Bill Barrett Corp. v. Lembke
Citation | 488 P.3d 390 |
Decision Date | 06 September 2018 |
Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 17CA1616 |
Court | Court of Appeals of Colorado |
Parties | BILL BARRETT CORPORATION and Bonanza Creek Energy, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, and Noble Energy, Inc., Intervenor-Appellant, v. Robert LEMBKE ; 70 Ranch L.L.C. ; South Beebe Draw Metropolitan District, f/k/a Bromley Park Metropolitan District No. 1 ; and United Water and Sanitation District, Defendants-Appellees. |
Davis Graham & Stubbs, LLP, R. Kirk Mueller, Paul D. Swanson, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants
Hogan Lovells US, LLP, Elizabeth H. Titus, Lacy G. Brown, Denver, Colorado, for Intervenor-Appellant
Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, S. Kirk Ingebretsen, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees Robert Lembke and 70 Ranch L.L.C.
Brown Dunning Walker PC, Douglas W. Brown, David C. Walker, Drew P. Fein, Denver, Colorado; Wass Campbell Rivera Johnson Velasquez LLP, Darrell G. Waas, Mikaela V. Rivera, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee South Beebe Draw Metropolitan District
Hamre Rodriguez Ostrander Dingess PC, Donald M. Ostrander, Richard F. Rodriguez, Joel M. Spector, Denver, Colorado; Wass Campbell Rivera Johnson Velasquez LLP, Darrell G. Waas, Mikaela V. Rivera, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee United Water and Sanitation District
Opinion by JUDGE WEBB
¶ 1 Plaintiffs Bill Barrett Corporation and Bonanza Creek Energy, Inc., and intervenor Noble Energy, Inc., (collectively, lessees) appeal the trial court's order denying their motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent defendant South Beebe Draw Metropolitan District (South Beebe) from taxing oil and gas that lessees produce from the mineral estate underlying an approximately 13,000-acre tract (the 70 Ranch) located in unincorporated Weld County. Defendants Robert Lembke and 70 Ranch L.L.C. (the L.L.C.) own the surface estate, where all of lessees' well heads are located.1 Lessees also appeal the court's entry of summary judgment on one of their claims.
¶ 2 We affirm the entry of summary judgment, vacate the denial of the motion for preliminary injunction, and remand for further findings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 3 On appeal, lessees raise three challenges to South Beebe's taxing authority. The trial court entered summary judgment on the first of these issues.
¶ 4 Preservation of these contentions is undisputed.
¶ 5 Lessees obtained a temporary restraining order in the Weld County District Court that prohibited the Weld County Treasurer, who had collected the disputed taxes, from disbursing the monies to South Beebe. Venue was transferred to the Adams County District Court. That court held an evidentiary hearing on lessees' motion for a preliminary injunction. Finding that lessees had not shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits, the court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction and dissolved the temporary restraining order. Later, the court entered a final judgment under C.R.C.P. 54(b) and 56(h) against lessees on their section 32-1-401 claim.
¶ 6 Lessees appealed. They requested that this court preserve the status quo by enjoining the treasurer from disbursing taxes collected to South Beebe. A motions division of this court granted the requested relief, expedited briefing, and ruled that the appeal would be decided without oral argument.
¶ 7 In 2009, Sand Hills included the 70 Ranch within its boundaries and began assessing ad valorem taxes on the oil and gas extracted from the mineral estate. Much as lessees have done in this case, they challenged the taxes levied by Sand Hills and obtained summary judgment in Weld County District Court. Both sides appealed.
¶ 8 In Bill Barrett Corp. v. Sand Hills Metropolitan District , 2016 COA 144, 411 P.3d 1086, the division agreed with the district court that when Sand Hills included the 70 Ranch, the combination of its change in purpose and its complete shift in geography constituted a material departure from its 2004 service plan under section 32-1-207(2)(a), C.R.S. 2017. Id. at ¶¶ 21, 23, 30. The division also agreed that this material modification of the existing service plan required—but Sand Hills had not obtained—approval from the Weld County BOCC. Id. at ¶ 32. For these reasons, the division held that Sand Hills lacked taxing authority after 2009. Id. at ¶ 37.
