Billings v. Polk
| Decision Date | 14 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-8.,05-8. |
| Citation | 441 F.3d 238 |
| Parties | Archie Lee BILLINGS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Marvin POLK, Warden of Central Prison, Raleigh, North Carolina, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: Kevin Patrick Bradley, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Steven Franklin Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, North Carolina Department of Justice, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Cynthia Katkish, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Roy
Cooper, Attorney General of North Carolina, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Before WILKINSON, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge LUTTIG wrote the opinion, in which Judge WILKINSON and Judge MICHAEL joined.
Petitioner-appellant Archie Lee Billings appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Finding no error in the district court's adjudication of Billings' claims, we affirm.
On September 12, 1995, Archie Lee Billings was indicted in North Carolina for first-degree murder, first-degree rape, first-degree kidnapping, first-degree burglary, and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, inflicting serious injury. J.A. 8-12. In May 1996, a jury convicted Billings on all counts, id. at 80-84, and, after a separate capital sentencing proceeding, recommended a death sentence, id. at 266-72, which the state court duly imposed, id. at 273-74. The facts underlying Billings' convictions and death sentence, as summarized by the Supreme Court of North Carolina on direct appeal, are as follows:
The State's evidence tended to show inter alia that Robert Jackson left his Caswell County mobile home at 1:50 a.m. on 7 July 1995 to gather and ready a herd of cows for milking. Jackson left his two children, Bobby, thirteen years old, and Amy, eleven years old, asleep in their beds. Sometime between 1:50 a.m. and 4:50 a.m., [Billings] entered the mobile home, stabbed Bobby repeatedly with a knife, and began his assault on Amy. Bobby struggled to a telephone in the kitchen and dialed 911. When emergency personnel arrived at 5:00 a.m., Bobby was found on the kitchen floor in a pool of his own blood. [Billings] had stabbed the boy some twenty-three times. Bobby identified [Billings] as the man who stabbed him and whom he had seen carry his sister out of the mobile home. It was not until some twelve hours later that Amy's body was found in a field, with her pajama bottoms around her feet and her pajama top partially torn off. Amy had died from a stab to her throat that had severed her carotid artery. An autopsy revealed that Amy had also been sexually assaulted. [Billings] worked with Jackson on the dairy farm, and both children knew him well. [Billings] was arrested by sheriff's deputies on the dairy farm the same morning the children were attacked.
On May 8, 1998, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed Billings' convictions and sentence, id. at 285-308, and on November 16, 1998, the United States Supreme Court denied Billings' petition for a writ of certiorari, Billings v. North Carolina, 525 U.S. 1005, 119 S.Ct. 519, 142 L.Ed.2d 431 (1998). On November 10, 1999, Billings filed a Motion for Appropriate Relief ("MAR") with the Superior Court of Caswell County, North Carolina. J.A. 309-14. That motion was denied, id. at 324-61, and the North Carolina Supreme Court denied Billings' petition for a writ of certiorari, id. at 362.
On March 5, 2003, Billings filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of North Carolina. Id. at 363-72. The case was subsequently transferred to the Middle District of North Carolina, id. at 373-74, which denied the petition and dismissed the action with prejudice, id. at 430. On November 7, 2005, we granted Billings' motion for a certificate of appealability. This appeal followed.
In reviewing the district court's denial of Billings' habeas petition, we review the district court's conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. Quesinberry v. Taylor, 162 F.3d 273, 276 (4th Cir.1998). Because this case comes before us on collateral review, our authority to grant relief is limited by the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), as well as by the Supreme Court's decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Under AEDPA, we may not grant habeas relief "with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim — (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under Teague, Billings may not have the benefit of any new constitutional rule of criminal procedure announced after his conviction became final.1 489 U.S. at 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060. With these standards of review in mind, we turn to the merits of Billings' claims.
On appeal, Billings raises five issues, three relating to allegations of juror misconduct, one relating to improper arguments made by the prosecutor during sentencing proceedings, and one relating to the trial court's submission of a mitigating circumstance to the jury over Billings' objection. We consider each of Billings' claims in turn.
Billings' first claim relates to juror Janie Coleman's alleged failure to answer honestly material questions on voir dire. During voir dire, defense counsel asked a panel of potential jurors, including Coleman, whether anyone "[knew] of any reason at all why [he or she] could not be a fair and impartial juror in this trial." J.A. 57. Coleman did not raise her hand in response to this question. See id. When asked a similar question by the court, Coleman expressly stated that she knew of no reason why she could not give both the state and the defendant a fair and impartial trial. Id. at 63. During a separate exchange, defense counsel Jim Tolin, who had previously represented Coleman's daughter-in-law in a domestic matter, asked Coleman whether his representation of her daughter-in-law would "cause [her] any problems." Id. at 75. Coleman responded that it would not, and, in response to Tolin's question, "What are your feelings about me?", stated that she had "no hard feelings" about him. Id. She further affirmed that she did not believe in punishing the defendant for anything Tolin might have done. Id. at 75-76. After further examining Coleman, Tolin informed the court that the defense was "content with this juror," and Coleman was accepted as juror number ten. Id. at 78-79.
In an affidavit submitted after trial, Coleman revealed several facts that she had not disclosed on voir dire. She stated that she "knew [the prosecutor] previously but not well" and that she was grateful that he had previously dropped an assault charge against her. Id. at 315. She also stated that defense counsel Tolin had heard an unemployment case of hers twenty years ago, that he had ruled against her, and that, before the trial, she would not have hired him. Id. Based on these statements from Coleman's affidavit, Billings argued before the state MAR court that his right to a fair jury trial was violated "because in voir dire, juror Janie Coleman failed to disclose that she was biased in favor of the prosecution by her gratitude toward the prosecutor for previously dropping an assault charge against her and by her animosity against one of appointed counsel for previously ruling in favor of her former employer and against her in her unemployment case." Id. at 310. The state MAR court rejected Billings' claim, concluding that the facts alleged in Coleman's affidavit, even if proven true, were insufficient to entitle Billings to relief. Id. at 326. The district court concluded that this ruling was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Id. at 396.
The district court did not err. In order to obtain a new trial based on a juror's failure to disclose information during voir dire, Billings "must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause." See McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984). Billings has not satisfied the first prong of this test. Coleman's affidavit does not, contrary to Billings' contention, establish that she failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire. Rather, it shows at most that Coleman failed to volunteer certain information when questioned about her ability to be impartial. Coleman's failure to volunteer this information does not amount to a dishonest response to the questions posed.2 The fact that Coleman was grateful to the prosecutor for dismissing charges against her does not establish that Coleman was being dishonest when she stated that she could be a fair and impartial juror. And neither the fact that Coleman believed defense counsel Tolin had ruled against her in an unemployment matter nor the fact that she would not have hired him before the trial establishes that Coleman was being dishonest when she stated that she had no hard feelings against Tolin and that his previous representation of her daughter-in-law would not affect her ability to give the defendant a fair trial. In short, other than the question about Tolin's representation of her daughter-in-law, Coleman was never asked about any previous contacts she may have had with the attorneys involved in the case, and...
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