Bigs v. City of Wichita, 83,168.
Decision Date | 01 June 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 83,168.,83,168. |
Citation | 23 P.3d 855,271 Kan. 455 |
Parties | BIGS, et al., Appellees, v. CITY OF WICHITA, KANSAS, Appellant. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Sharon L. Dickgrafe, assistant city attorney, argued the cause, and Gary E. Rebenstorf, city attorney, was with her on the briefs for appellant.
David R. McClure, of Fettis & McClure, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Everett C. Fettis, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for appellees.
Rebecca S. Rice, of Topeka, was on the brief for amicus curiae Kansas Retail Liquor Dealers Association.
Ezra J. Ginzburg, assistant attorney general, was on the brief for amicus curiae Kansas Department of Revenue, Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control.
W. Robert Alderson, of Alderson, Alderson, Weiler, Conklin, Burghart & Crow, L.L.C., of Topeka, was on the brief for amicus curiae Kansas Beer Wholesalers Association.
Robert E. Duncan, II, general counsel, of Topeka, was on the brief for amicus curiae Kansas Wine and Spirits Wholesalers Association.
Sandra Jacquot and Larry Kleeman, of Topeka, were on the brief for amicus curiae League of Kansas Municipalities.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Plaintiffs (Licensees) are private clubs and drinking establishments that brought this action against the City of Wichita (City) seeking refunds of excess liquor license fees collected by the City between July 1, 1988, and November 28, 1995. The district court certified a class, denied the City's motions for summary judgment, and granted Licensees' cross-motion for summary judgment. The City appealed. The case was transferred from the Court of Appeals pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3018(c).
In ruling on the summary judgment motions, the trial court made the following findings of facts:
The City raises six issues on appeal:
1. Was the City's licensing ordinance a valid exercise of its home rule authority?
2. Were Licensees' claims barred by the volunteer rule?
3. Were Licensees' claims barred by the statute of limitations?
4. Was the class certification appropriate?
5. Were Licensees entitled to prejudgment interest?
6. Should the attorney fees be based upon the amount of the judgment rather than the amount refunded to class members?
The City first argues that the adoption of Charter Ordinance No. 105, and the subsequent resolution establishing licensing fees in excess of those contained in K.S.A. 41-2622, was a valid exercise of the City's home rule authority.
On appeal, the City states that no factual issues exist with regard to the question of home rule authority so that the issue was appropriate for summary judgment. It should be noted that the City does dispute the second sentence of the trial court's finding of fact No. 9-"By operation of law, the amendment rescinded Charter Ordinance No. 105 and the enacting Resolution of December 22, 1987 insofar as they conflicted with it." This "finding," however, actually is a conclusion of law. The City contends that the district court entered summary judgment for the wrong party as a matter of law.
The undisputed facts relevant to the question of the City's home rule authority may be briefly stated: Licensees were required to obtain a liquor license from the City and pay a license fee in order to do business. By Charter Ordinance No. 105 and accompanying resolution, which became effective in December 1987, the City exempted itself from the fee limitations in K.S.A. 41-2622, a section of the Club and Drinking Establishment Act, K.S.A. 41-2601 et seq., (Act) and set fees exceeding the statutory maximums. On July 1, 1988, amendments to K.S.A. 41-2622 went into effect. The trial court was of the opinion and the parties agree that the post-amendment statute is uniformly applicable.
In July 1995, a Sedgwick County District Court held that the City's charter ordinance fee schedule was null and void. On November 28, 1995, the City, in response to the district court's holding, passed Resolution R-95-549, which set its liquor license fees at $250, in accordance with the statutory limit.
From July 1, 1988, until November 28, 1995, Licensees paid annual liquor license fees that exceeded the $250 maximum set forth in K.S.A. 41-2622(b).
The district court reached the following conclusions of law on the question of the City's authority to charge liquor license fees in excess of those set forth in K.S.A. 41-2622:
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