Bihler v. Singer Co., 82-5439

• Decision Date: 27 June 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-5439,82-5439
• Citation: 710 F.2d 96
• Parties: 32 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 66, 72 A.L.R.Fed. 1, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,685 Robert BIHLER, Appellant, v. The SINGER COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 96

710 F.2d 96

32 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 66, 72 A.L.R.Fed. 1,

32 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,685

Robert BIHLER, Appellant, v. The SINGER COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 82-5439.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued Feb. 28, 1983.

Decided June 20, 1983.

As Amended June 27, 1983.

Francis C. Foley (argued), Foley & Gazi, P.A., Iselin, N.J., for appellant.

Peggy L. Braden (argued), Stamford, Conn., for appellee.

Before ADAMS, WEIS and BECKER, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BECKER, Circuit Judge.

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 621-634 (1976 & Supp. V 1982), provides a federal cause of action for individuals who have been discriminated against on the basis of their age. Because primary responsibility for enforcement of the ADEA rests with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), ¹ the ADEA requires that prospective plaintiffs provide the EEOC with an opportunity to resolve the dispute without recourse to litigation before proceeding on their own. To this end, section 626(d) requires:

No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the [EEOC]. Such a charge shall be filed ... within 300 days after the unlawful practice occurred.

Upon receiving such a charge, the [EEOC] shall promptly notify all persons named in such charge as prospective defendants in the action and shall promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.

Id. Sec. 626(d). ²

In this case, appellant sent his employer a letter accusing the employer of age discrimination and threatening legal action if the company failed to redress his grievance. Appellant also sent a copy of this letter to the EEOC but had no further contact with the agency prior to filing this action. The district court determined that appellant had failed to file a charge with the EEOC and therefore dismissed the complaint. Bihler v. Singer Co., No. 81-4062 (D.N.J. June 21, 1982). We will affirm.

I.

Appellant Robert Bihler began his employment with appellee Singer Company in 1941. On March 7, 1980, Singer notified Bihler that his services would not be required after March 31, 1980. Bihler did in fact leave Singer's employ on that date, although he continued to draw severance pay until January 1981.

On December 23, 1980, acting upon the advice of counsel, Bihler sent a letter to Singer alleging that his dismissal violated state and federal laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age. The letter, copies of which Bihler sent to the EEOC and the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights, stated:

The Singer Company

150 Totowa Road

Wayne, N.J. 07470

Att: Manager, Employee Relations

Re: Mr. Robert E. Bihler

Illegal Termination of Employment

Dear Sir:

As you know I joined the Singer organization in 1941 and served continuously for a period of 39 years, except for my wartime service in the Armed Forces, until notified that my services were to be terminated and I was being forced to retire.

At the time that this notification was given to me I indicated that this action was heartless, wrongful, illegal and certainly not equitable in view of my long service with the company. In a word, it constituted age discrimination in violation of the New Jersey and Federal statutes prohibiting such conduct.

I am ready, willing and able to continue my employment with Singer and I ask that remedial action be taken forthwith.

I intend to institute legal procedures if satisfactory action is not taken by Singer.

Very truly yours,

Robert E. Bihler

cc: Singer Co.

8 Stamford Forum

Stamford, Connecticut 06904

cc: Civil Rights Division

State of New Jersey

1100 Raymond Boulevard

Newark, New Jersey

cc: Office of Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission

744 Broad Street

Newark, N.J.

Bihler did not receive satisfaction from Singer; he therefore filed a complaint with the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights ³ on April 13, 1981. When that agency failed to resolve his grievance, Bihler brought this action on December 15, 1981, in the District Court for the District of New Jersey. On June 21, 1982, the district court granted Singer's motion to dismiss the complaint. ⁴ The court found that the only document that Bihler had sent to the EEOC within the 300-day period was the carbon copy of the letter addressed to Singer, ⁵ and concluded that this document did not satisfy section 626(d).

II.