¶ 9 Following the entry of summary judgment and before the Sand Hills appeal was filed, Lembke and the L.L.C. petitioned South Beebe to include the 70 Ranch. Lessees were not notified of this action. South Beebe resolved to include the 70 Ranch, agreed to assume development and construction of the regional water infrastructure commenced by Sand Hills, and committed to provide services to the 70 Ranch. The Adams County District Court approved inclusion of the 70 Ranch into South Beebe, as required by section 32-1-401(1)(c)(I), which states that "[i]f a petition [for inclusion] is granted [by the district's board] ..., the board shall ... file [an order] with the clerk of the court, and the court shall thereupon order the property to be included in the special district." (Emphasis added.)3
¶ 10 "Preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy designed to protect a [party] from sustaining irreparable injury and to preserve the power of the district court to render a meaningful decision following a trial on the merits." Rathke v. MacFarlane , 648 P.2d 648, 651 (Colo. 1982).
¶ 11 Preliminary "injunctive relief should not be indiscriminately granted"; rather, it should be granted sparingly, cautiously, and with the trial court's full conviction of the urgent necessity for the relief. Id. at 653. Before granting relief, the trial court must find that the moving party has shown:
Id. at 653-54 (citations omitted). If the moving party fails to establish any criterion, injunctive relief is not available. Id. at 654.
¶ 12 The General Assembly enacted the Special District Act (the Act) with the intent that special districts "promote the health, safety, prosperity, security, and general welfare" of their inhabitants and of the State of Colorado. § 32-1-102(1), C.R.S. 2017; see also Sand Hills , ¶ 15 ; Todd Creek Vill. Metro. Dist. v. Valley Bank & Tr. Co ., 2013 COA 154, ¶ 37, 325 P.3d 591. Special districts are political subdivisions of the state that possess proprietary powers. Todd Creek , ¶ 38. But they possess only those powers expressly conferred on them. Sand Hills , ¶ 15.
¶ 13 Once established, a special district must conform to its service plan "so far as practicable." § 32-1-207(1). Any material modifications to the service plan must be approved by the appropriate governing authority. § 32-1-207(2)(a).
¶ 14 Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. See, e.g. , Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Equalization v. Gerganoff , 241 P.3d 932, 935 (Colo. 2010). Likewise, appellate courts review de novo the application of law to undisputed facts. See Camp Bird Colo., Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs , 215 P.3d 1277, 1281 (Colo. App. 2009). And the de novo standard applies to review of summary judgments. Rocky Mountain Expl., Inc. v. Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP , 2018 CO 54, ¶ 27, 420 P.3d 223.
¶ 15 "The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction lies within the sound discretion of the trial court." MDC Holdings, Inc. v. Town of Parker , 223 P.3d 710, 716 (Colo. 2010). Generally, the conclusion reached by the trial court will be not overturned unless it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair. Evans v. Romer , 854 P.2d 1270, 1274 (Colo. 1993). "If, however, the issue being reviewed concerns only legal, rather than factual questions, a trial court's preliminary injunction ruling is subject to de novo appellate review." State ex rel. Salazar v. Cash Now Store, Inc. , 31 P.3d 161, 164 (Colo. 2001). The same is true when the ruling rested only on stipulated facts or documentary evidence. MDC Holdings , 223 P.3d at 716.
¶ 16 On review of a preliminary injunction, the trial court's factual findings will be upheld unless they are so clearly erroneous as to find no support in the record. Phoenix Capital, Inc. v. Dowell , 176 P.3d 835, 846 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶ 17 Whether a special district's action constitutes a "material modification" of the service plan presents a question of law. Indian Mountain Corp. v. Indian Mountain Metro. Dist. , 2016 COA 118M, ¶¶ 59, 61-62, 412 P.3d 881. A court looks to the language of the service plan and gives effect to its plain and ordinary meaning. See Todd Creek , ¶¶ 10-11.
¶ 18 The standard of review as to whether material modifications were approved by the appropriate BOCC is unresolved. But in Friends of the Black Forest Regional Park, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners...
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