Billings v. Gates

• Decision Date: 09 May 1996
• Citation: 916 P.2d 291,323 Or. 167
• Parties: Jess A. BILLINGS, Respondent on Review, v. Edward L. GATES, Superintendent, Snake River Correctional Institution, Petitioner on Review. CC 94-02-26238M; CA A83424; SC S42241.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 291

916 P.2d 291

323 Or. 167

Jess A. BILLINGS, Respondent on Review, v. Edward L. GATES, Superintendent, Snake River Correctional Institution, Petitioner on Review.

CC 94-02-26238M; CA A83424; SC S42241.

Supreme Court of Oregon In Banc.

Argued and Submitted Jan. 4, 1996.

Decided May 9, 1996.

[323 Or. 168-B] Philip Schradle, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With him on the brief were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, and Kristin N. Preston, Assistant Attorney General, Salem.

Garrett A. Richardson, Multnomah Defenders, Inc., Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.

VAN HOOMISSEN, Justice.

This is a habeas corpus proceeding. See ORS 34.310 et seq. (describing habeas corpus procedures). The trial court denied plaintiff's petition as meritless. The Court of Appeals reversed. Billings v. Gates, 133 Or.App. 236, 244, 890 P.2d 995 (1995). The sole issue presented is the correct standard under Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution, ¹ for testing this petition for habeas corpus. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, but on different grounds.

Plaintiff Billings, an inmate at Snake River Correctional Institution (SRCI), petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that defendant Gates, the superintendent of SRCI, had denied him proper medical treatment. ² Plaintiff's petition alleged in part:

"The shoes the institution has [have] no arch supports, and [plaintiff] has attempted to address this problem, because any walking causes the [plaintiff] pain to the point where he cannot walk. When the Doctor did see the [plaintiff], he told him that he has high arches, will have to buy arch supports off of the commissary, that SRCI will not provide arch supports, even where the [plaintiff] is indigent and unable to pay for arch supports for his bad feet. Thus, denying the [plaintiff] proper medical treatment."

Plaintiff did not cite any authority in support of his claim. The trial court ordered defendant to show cause why the writ should not be allowed. ³

Defendant's response alleged that plaintiff is being provided "constitutionally adequate" medical care and asked that his petition be denied on the ground that it failed to state a claim for habeas corpus relief. ⁴ In a legal memorandum submitted with his response, defendant argued that the standard of care recognized in Estelle v Relying on defendant's response and on factual materials attached to that response by defendant, the trial court entered this judgment:

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) reh'g den. 429 U.S. 1066, 97 S.Ct. 798, 50 L.Ed.2d 785 (1977), ⁵ under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, ⁶ should be followed under Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution. Defendant also asserted that, if the Estelle standard were applied, plaintiff could not prevail.

"Plaintiff suffers from Pes Cavus, an exaggeration of the normal arch of the foot. Plaintiff received a Physician's Order on December 27th, 1993, allowing him to purchase arch supports with his own funds. Obviously, Plaintiff and the Institution's Health Services Unit differ with respect to whether the arch supports are medically necessary.

"To prevail on this type of claim, Plaintiff must show that the Defendant was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need. A difference of opinion as to whether the arch supports are 'medically necessary' does not establish deliberate indifference. Plaintiff chooses not to use any of the funds placed in his account for arch supports. Such is his right. Plaintiff cannot, however, in turn force [defendant] to pay for his arch supports under the circumstances found in this case. OAR 291-124-085(2) is not Constitutionally void on its face nor do the circumstances in this case involve a deprivation of a Constitutional right requiring immediate judicial attention. ORS 34.362.

"NOW THEREFORE, PLAINTIFF'S PETITION IS MERITLESS IN THAT THE RELIEF HE SEEKS IS NOT AVAILABLE UNDER A HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDING. NOW THERE [sic ], IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF'S PETITION BE, AND IT IS HEREBY, DISMISSED.

