Bijou v. Young-Battle
| Decision Date | 30 April 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 182, September Term, 2007.,182, September Term, 2007. |
| Citation | 185 Md. App. 268,969 A.2d 1034 |
| Parties | Leila BIJOU, et al. v. Adrienne YOUNG-BATTLE. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Richard R. Schimel (Budow & Schimel, on the brief), Bethesda, for Appellant.
Barnaby W. Zall, Rockville (Roger E. Middleton, Bowie, and T.N. Nokware Adesegun, Snellville, GA, on the brief), for Appellee.
Panel: JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR., Judge of the Court of Appeals (specially assigned), BARBERA,* and JAMES A. KENNEY, III, (retired, specially assigned), JJ.
JAMES A. KENNEY, III, Judge (retired, specially assigned).
Described by appellants as a "procedural hot potato," this appeal directs our focus to the 1998 Committee note to Maryland Rule 2-341(b) and a post-verdict motion filed in this Court for leave to amend the ad damnum clause to reflect the damages awarded by a jury. Appellee, Adrienne Young-Battle ("Young-Battle"), sued appellants, Leila Bijou and Michael Bijou ("the Bijous"), in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, to recover damages for injuries she sustained during a confrontation with the Bijous' labrador retriever. A jury awarded Young-Battle damages that exceeded the amount requested in the Complaint. After entry of the judgment in the amount of the jury award, and the denial of their post-trial motions, the Bijous appealed to this Court. With that appeal pending, Young-Battle filed a motion, in this Court, requesting leave to amend the ad damnum clause of her Complaint to reflect the jury award. This Court, in an unreported opinion, remanded the case to the circuit court to explain the basis for its denial of the post trial motions and to consider whether Young-Battle's motion to amend was timely. The circuit court found the motion timely, and this appeal followed. Appellants present the following question for our review:
Is a trial court obliged to reduce a verdict which exceeds the amount claimed in the ad damnum clause of the Complaint, when the Plaintiff fails to amend that clause pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-341(b) prior to the entry of judgment?
For the following reasons, we shall affirm the judgment against appellants for $250,000.00, subject to a release of the excess above $250,000.00 being filed in this Court.
On May 3, 2002, the Bijous' dog bit Young-Battle's hand while she was attempting to drive the dog from her property. When the dog had come onto Young-Battle's property on several prior occasions, she had successfully driven the dog away without incident. Young-Battle filed a complaint against the Bijous on March 4, 2003, seeking compensatory damages in the amount of $250,000.00, plus interest and costs.
The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bijous on January 28, 2004. Young-Battle filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, requesting "the [c]ourt to provide a basis for [its] decision, including any findings of fact and conclusions of law." The court denied Young-Battle's motion, and Young-Battle appealed to this Court. In an unreported opinion, a panel reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.1
On remand, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Young-Battle in the amount of $504,480.00. The Verdict Sheet reads as follows:
VERDICT SHEET
1. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that [the Bijous] were negligent on May 3, 2002 and that their negligence was the proximate cause of the injury to [Young-Battle]? YES
2. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that [Young-Battle] was negligent on May 3, 2002 and that her negligence was the proximate cause of the injury to [Young-Battle]? NO
3. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that [Young-Battle] assumed the risk of injury on May 3, 2002? NO
4. What damages, if any, do you award to [ ] Young-Battle for:
a) medical expenses $ 27,100
b) Loss of earnings, and earnings incurred in
the past $ 27,380
c) Loss of earnings or earning capacity reasonably
probable to be expected in the future $311,000
d) Non-economic damages sustained in the
past and reasonably probably to be sustained
in the future. All damages which you may
find for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical
impairment, disfigurement, loss of consortium
or other non-pecuniary injuries are
noneconomic damages. $139,000
Total $450,0002
The Bijous filed a motion for a new trial or in the alternative a remittitur, in which they asserted that the judgment should be remitted to $250,000.00, the amount Young-Battle requested in the ad damnum clause of her Complaint.3 The circuit court denied the motions, and the Bijous appealed on December 20, 2005. Five months later, on May 22, 2006, Young-Battle filed a motion in this Court for leave to amend her Complaint to conform the ad damnum clause to the damages awarded by the jury.
