., Riva, MD, for plaintiffs.

Rochelle S. Eisenberg, Leslie R. Stellman, Hodes Ulman pessin and Katz PA, Towson, MD, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

LEGG, District Judge.

Now pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated herein, the Court shall, by separate Order, GRANT Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts I and II, GRANT Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count III, and DIRECT the Clerk to CLOSE the CASE.

I. Background:

Leslie Biggs was born on April 24, 1985, and diagnosed with epilepsy in 1995. During the 1996-97 school year, she had frequent seizures requiring hospitalization. By the beginning of the 1997-98 school year, Ms. Biggs's condition had improved and "she was essentially seizure-free."

In the fall of 1997, Ms. Biggs began the seventh grade at Bohemia Manor Middle School in Cecil County, Maryland. During the 1997-98 school year, Ms. Biggs was subjected to taunting and teasing by some classmates, apparently on the basis of her epilepsy and physical appearance. These classmates taunted and teased Ms. Biggs by calling her, inter alia, "ugly dog," "seizure girl," and "Lesby," and telling her, "go have a seizure, ugly dog."

Ms. Biggs, and her mother, Mrs. Nancy Biggs, complained to the school on many occasions throughout the school year. In response to the complaints, the school took a number of steps to stop the harassment. In January of 1998, Ms. Currinder, the school guidance counselor, set up a meeting with Leslie and two boys accused of teasing her to discuss the harmful effects of teasing. In February of 1998, Mrs. Biggs gave Mr. Cole, the Vice Principal, a list of the names of eleven boys whom Leslie said had teased her. In response, Mr. Cole set up meetings with each of the accused students to discuss the incidents and explain that the teasing was unacceptable. After speaking with each student, Mr. Cole directed his secretary to send the following letter to each student's parent(s) or guardian(s):

On Monday, February 2, 1998, [student's name] was referred to the office for harassing a female student by name calling and other verbal mistreatment.

We feel that a conference is needed to discuss this matter, please telephone Bohemia Manor Middle School at 410-885-2095 to arrange this conference. If we do not hear from you by Wednesday, February 4, 1998 at 4:00 p.m., your child may be suspended from school until a conference can be arranged.

Please talk to your child about this behavior. It is a goal of the school to provide the best educational opportunities for all of our students. To reach this goal we need to maintain an atmosphere conducive to learning.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at Exhibit 19. Additionally, Mr. Cole spoke with Ms. Biggs's teachers regarding the taunting and teasing. Mr. Cole informed each teacher that "if they ever hear[d] anybody saying any harassing things to Leslie to send that kid to the office immediately." Defendant's Motion, Exhibit 17 at E.271.

While these corrections were underway, on February 12, 1998, Leslie's parents removed her from Bohemia Manor Middle School and home tutored her for the remainder of the school year. In the fall of 1998, Leslie was enrolled at the Elkton Christian School and repeated the seventh grade.

On April 10, 2000, Nancy Biggs and Allen Biggs, Jr., parents of Leslie Biggs, filed suit against Defendant Board of Education of Cecil County, Maryland. The Amended Complaint alleges the following three counts: (i) Count I, filed under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("the Rehabilitation Act"), (ii) Count II, filed under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("Title II of the ADA"), and (iii) Count III, filed under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. ("Title IX"). The Amended Complaint seeks damages in the amount of $300,000 on the grounds that Leslie was "denied a free appropriate public education," "suffered damages to her education performance and opportunities by having to repeat the seventh grade," and suffered emotional distress. The Amended Complaint also seeks attorney fees and costs.

On May 26, 2000, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss all counts, or in the alternative, for Summary Judgment on two counts. On February 2, 2001, the Court denied Defendant's Motion without prejudice to refiling after discovery. On February 28, 2001, the Court issued a scheduling order, and on August 13, 2001, following discovery, Defendant again filed a Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment. On February 14, 2002, the Court heard three hours of oral argument on Defendant's Motion. In preparation for the hearing, the Court submitted a list of nine questions to counsel to frame the oral argument. A copy of the list is attached hereto as Exhibit 1^*.

For the following reasons, the Court concludes that: (i) under the rationale of the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama, et al. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001), the State is immune from suit under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, (ii) the local school board is a state agency entitled to invoke the protections of Eleventh Amendment immunity, and (iii) although there is a private right of action under Title IX for student-on-student sexual harassment, Defendant Board of Education is entitled to summary judgment because the board was not "deliberately indifferent" to the taunting and teasing of Leslie Biggs.

Accordingly, the Court will, by separate Order, GRANT Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on Counts I and II, GRANT Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count III, and instruct the Clerk to CLOSE the CASE.

II Standards:

A. Motion to Dismiss:

Ordinarily, a Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) unless it appears beyond all doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which entitle it to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Labram v. Havel, 43 F.3d 918, 920 (4th Cir.1995). The liberal pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) demand only a "short and plain" statement of the claim. In evaluating such a claim, the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of fact and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-22, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969). In essence, the legal theory articulated, or even suggested, by the nonmoving party must be one that could not be the basis for a ruling in that party's favor.

B. Summary Judgment:

The Court may grant summary judgment when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.1987) (recognizing that trial judges have "an affirmative obligation" to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.). Nevertheless, in determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the Court views the facts, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir.1987).

III Discussion:

A. Title II of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims:

1. Eleventh Amendment:

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss contends that (i) under the Supreme Court's analysis in Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955 (2001), Title II of the ADA unconstitutionally attempts to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, and (ii) the Board of Education of Cecil County is a "state" agency entitled to immunity from suits brought pursuant to Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for money damages.¹ In their Opposition, Plaintiffs counter that: (i) the Garrett decision is inapplicable to Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and (ii) even if Garrett is applicable, Defendant Board of Education is not a "state" agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

For the following reasons, the Court finds that (i) under the rationale of the Supreme Court's decision in Garrett, the state is immune from suit under Title II of the ADA, and (ii) the local school board is a state agency entitled to invoke Eleventh Amendment immunity.

a. Congress did not properly abrogate the sovereign immunity of states in Title II of the ADA:

Defendant contends that the Court should extend the logic of the Supreme Court's decision in Garrett to Title II of the ADA.² In Garrett, the Supreme Court held that Congress had not properly abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity in Title I of the ADA. Although the Supreme Court's decision in Garrett was expressly limited to Title I of the ADA, the Court finds that the logic and analysis of the opinion are also applicable to Title II of the ADA.³

Under the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, "Congress may abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both unequivocally intends to do so and act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority." Id. at 365, 121 S.Ct. 955 (internal citations omitted). The first requirement is not in dispute in this case.⁴ The crux of the dispute is, therefore, whether Congress abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment...