Billings v. State

Decision Date14 January 1902
Citation67 P. 583,27 Wash. 288
PartiesBILLINGS v. STATE.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Appeal from superior court, Thurston county; Charles W. Hodgdon Judge.

Action by M. Billings against the state of Washington. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Allen Weir, for appellant.

W. B Stratton and Thos. M. Vance, for the State.

ANDERS J.

This action was instituted to recover from the state of Washington damages alleged to have resulted by reason of delay on the part of the commissioner of public lands in issuing to plaintiff (appellant here), a contract of sale of certain tide lands. It appears from the complaint herein that on January 7, 1897, the plaintiff made application in writing in due and regular form, to the commissioner of public lands to purchase certain described tide lands in Island county owned by the state, and subject to sale; that plaintiff's said application was duly filed in the office of the commissioner of public lands; that thereafter, and prior to the 12th day of March, 1897, the plaintiff did and performed all the acts and things necessary to entitle him to a contract of purchase of said tide land from defendant, including the payment to defendant of the part of the purchase price of the same required by law; that on March 25, 1897, and continuously thereafter until March 7, 1900, the plaintiff was entitled to have and receive from the defendant a contract of purchase of all of said tide land, which contract would have entitled this plaintiff to the possession and beneficial use of the same; that on May 16, 1897, the plaintiff filed with the commissioner of public lands, who was charged with the duty of executing and issuing contracts of sale of tide lands for the state, a written demand for a contract of sale conveying said tide lands to plaintiff; that the said commissioner then and there refused and continued to refuse until March 7, 1900, to execute and deliver to plaintiff any contract conveying to plaintiff any portion of said tide land; that by reason of such refusal the plaintiff was during said time unable to obtain possession of any portion of said land, and was denied the beneficial use thereof, although entitled thereto. The complaint also states the monthly rental value of the lands during the time plaintiff alleges he was kept out of possession by the failure to deliver the contract of sale, the amount expended by this plaintiff in this court in enforcing the execution and delivery of the contract of sale to him by the commissioner of public lands, and prays judgment for the damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of the facts and matters set forth therein. A demurrer was interposed to the complaint on the grounds: (1) That the court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the cause; and (2) that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant. The demurrer was sustained, and, the plaintiff having declined to plead further, the court entered judgment dismissing the action at the cost of plaintiff. From this judgment the plaintiff has appealed, and the decision of the court sustaining the demurrer is assigned as error.

No objection is made here to the jurisdiction of the superior court. Nor is there any controversy in regard to the facts of the case. The sole question to be determined is whether the complaint herein states a cause of action against the respondent; or, in other words, whether the state, under our statute, is liable for damages suffered by an individual by reason of the negligence or malfeasance of one of its officers occurring while engaged in the discharge of his official duty. The state constitution (article 2, § 26) ordains that 'the legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the state.' This constitutional provision was made operative by an act of the legislature approved March 20, 1895 (Sess. Laws, p. 188), the first section of which (Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 5608) provides that 'any person or corporation having any claim against the state of Washington shall have the right to begin an action against the state in the superior court of Thurston county.' And the word 'claim,' used in this section of the act of March 20, 1895, was construed by this court in Northwestern & Pacific Hypotheek Bank v. State, 18 Wash. 73, 50 P. 586, 42 L. R. A. 33, as synonymous with 'cause of action.' That action was instituted for the purpose of having a judgment awarding a lien in favor of the state against certain lands in King county decreed to be subject to a prior mortgage held by plaintiff on said lands. The superior court held, upon demurrer to the complaint, that it had no jurisdiction of the cause; but this court, on appeal, reversed the judgment, and directed the lower court to overrule the demurrer. It is conceded by the learned counsel for appellant that it is only by virtue of the statute that an action can be maintained against the state. But he earnestly insists that the state, by the act of the legislature above mentioned, entirely waived its immunity from suits in its courts, and placed itself on an equality with any individual with whom it might thereafter transact business, and that this court so interpreted the statute in the case of Northwestern & Pacific Hypotheek Bank v. State, supra. It is true that this court observed in that case that it was intended by the constitution that 'the state might be permitted to be sued in like manner as an individual, and it was left to the legislature to determine in what court such suits should be brought, and to prescribe the method of procedure.' But it must not be inferred from the language there used that the court decided, or intended to decide, that the right to maintain suits against the state by an individual is, under all circumstances, and in all cases, coextensive or coequal with the right of one individual to maintain an action against another. The only question considered and determined in that case was whether this act of March 20, 1895, conferred jurisdiction upon the superior court of Thurston county to hear and determine the matter in controversy in that particular action. The attorney general contended that the word 'claim,' as used in section 1 of the statute, meant a claim for money only, and hence there was nothing in the statute authorizing an action against the state for the equitable relief demanded by the plaintiff. This court, however, concluded that the action was warranted by the statute, and accordingly held that the objection to the jurisdiction of the court was untenable. Bearing in mind what was actually decided in that case, as well as the facts upon which the decision was based, we are unable to see how the contention of the appellant that the decision therein is decisive of the case at bar can possibly be sustained. As we have said, the only question to be determined in this case is whether the complaint states a cause of action, and that must be determined by the application of settled principles of law to the facts admitted by the demurrer. If, therefore, the state is liable to the appellant, under the law applicable to the facts stated, for the damages claimed by him, it necessarily follows that the complaint states a cause of action, and that the judgment must be reversed. But we are clearly of the opinion that the state is not legally responsible for the alleged acts of one of its officers, and that the judgment appealed from was right, and ought to be affirmed.

It is frankly conceded by counsel for appellant that the statute permitting the state to be sued did not create any liability on the part of the state which did not exist at the time...

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20 cases
  • Maziar v. Wash. State Dep't of Corr.
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • 24 March 2014
    ...dictating the proper forum for claims against the State did not create any new causes of action against the State. Billings v. State, 27 Wash. 288, 291–93, 67 P. 583 (1902). In Billings, the plaintiff had attempted to assert a negligence claim against the State pursuant to a statute which p......
  • McDevitt v. Harborview Med. Ctr.
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 14 November 2013
    ...the legislature has the constitutionally sanctioned power to alter the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Billings v. State, 27 Wash. 288, 291, 67 P. 583 (1902) (recognizing that “only by virtue of [a] statute [passed under article II, section 26] that an action can be maintaine......
  • McDevitt v. Harborview Med. Ctr.
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 27 December 2012
    ...the legislature has the constitutionally sanctioned power to alter the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Billings v. State, 27 Wash. 288, 291, 67 P. 583 (1902) (recognizing that “only by virtue of [a] statute [passed under article II, section 26] that an action can be maintaine......
  • Sandel v. State
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • 2 August 1922
    ...apply to the case of a convict who, while at work outside the prison, was injured by the negligence of state agents. In Billings v. State, 27 Wash. 288, 67 Pac. 583, it was held that a state does not consent to become responsible for the misconduct or negligence of its officers or agents, b......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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