As the district court correctly recognized, the charge requirement of section 626(d) serves two purposes. First, it puts the employer on notice that "a complaint has been lodged against him and gives him the opportunity to take remedial action." Bihler v. Singer Co., supra, slip op. at 3 (citing Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F.Supp. 617 (D.Kan.1973)). Second, it gives the EEOC notice of the alleged violation and an opportunity to fulfill its statutory responsibility of "seek[ing] to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion." 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(d); see H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 504, 534 ("[T]he basic purpose of the notice requirement ... is to provide the [EEOC] with sufficient information so that it may notify prospective defendants and to provide the [EEOC] with an opportunity to eliminate the alleged unlawful practices through informal methods of conciliation."). There is no question that the letter to Singer satisfied the first objective: Singer had both notice of and an opportunity to remedy Bihler's grievance. The letter may also have sufficed to notify the EEOC that Bihler believed he had been the victim of age discrimination. However, we agree with the district court that the letter did not suffice to notify the EEOC that Bihler wanted the EEOC to perform its statutory function.

In order to constitute a charge that satisfies the requirement of section 626(d), notice to the EEOC must be of a kind that would convince a reasonable person that the grievant has manifested an intent to activate the Act's machinery. ⁶ The efficient operation of the administrative agency demands such notice, for Congress certainly did not intend the Commission to squander its resources by investigating where no complaint has been filed or where the employee, on his own, has received satisfaction from the employer.

Even giving the requirement the liberal construction that is due all provisions of the ADEA, see Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525 F.2d 92 (8th Cir.1975), however, it would be difficult to conclude that the EEOC should have perceived the copy of the December 23 letter, addressed to Singer, as a request to remedy Singer's allegedly unlawful actions. ⁷ The last paragraph of the letter states that Bihler "intend[s] to institute legal procedures if satisfactory action is not taken by Singer." Especially given the fact that the letter was addressed not to the EEOC, but to Singer, we think a reasonable person would read that paragraph to mean that Bihler intended subsequently to lodge a complaint with the EEOC if Singer did not reinstate him. We therefore hold that Bihler did not file a charge within the meaning of section 626(d).

Our holding does not contravene the prevailing jurisprudence that a charge need not comply with a plethora of particular requirements. ⁸ See, e.g., House Conf.Rep. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted at 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 528, 534 (conference report on 1978 amendments to ADEA); Pirone v. Home Insurance Co., 507 F.Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (letter to senator forwarded to Secretary of Labor sufficient to satisfy requirement); Burgett v. Cudahy Co., supra, 361 F.Supp. at 621 ("the notice is not required to meet any formal specifications"). Thus we do not suggest that the requirement of section 626(d) can never be satisfied by sending the EEOC a copy of a letter addressed to an alleged violator. Nor do we suggest that a letter addressed directly to the EEOC and stating that the complainant intends to institute legal proceedings if his employer does not redress his grievance would not constitute compliance with that requirement. We hold only that the combination of circumstances here did not sufficiently inform the EEOC whether it was "to investigate immediately or to await further communication from the plaintiff before investigation." Bihler v. Singer Co., supra, slip op. at 4.

The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

WEIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

In its original form, the ADEA required that an aggrieved party give the Secretary "notice of an intent to file" a civil action. When it became apparent that this prerequisite was depriving too many parties of the opportunity to litigate their cases on the merits, Congress amended the statute in 1978 to make the filing requirement less demanding. In place of the "intent to sue" requirement, that legislation substituted a directive that "[n]o civil action may be commenced ... until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Secretary." 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(d). Because the majority gives too formalistic an application to the "charge" requirement, I dissent.

The main purpose of the charge provision is to give sufficient information to the EEOC so that it may notify prospective defendants and attempt to eliminate an unlawful practice through conciliation and persuasion. Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 283 (8th Cir.1983). The written notice to the agency should (1) describe the alleged discriminatory action, and (2) identify the offending party. Id. (quoting H.Conf.Rep. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 528, 534). On receipt of this information, the agency is to notify the accused party of the charge and begin the conciliation process. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(d)...