In an unreported opinion, the panel remanded the case to the circuit court for "(1) articulation of its ruling on [the Bijous'] motion for a new trial or remittitur; (2) consideration of whether [Young-Battle's] motion to amend [was] timely; and (3) modification of the verdict to reflect damages for past medical expenses of $4,168.56."4 The panel explained that "the [circuit] court did not articulate a reason for its denial of [the Bijous'] motions," and, therefore, it was "not possible for [it] to discern an appropriate exercise of discretion." Bijou II, slip op. at 10. The Court of Appeals denied the Bijous' petition for certiorari.5
On remand, the circuit court, following a hearing, issued a written opinion explaining that it had denied the motion for a new trial or remittitur because it "did not find the amount of the jury verdict excessive or grossly excessive and the verdict did not shock [its] conscience." The court reasoned that "[Young-Battle's] job as a graphics artist involved fine motor movements of the hand which was mangled by this incident," and "the compensation determined by the jury to be appropriate in this circumstance did not appear to the [c]ourt to be excessive in light of the evidence of permanent impairment in this case."
The circuit court also found that Young-Battle's motion to amend her Complaint was timely because "[Maryland] Rule 2-341(b), as amended in 1998, permits the filing of a motion to amend a complaint to increase an ad damnum clause to conform to a jury verdict," and that "[t]here [i]s no requirement that the motion to amend be filed prior to the [c]ourt's consideration of the Motion for a New Trial or Remittitur." According to the court:
Amendment of pleadings under Rule 2-341(b) may be made only with leave of court. It is the trial court's discretion, in the first instance, which determines whether such leave may be granted. The standard for review of such a request is whether the failure to amend or the amendment itself would prejudice the defendant, which, in the [c]ourt's view, means that the defendant would have been hindered in presenting a defense. After close observation of the trial, and after consideration of the material presented to the [c]ourt following the trial, the [c]ourt believes that [the Bijous] were not prejudiced by the lack of an amended ad damnum clause[ ] because the defense presented would have been the same no matter what the ad damnum had claimed.
The Bijous assert that the circuit court was required to grant their motion for remittitur because Young-Battle failed to make a motion to amend the ad damnum to conform to the jury verdict before the circuit court entered final judgment. They argue, citing Harris v. Jaffray, 3 Har. & J. 543 (1815), that "[i]t has long been the law of this State that if a plaintiff recovers a verdict in excess of the damages set forth in a Complaint, a remittitur by the trial court is proper." They also argue that Rule 2-341(b) does not apply to the appellate courts, and this Court does not have the authority to entertain a motion to amend the ad damnum.
Young-Battle argues that neither Rule 2-341(b) nor the Committee note imposes a specific deadline for filing a motion to amend the ad damnum, and, when the judgment was challenged on appeal, she could make a motion to amend the ad damnum at the appellate level. She also argues that the circuit court, on remand, could grant the motion. Because the ad damnum does not inherently limit the power of the court to enter a judgment that exceeds it, Young-Battle contends that failure to amend the ad damnum clause does not require the trial court to grant a remittitur and reduce a verdict that exceeds the ad damnum.
The Court of Appeals considered a post-verdict motion to amend an ad damnum clause in Falcinelli v. Cardascia, 339 Md. 414, 663 A.2d 1256 (1995). In Falcinelli, plaintiff sued defendant for injuries suffered in an automobile accident, claiming damages of $100,000.00. Id. at 416, 663 A.2d 1256. The jury returned a verdict of $205,187.08 for reimbursement of medical expenses, lost wages, and noneconomic damages. No objection was made to the verdict prior to discharge of the jury. The clerk noted the verdict on the docket and entered judgment on the day that the verdict was returned. Id. at 47, 663 A.2d 1256.
Within ten days of the entry of the verdict, defendant moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for a new trial, or, in the alternative, for a remittitur. Id. In support of a remittitur, defendant argued that the verdict was excessive, stating that "[i]t may be that the Plaintiff would agree inasmuch as the figure of $100,000 was penned in her Complaint." Id.
In response to defendant's motions, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend the Complaint, together with a proposed Amended Complaint with an ad damnum of $205,187.08. Id. Defen...
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