Bigley v. Unity Auto Parts, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 November 1981
• Citation: 436 A.2d 1172,496 Pa. 262
• Parties: John B. BIGLEY, Appellant, v. UNITY AUTO PARTS, INC. and The Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 1172

436 A.2d 1172

496 Pa. 262

John B. BIGLEY, Appellant, v. UNITY AUTO PARTS, INC. and The Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 5, 1981.

Decided Nov. 5, 1981.

Raymond G. Hasley, Rose, Schmidt, Dixon, Hasley, Whyte & Hardesty, Karl Alexander, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Joseph F. Grochmal, Noble R. Zuschlag, Fried, Kane, Walters & Zuschlag, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before O'BRIEN, C. J., and ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY and KAUFFMAN, JJ.

OPINION

NIX, Justice.

Appellant John Bigley was an employee of Unity Auto Parts, Inc. On September 7, 1973, Bigley was a passenger in a vehicle belonging to Unity and operated by a co-worker when it became involved in an accident. As a result of the injuries sustained, Bigley is now a quadriplegic. At the time of the accident Bigley was 21 years of age and had just graduated from Penn State University. He was married and the couple had one child. Following the accident, American Hardware Mutual Insurance Company, the workmen's compensation carrier for Unity, filed an official form of notice to the Commonwealth reporting the injury and indicating that compensation would be paid to Bigley at the rate of $62.67 weekly. The payments were not accepted by Mr. Bigley. Instead, Bigley and his wife instituted a trespass action in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County. ¹ They named as defendants Unity as well as Jeannette Auto Parts, Inc., ² Isadore Friedman ³ and Albert R. Larrabee. ⁴ Unity's liability insurance company was different from their workmen's compensation insurer.

On September 5, 1975, Bigley also filed a workmen's compensation claim petition alleging a work related injury on September 7, 1973. ⁵ That petition included a notice which stated: "This action is filed to protect my rights under the Workmen's Compensation Act within the statutory period allowed for filing claims."

In the suit in the trespass action, on August 7, 1975, the judge ruled that the injury did not occur while in the regular course of employment ⁶ and that the defense of workmen's compensation was not available to Unity. ⁷ Subsequently on March 5, 1976, the remaining parties (Bigley, Unity and Larrabee) entered into a settlement. By the terms of the settlement agreement, Bigley agreed to prosecute the claim for workmen's compensation and to use his best efforts in successfully concluding the matter. It was also agreed that the insurance companies of the defendants in the trespass action could be subrogated out of the award Bigley might receive under the Workmen's Compensation Act. § 319, 77 P.S. § 671.

On March 5, 1976, pursuant to an oral motion made by the defendants in the trespass action, the court issued a decree vacating the original order of August 7, 1975 relating to Bigley's status at the time of the accident and further decreed that the issue of whether the injury was suffered during the regular course of employment was to be preserved for disposition by the appropriate workmen's compensation authority.

For reasons not explained on this record, the claim petition was withdrawn at appellant's counsel's request. The request was made on February 25, 1977. On February 28, 1977 Referee Kenney approved the request and permitted the withdrawal. ⁸ No appeal was taken from that order. Subsequently, new counsel for Bigley filed on his behalf on October 3, 1977 a petition to reinstate his workmen's compensation claim. Unity filed an answer alleging (a) that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations; (b) that the original petition had been withdrawn and no appeal taken and was therefore res judicata; and (c) that the petition for reinstatement was untimely. The referee before whom the hearing on the petition for reinstatement was held dismissed the petition. This decision was upheld by the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board and the Commonwealth Court, 49 Pa.Cmwlth. 448, 411 A.2d 575. This Court granted review.

The Commonwealth Court was of the view that the instant appeal was controlled by that court's decision in Fox v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 33 Pa.Cmwlth. 575, 382 A.2d 494 (1978). Mr. Fox filed a claim on July 19, 1971 seeking workmen's compensation benefits as a result of an injury allegedly suffered on October 29, 1970. On June 5, 1972 during the hearing before the referee, Mr. Fox agreed to withdraw his claim petition upon the promise of the employer to pay the medical bills incurred as a result of the injury. On that date an order was entered permitting the withdrawal. Later Mr. Fox obtained counsel and appealed to the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board seeking a reversal of the Referee's order permitting the withdrawal of the claim petition. He argued that he acted without the advice of counsel and contended he was under medication at the time which vitiated his capacity to intelligently decide to withdraw the claim. The Board decided against Mr. Fox and no further appeal of that ruling was taken.

