Bilal-Edwards v. United Planning Org.

• Decision Date: 10 October 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–2220(RBW).
• Citation: 896 F.Supp.2d 88
• Parties: Salim BILAL–EDWARDS, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED PLANNING ORGANIZATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

896 F.Supp.2d 88

Salim BILAL–EDWARDS, Plaintiffs,

v.UNITED PLANNING ORGANIZATION, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 11–2220(RBW).

United States District Court,

District of Columbia.

Oct. 10, 2012.

Joseph Erwin Schuler, Jackson Lewis LLP, Reston, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, District Judge.

This case, in which the plaintiff, Salim Bilal–Edwards, filed a six-count complaint against the defendants alleging, among other things, wrongful termination, negligence, extreme and outrageous conduct, and hostile work environment,¹ is currently before the Court on the Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Counts 1, 3, 5 and 6 for Failure To State Claims upon which Relief Can Be Granted (“Defs.' Mot.”), the Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed with Counts 1, 3, 5, and 6 (“Pl.'s Mot.”),² and the Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to Defendant[s'] Motion to Dismiss Counts 1, 3, 5, and 6 [and] Plaintiff Ask for Continuance Until Appropriate Counsel Can Assist with the Case (“Pl.'s Cont. Mot.”).³ For the reasons explained below, the defendants' motion will be granted, and the plaintiff's motion will be denied as moot.⁴

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Plaintiff's Factual Allegations

Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts currently before the Court are as follows.

One of the defendants, the United Planning Organization (“UPO”), is a “human service agency” ⁵ doing business in the District of Columbia. Compl. ¶ 5. The other two defendants, DeAngelo Rorie and Andrea Thomas, are the Director of Youth Services and Chief of Staff of the UPO, respectively. Id. ¶¶ 6–7.

The plaintiff, Salim Bilal–Edwards, is a fifty-year old man who was hired in March 2009 as an Assistant Director of Youth Services at the UPO's facility located at 301 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W. Id. ¶¶ 3, 8–9. As an Assistant Director, the plaintiff was responsible for monitoring at least some of the UPO's financial activities, including ensuring that federal grant funds received by the UPO were expended properly. Id. ¶¶ 20, 22–23. The plaintiff also “developed partnerships” with other organizations within the community on behalf of the UPO. Id. ¶ 36.

The plaintiff was instructed, but refused, to breach a contract with one of the UPO's community partners and to “submit a potentially false report” to another. Id. ¶¶ 38–39, 45–46. Ms. Thomas and Mr. Rorie were “angry” and “enraged” with the plaintiff because of his refusals and complaints. Id. ¶¶ 44–46.

In the course of carrying out his various duties, the plaintiff discovered that the UPO was misusing federal grant funds, id. ¶¶ 27–28, and subsequently “informed staff that [the d]efendants could not spend federal stimulus grant dollars” inappropriately, id. ¶¶ 46–48. In addition to complaining about funding discrepancies and contracts, the plaintiff complained to Ms. Thomas about her “use of negative and derogatory names.” Id. ¶ 51. Ms. Thomas “often referred to [the p]laintiff and another male employee as ‘box lifters,’ ” and “referred to another male employee as her ‘pole dancer.’ ” Id. ¶¶ 49–50. The plaintiff further complained to the UPO's Assistant Director of Human Resources about a female employee's allegations that Ms. Thomas was sexually harassing her. Id. ¶¶ 57–59. Because of the plaintiff's complaints, Ms. Thomas increased the amount of work required of the plaintiff. Id. ¶ 61.

In December 2009, the plaintiff was transferred to UPO's 3839 Alabama Avenue, S.E. location. Id. ¶ 8. Both the UPO and Mr. Rorie were aware that the Alabama Avenue facility “had a history of sewage problems” and that “sewage was leaking” underneath the facility. Id. ¶¶ 10–11, 15. Additionally, a methane odor permeated the facility, resulting in the plaintiff and two female employees, both in their twenties, complaining to the UPO and to Mr. Rorie about the odor. Id. ¶¶ 13–14, 16. The “[p]laintiff inhaled [the] methane fumes for months,” causing him to fall ill and suffer from migraine headaches. Id. ¶ 16.

Neither the UPO nor Mr. Rorie responded to the plaintiff's complaints about the odor or his resulting illness. Id. ¶ 18. Because of the plaintiff's “complaints about the odor of methane,” id. ¶ 19, and “complaints about [Ms. Thomas's] conduct towardolder males on staff,” as well as the plaintiff's “refus[al] to comply with [the d]efendants' directives to engage in illegal reporting about the use of government funds,” id. ¶¶ 69–72, the defendants terminated the plaintiff's employment.⁶

B. Procedural History

After removing this action to this Court, the defendants filed their motion to dismiss on January 4, 2012. Because the plaintiff did not file a response within the appropriate time frame, the defendants filed a supplemental brief arguing that, in addition to the substantive arguments raised in their initial memorandum of law in support of their motion to dismiss, the plaintiff's claims should be dismissed as conceded. Defs.' Supp. Mem. at 2. The plaintiff did not immediately reply, but instead notified the Court and the defendants that his attorney “ha[d] been unresponsive to phone calls and emails,” and further noted that he would be proceeding pro se because he “lack[ed] the means to hire new [c]ounsel.” Pl.'s Jury Mot. at 1. The plaintiff eventually filed his opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss on May 14, 2012. On May 31, 2012, the plaintiff filed his motion for a continuance, which also contained additional arguments in response to the defendants' motion to dismiss. Pl.'s Cont. Mot. at 3–5. The defendants opposed the plaintiff's motion in a June 13, 2012 memorandum. Defs.' Cont. Opp'n at 1.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The defendants seek dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether a complaint has properly stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. Woodruff v. DiMario, 197 F.R.D. 191, 193 (D.D.C.2000). For a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that it contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although Rule 8(a) does not require “detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff is required to provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)), in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (omission in original). In other words, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). A complaint alleging facts which are “merely consistent with a defendant's liability ... stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion under this framework, “[t]he complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged,” Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C.Cir.1979) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), and the Court “may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint[,] and matters of which [the Court] may take judicial notice,” EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C.Cir.1997) (footnote omitted). Although the Court must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true, any conclusory allegations are not entitled to an assumption of truth, and even those allegations pleaded with factual support need only be accepted to the extent that “they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. If “the [C]ourt finds that the plaintiff [has] failed to allege all the material elements of [his] cause of action,” then the Court may dismiss the complaint without prejudice, Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 753, 761 (D.C.Cir.1997), or with prejudice, provided that the Court “determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency,” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C.Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. The Plaintiff's Motion for a Continuance

The plaintiff objects to the defendants' argument that “Counts 1, 3, 5, and 6 [should] be denied due to untimely filing by the Plaintiff,” and thus requests that the Court grant him a continuance prior to ruling on the motion to dismiss in order to allow him to obtain new counsel. Pl.'s Cont. Mot. at 1. Because the Court finds, upon considering the merits of the plaintiff's complaint and the plaintiff's briefs, see, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 296 F.3d 1135, 1143–44 (D.C.Cir.2002) (considering merits of pro se motion despite untimeliness), that the plaintiff's claims are substantively deficient, the plaintiff's motion for a continuance is hereby denied as moot.⁷

B. The Plaintiff's Wrongful Termination Claim

The plaintiff alleges that the defendants terminated his employment in retaliation for his complaints about the misappropriation of government funds, refusal to breach a contract, and complaints about the UPO's Alabama Avenue facility, Compl. ¶¶ 78–79, 83, 85, and “for insubordination,” Pl.'s Cont. Mot. at 3. The defendants...