Biggs v. Norfolk Dredging Company
Decision Date | 31 March 1966 |
Docket Number | No. 10053,10054.,10053 |
Citation | 360 F.2d 360 |
Parties | Orvner D. BIGGS, Appellant, v. NORFOLK DREDGING COMPANY, Appellee. Samuel J. CLOWERS, Appellant, v. TIDEWATER-RAYMOND-KIEWIT, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Ralph Rabinowitz, Norfolk, Va. (Sidney H. Kelsey, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellants.
Guilford D. Ware, Norfolk, Va. (Michael A. O'Brien and Baird, Crenshaw & Ware, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellee in No. 10,053.
Roy L. Sykes, Norfolk, Va. (Jett, Sykes & Berkley, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellee in No. 10,054.
Before BRYAN and BELL, Circuit Judges, and MAXWELL, District Judge.
These two appeals have a common issue: whether an employee injured aboard his employer's ship on navigable waters may, on the allegation that he is a seaman, sue his employer for damages upon the Jones Act1 or the general maritime law after deliberately obtaining compensation under Virginia's industrial statute2 or under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act3, on the allegation that he is not a seaman.
The District Court, on motions for summary judgment, dismissed the appellant-employees' separate actions at law against their respective employers (appellees) for injuries ascribed to the negligence of the employers and the unseaworthiness of the ships. Decision was grounded on estoppel of the claimants to sue by reason of their prior pursuit and acceptance of compensation. The term "compensation" is used herein as referring to the benefits provided by the State and Federal laws just mentioned. Footnotes 2 and 3 supra.
We reverse. In our judgment, each of the complaints alleges circumstances indicating prima facie that the plaintiff was in truth performing seaman's duties, and so under the doctrine of Reed v. The S. S. Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 83 S.Ct. 1349, 10 L.Ed.2d 448 (1963), entitled to prosecute maritime remedies notwithstanding prior procurement of compensation. Moreover, summary judgment was inappropriate, we think, because the supporting papers did not exclude the existence of a genuine issue on the decisive fact of whether the plaintiffs were seamen, or acting as seamen, and so possessed of general maritime or Jones Act rights and remedies.
The appellant, Orvner D. Biggs, was employed by the Norfolk Dredging Company operating a marine equipment yard along the Elizabeth River in Virginia. He was listed on the payroll records as a temporary yard helper. The company was then engaged in raising and reassemblying a pipeline submerged in the river. Several barges were ranged along the shipyard's dock to receive the pipe. Biggs, who held a Coast Guard certificate as a seaman, had on occasion handled the lines and assisted in maneuvering the barges. One end of the pipeline rested on a pontoon made fast to the dock. Alongside the pontoon in navigable waters was a derrick barge, the crane of which picked up pipe sections from the pontoon and put them in position for proper placement. In one of these movements, on July 24, 1961, a pipe section struck and injured Biggs as he worked on the derrick barge.
After the injury the employer's insurance carrier voluntarily and immediately began paying Biggs compensation in accordance with the Virginia compensation rate. When these payments stopped, Biggs retained counsel to have them resumed. A hearing was held before the Virginia Industrial Commission solely on the issue of Biggs' physical condition. It resulted in a reinstatement of compensation. Thereafter his counsel, familiar with the requisites of the Commission's jurisdiction as well as with seamen's rights and remedies, instituted the present action alleging that Biggs when hurt was working as a seaman. The Commission lacks jurisdiction, it is agreed, if the claimant's injury arose in the course of employment as a seaman. See Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Hicks, 285 U.S. 502, 513, 52 S.Ct. 450, 76 L.Ed. 903 (1932); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 218, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086 (1917).
The District Court in dismissing by summary judgment concluded that in seeking and obtaining redress by way of compensation, Biggs precluded himself from suing for relief as a seaman or as one performing a seaman's traditional work.
Samuel J. Clowers was employed by Tidewater-Raymond-Kiewit which was constructing the Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel, extending from the end of Virginia's eastern peninsula southwardly across the Bay to its southern shore. Employees were transported daily to and fro the project upon the employer's vessel, the Diane. In debarking on the morning of November 24, 1962, Clowers' foot was caught between the side of the boat and the bridge piling on which hung a rope ladder to be used in getting atop the structure. As he stepped from the deck, the vessel rose with the surge of the water and crushed his foot.
While Clowers was hired and classified as a carpenter, he performed little or no labor of that type. Principally he worked upon a large unit of equipment, known as the "monster", which placed caps upon the piles in the bridge trestle. Among its operations, the "monster" by crane lifted steel beams from barges alongside and placed them where needed. At times Clowers was engaged variously aboard these barges or on another delivering the caps. At other times he acted as a survey rodman on still another ship.
After the injury the employer's insurance carrier voluntarily and immediately began paying Clowers compensation under the Virginia statute. Thereafter Clowers obtained counsel and filed an application for benefits under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, supra, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. A hearing under the Act was necessitated by the insurance carrier's insistence that the plaintiff's sole remedy was under the State statute. The Commissioner, overruling the carrier's point, awarded, and Clowers accepted, compensation based on the Federal Act.
In his present suit Clowers alleges that he was a seaman or performing a seaman's duties. The first hearing before the District Court was on the employer's motion to dismiss because Clowers, having elected to claim compensation as a non-seaman within the Longshoremen's Act, was barred from suing for damages. After argument the judge announced he would consider the record of the proceeding under the Longshoremen's Act and, treating the motion as for summary judgment, he dismissed the action. At this time claimant's counsel produced a letter he had written to the Commissioner when he filed the claim under the Act, stating that this claim "should not in any way be construed as a waiver, a sic estoppel, or any relinquishment whatever of Samuel James Clowers' rights as a seaman under the Jones Act * * * and the General Admiralty Law. * * *" The letter was introduced in response to the Court's strictures upon the attorney's prosecuting a suit in conflict with his position before the Commissioner.
The determinative factors in Reed v. The S.S. Yaka, supra, 373 U.S. 410, 83 S.Ct. 1349 are present in each case here. The Supreme Court's ruling was this: if an employer is the permanent or pro hac vice owner of the ship on which his employee is injured while working as a longshoreman, then the employee may sue his employer under the general maritime law for damages, notwithstanding that previously the employee has received compensation.
In Yaka a longshoreman libeled the ship on which he was employed for damages for personal injuries suffered in his work aboard. The predicate of the claim was the vessel's unseaworthiness. His employer, the ship's bareboat charterer — or her owner pro hac vice — intervened to defend the suit. The defense was that as the libelant and the charterer were, respectively, employee and employer, the injured man's sole remedy was under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, supra, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. Although the opinion noted, 373 U.S. at 412, 83 S.Ct. at 1351, that "compensation liability of an employer under the Act is exclusive and in place of all other liability on his part",4 and although compensation was there available — and availed of5 — the Court held the longshoreman could still sue to vindicate his maritime rights.
"The only question", said the Court, "is whether the Longshoremen's Act prevents recovery by petitioner for Pan-Atlantic's the charterer's breach of its warranty of seaworthiness." 373 U.S. at 413, 83 S.Ct. at 1352.
Further, at 413, 83 S.Ct. at 1352:
Again, at 415, 83 S.Ct. at 1353:
"In the light of this whole body of law, statutory and decisional, only blind adherence to the superficial meaning of a statute could prompt us to ignore the fact that Pan-Atlantic was not only an employer of longshoremen but was also a bareboat charterer and operator of a ship and, as such, was charged with the traditional, absolute, and nondelegable obligation of seaworthiness which it should not be permitted to avoid."
Like reasoning applies to the instant cases. Each plaintiff now...
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