Prior to the Board's affirmance of the referee's order approving the withdrawal, Mr. Fox filed a petition for modification of award advancing the same argument that he urged before the Board. A second hearing before a referee was held and thereafter the referee dismissed the petition. The referee's dismissal was affirmed by the Board.

In Fox the Commonwealth Court upheld the Board and the referee by concluding that Section 315 of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act (Act), Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended 77 P.S. § 602 barred the requested recovery. ⁹ The Commonwealth Court reasoned "(p)etitioner's modification petition was properly treated as a claim petition in light of the withdrawal of his original claim petition." Id. at 577, 382 A.2d at 495.

The factual matrix of Fox is entirely different from that presented here. In Fox claimant's reasons for the request to vacate the order to withdraw received an administrative airing. Rather than seeking judicial review of that ruling, appellant sought to reinstate the administrative process through the guise of a "petition for modification." The Commonwealth Court in Fox properly perceived the "petition for modification" as an attempt to relitigate an abandoned claim. The abandonment of the claim did not stem from the original agreement to withdraw by the claimant but from his failure to properly pursue his contention that the agreement to withdraw was not intelligently made.

The justification of the Commonwealth Court's result in Fox is simply that the claimant, having abandoned his claim, would not be permitted to gain recovery in a fresh action which ignored the conclusive effect of the prior abandoned one. The Commonwealth Court's reliance in that case upon the bar of section 315 was merely the device used to reach a desired result. In our present consideration, we must not permit the rationale employed in Fox to obscure the real question that we must resolve.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether the withdrawal of the original claim petition precluded claimant from a further attempt to seek recovery under the Act. The reliance upon the decision in Fox and the forfeiture provision of section 315 merely obscures the question to be here decided. It is clear that the obvious purpose of section 315 is to dictate the time within which a formal claim for compensation must be made. The suggestion implied by appellee's argument that section 315 may also insure the expeditious disposition of the claim petition is neither warranted by the wording of the section itself nor the general scheme of the act. ¹⁰

If a second request for compensation had been timely made under section 315, the same issue would be presented. The rights of the parties to this lawsuit do not depend upon a fictional determination of whether the petition to reinstate should be considered a new claim which would be barred by the time constraints of section 315 or an attempt to revive the original action which would not face that impediment. To the contrary, the true question raised is whether the Act or some rule of policy precludes further consideration of the claim. The time in which the effort was commenced to revive the claim is only one possible factor to be considered in that judgment.

Where an agreement has been reached as to compensability and liability for a particular injury the Act has provided broad administrative discretion to modify, reinstate, suspend, or terminate to effectuate the purposes of the Act. See Leaseway Systems, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 53 Pa.Cmwlth. 520, 418 A.2d 796 (1980); 77 P.S. §§ 732, 772. If the withdrawal had been requested and approved in accordance with such an agreement, the administrative authority to vacate that withdrawal and enter the appropriate order upon cause shown is beyond question. DeMontis v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 29 Pa.Cmwlth. 625, 372 A.2d 950, reargued and confirmed, 34 Pa.Cmwlth. 285, 383 A.2d 259 (1977). Similarly, where an award has been entered, a corresponding set of powers have been provided in the administrative process to rectify any injustices, see Richardson v. Walsh Construction Co., 334 F.2d 234 (C.A. 3 Cir. 1964); Iacaponi v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 258 F.Supp. 880 (D.C.1966), affirmed, 3 Cir., 379 F.2d 311, certiorari denied, 389 U.S. 1054, 88 S.Ct. 802, 19 L.Ed.2d 849 or to conform the order to meet changes in circumstances. See Muenz v. Kelso Beach Imp. Association, 181 Pa.Super. 105, 124 A.2d 153 (1956); Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Dill Construction Company, 20 Pa.Cmwlth. 145, 341 A.2d 537 (1975); Airco-Speer Electronics v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 17 Pa.Cmwlth. 539, 333 A.2d 508 (1975). See generally : P.L.E. Workmen's Compensation, § 256, 53; 77 P.S. § 771 (compensation agreement or notice of compensation payable may be reviewed and modified or set aside, if it be proved that such agreement or notice of compensation payable was...