Billings v. State

• Decision Date: 23 April 1886
• Citation: 6 N.E. 914,107 Ind. 54
• Parties: Billings v. State.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

107 Ind. 54

6 N.E. 914

Billings

v.State.¹

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 23, 1886.

Appeal from Daviess circuit court.

Baker & Padgett, for appellant.

The Attorney General, for appellee.

Elliott, J.

The information charges that the appellant forged the name of Louis C. Morgan, deceased, to an instrument purporting to be a promissory note; that the forgery was committed after his death, and was committed for the purpose of defrauding the estate of Louis C. Morgan.The objection urged against this information is that it does not aver that the forgery was committed with the intent to defraud any person.The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does not regard the estate of a decedent as a person.This intention cannot prevail.The estate of a decedent is a person in legal contemplation.“The word ‘person,”’ says Mr. Abbott, “in its legal signification, is a generic term, and includes artificial as well as natural persons.”2 Abb. Dict. 271;Douglass v. Pacific, etc., Co., 4 Cal. 304;Planters', etc., Bank v. Andrews, 8 Port.(Ala.) 404.It is said in another work that “persons are of two kinds: natural and artificial.A natural person is a human being.Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties.The latter class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law.Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.”2 Rapalje & L. LawDict. 954.Our own cases inferentially recognize the correctness of the definition given by the authors from whom we have quoted, for they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a claim against a decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the estate of the deceased person, naming him.Ginn v. Collins, 43 Ind. 271.Unless we accept this definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in cases where, as here, the forgery is committed after the death of the person whose name is forged; and this is a result to be avoided if it can be done consistent with principle.We perceive no difficulty in avoiding such a result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person.It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made, and, although natural persons as heirs, devisees, or creditors, have an interest in the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity.The interest which natural persons have in it is not complete until there has been a due administration; and one who forges the name of the decedent to an instrument purporting to be a...