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT JUDGMENT BE, AND IT IS HEREBY, GIVEN IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT. ORS 34.370(2)(b)(A)." ⁷

In denying the petition, the trial court did not specify whether it was applying a state or federal constitutional standard, assuming that the two are different. However, from the text and context of the trial court's ruling, it is apparent that the court based its decision on a conclusion that plaintiff's petition did not meet either standard, state or federal. Plaintiff appealed. ORS 34.710. On appeal, plaintiff relied exclusively on The Court of Appeals first concluded that a summary ruling on a show cause order issued pursuant to ORS 34.370(1) and (2) must be made on the basis of the sufficiency of the habeas corpus pleadings alone. The court held that the trial court's consideration of the factual materials attached to defendant's response was error. Billings, 133 Or.App. at 239-41, 890 P.2d 995. Defendant does not seek review of that holding, and we do not address it. The court also held that plaintiff's petition adequately pleads that his claim requires immediate judicial attention and that no other timely remedy is practicably available to him. Defendant does not seek review of that holding, and we do not address it.

Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution.

The Court of Appeals then reversed, reaffirming its holding in Priest v. Cupp, 24 Or.App. 429, 545 P.2d 917, rev. den. (1976) (Priest ), that under Article I, section 16, prison inmates must

" 'be afforded such medical care in the form of diagnosis and treatment as is reasonably available under the circumstances of [their] confinement.' 24 Or.App. at 431 ." Billings, 133 Or.App. at 241, 890 P.2d 995.

The court concluded that, under a "reasonably available" standard, plaintiff's petition stated a sufficient claim for habeas corpus relief. Id. at 243, 890 P.2d 995. We allowed defendant's petition for review to consider whether the Court of Appeals applied the correct standard under Article I, section 16--an issue of first impression for this court.

Defendant argues that this court should adopt the same standard under Article I, section 16, that the United States Supreme Court recognized for an Eighth Amendment violation in Estelle. Plaintiff responds that Estelle's "deliberate indifference" standard results in convoluted and costly inquiries into the subjective intentions of prison officials. Plaintiff also argues that the Court of Appeals' "reasonably available" standard correctly focuses on the seriousness of plaintiff's medical condition and on the availability and reasonableness of potential treatment, given the conditions of his confinement.

Article I, section 16, closely parallels the Eighth Amendment. In interpreting a provision of the Oregon Constitution, however, this court is not bound by an interpretation of the United States Supreme Court relating to a parallel provision of the federal constitution. State ex rel. Juv. Dept. v. Rogers, 314 Or. 114, 118, 836 P.2d 127 (1992).

In considering state law claims, particularly claims of first impression, this court has expressed a preference for principled arguments as opposed to mere citations from other jurisdictions. State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 266-67, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983). Litigants are expected to scrutinize and expound on state constitutional provisions. Id.; see also Dept. of Trans. v. Lundberg, 312 Or. 568, 572 n. 4, 825 P.2d 641, cert. den. 506 U.S. 975, 113 S.Ct. 467, 121 L.Ed.2d 374 (1992) (because the defendants did not suggest any different analysis under the Oregon Constitution than under the United States Constitution, court would assume for purposes of the case, without deciding, that the analysis would be the same under the state constitution); State v. Mendez, 308 Or. 9, 19, 774 P.2d 1082 (1989) (refusing to consider a state constitutional claim when the party failed to raise any constitutional argument in the trial court and also failed to brief or argue any independent state constitutional theory on appeal).

In determining the proper standard of medical care that Oregon prison officials owe inmates under Article I, section 16, we address three aspects of that provision: its specific wording, the case law surrounding it, and the historical circumstances that led to its creation. See Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or. 411, 415-16, 840 P.2d 65 (1992) (stating method of analysis in interpreting Article I, section 14).

TEXT AND CONTEXT

Although the framers of the Oregon Constitution did not express what they meant by "cruel and unusual punishments," ⁸ that Throughout the nineteenth century, state and federal courts interpreted cruel and unusual punishments clauses narrowly and generally prohibited only physically torturous punishments ordered by sentencing judges. For the first half of the twentieth century, claims under Article I, section 16, focused on the duration of the sentence imposed, rather than on the conditions of confinement or alleged deprivations of other constitutional rights. ⁹ Federal courts also adhered to a hands-off policy in regard to prisoners' complaints about conditions of confinement or deprivation of rights by state and local prison officials. Two primary reasons were advanced for this policy: (1) deference to prison officials, the supposed experts in penology, and (2) principles of federalism, which vested primary responsibility for the administration of state prisons in state officials. To this day, federal courts continue to adhere to a policy of deference to a large extent. See Linda G. Hemphill, Challenging Conditions of Confinement: A State Constitutional Approach, 20 Willamette LRev 409, 413-14 (1984) (explaining federal courts' policy of deference to state prison...