Billingslea v. Southern Freight Inc

• Decision Date: 29 March 2010
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:09-CV-1299-ODE.
• Citation: 699 F.Supp.2d 1369
• Parties: Darrell BILLINGSLEA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffv.SOUTHERN FREIGHT, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

699 F.Supp.2d 1369

Darrell BILLINGSLEA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffv.SOUTHERN FREIGHT, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:09-CV-1299-ODE.

United States District Court,

N.D. Georgia,

Atlanta Division.

March 29, 2010.

Deirdre M. Stephens Johnson, Morgan & Morgan, P.A., Atlanta, GA, Jennifer M. Bermel, Morgan & Morgan, P.A., Memphis, TN, for Plaintiff.

Douglas Hanson Duerr, Jennifer Humphrey Keaton, Elarbee Thompson Sapp & Wilson, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.

ORDER

ORINDA D. EVANS, District Judge.

Plaintiff Darrell Billingslea (“Plaintiff”), on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks allegedly unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (“FLSA”), from his purported former employer, Southern Freight, Inc. (“Defendant”).

The case comes before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment [Doc. 22], to which Plaintiff has responded [Doc. 29] and in support of which Defendant has replied [Doc. 31]. For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

I. Background ¹

Defendant is a Florida corporation operating in Georgia and registered with the United States Department of Transportation as an interstate motor carrier [Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, Doc. 22-2, ¶ 3].² Defendant qualifies as a “motor private carrier” as defined by the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 (“MCA”) [Doc. 22-2, ¶ 4]. See generally 49 U.S.C. § 13102(15).

Defendant provided third-party transportation services at a Nestle distribution facility located in Fairburn, Georgia [Doc. 22-2, ¶ 7]. Those services included receiving international and domestic shipments of Nestle products that originated outside of the State of Georgia; Defendant was responsible for the freight in those shipments as a bailee [Doc. 22-2, ¶ 7]. The freight was intended for eventual retail sale elsewhere [Doc. 22-2, 18].

Defendant employed Plaintiff as a “yard hostler” at the Nestle distribution facility from August 2008 until November 2008, when he voluntarily resigned [Doc. 22-2, ¶ 20]. Prior to his employment, Defendant required Plaintiff to undergo a drug test and satisfy various physical requirements, consistent with standards set by the Department of Transportation [Doc. 22-2, ¶ 9]. Plaintiff satisfactorily completed the drug test and met the physical requirements [Doc. 22-2, ¶ 10]. Also, prior to his employment, Plaintiff was trained in relevant safety procedures and protocols for his position and acknowledged in writing that he received training on those procedures [Doc. 22-2, ¶ 11].

As a yard hostler at the Nestle distribution facility, Plaintiff drove a “hostler tractor,” which he connected to freight trailers in order to transport the trailers from a staging area to loading docks at the facility [Doc. 22-2, ¶ 12].³ Once Plaintiff moved a given trailer to the distribution facility loading dock, the freight in that trailer would be unloaded into the facility; afterwards, Plaintiff would use a hostler tractor to return emptied trailers to the staging area [Doc. 22-2, ¶ 13]. Nothing in the record indicates that Plaintiff ever drove a hostler tractor or any trucks on a public roadway or interstate highway, or that Defendant ever assigned Plaintiff the duty of driving any vehicles on a public roadway or interstate highway. Instead, the record indicates that Plaintiff performed all of his duties as a yard hostler on private property at the distribution facility.⁴

In addition to his core duties, Plaintiff performed various additional tasks designed to promote safety at the distribution facility. At the start of each of his shifts, Plaintiff inspected his assigned hostler tractor for any noticeable maintenance or damage issues [Doc. 22-2, ¶ 14]. If any such issues existed, he reported them to an on-site administrator and made a written report detailing the issues [Doc. 22-2, ¶ 14].

Plaintiff also inspected trucks, trailers, and freight that arrived at the distribution facility. When Plaintiff received refrigerated trucks that he was assigned to transfer, he ensured that the fuel and temperature levels of the truck remained satisfactory during the transfer [Doc. 22-2, ¶ 15]. When Plaintiff received a sealed freight trailer, he often used a bolt cutter to break the trailer's seal and opened one of the trailer's back doors before backing the trailer onto the loading dock [Doc. 22-2, ¶ 16]. After opening the back door of a given trailer, Plaintiff would assess whether the freight inside the trailer had shifted during transport or posed any danger to unloaders [Doc. 22-2, ¶ 16]. Plaintiff also inspected trailers that he transported for any noticeable damage, such as broken taillights or flat tires [Doc. 22-2, ¶ 19]. Plaintiff reported such damage to the administrative office and would then move the trailer to the maintenance area of the distribution facility yard [Doc. 22-2, ¶ 19].

When other yard hostlers backed trailers up to the distribution facility's loading dock, Plaintiff helped “spot” those trailers [Doc. 22-2, ¶ 17]. When Plaintiff backed trailers up to the loading dock, he often chocked the trailer tires to ensure that the trailer did not slide or roll unintentionally after being parked at the loading dock [Doc. 22-2, ¶ 18].

Defendant compensated Plaintiff on an hourly basis and internally classified him as exempt from the overtime compensation requirements of the FLSA, based on its interpretation of an exemption provision in the MCA [Doc. 22-2, ¶ 23]. Defendant always compensated Plaintiff at one-and-one-half times his hourly wage rate for all hours that he worked in excess of sixty hours during any single workweek [Doc. 22-2, ¶¶ 24-25]. Plaintiff recalled an instance in which his paycheck reflected fewer hours paid than he had in fact worked, but Defendant rectified that situation prior to Plaintiff's voluntary resignation [Doc. 22-2, ¶ 22].

On May 14, 2009, Plaintiff filed the instant civil action against Defendant, alleging that he and others similarly situated “routinely worked overtime hours but were not properly compensated for same” [Doc. 1, ¶ 13]. Plaintiff claims that he and others similarly situated were “entitled to receive proper payment of time and one-half their regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week,” and “[a]s a result of Defendant's intentional, willful and unlawful acts ... [he] has suffered damages [and] incurr[ed] reasonable attorneys' fees and costs” [Doc. 1, ¶¶ 13-14].

II. Summary Judgment Standard

The Court will grant summary judgment only after determining that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is not “genuine” if it is unsupported by the evidence or is created by evidence that is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Similarly, a fact is not “material” unless it is identified by the controlling substantive law as an essential element of the non-moving party's case. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted” in the summary judgment analysis. Id.

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). When the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on the merits, the moving party's initial burden is to negate an essential element of the non-moving party's case or to show that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the non-moving party's case. See Young v. City of Augusta, 59 F.3d 1160, 1170 (11th Cir.1995).

Only after the moving party meets its initial burden does any obligation on the part of the non-moving party arise. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear of Fla., Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1477 (11th Cir.1991). At that time, the non-moving party must present “significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact.” Chanel, Inc., 931 F.2d at 1477. If the non-moving party fails to do so, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir.1991).

At the summary judgment stage, all evidence and justifiable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1532 (11th Cir.1987). “ ‘[C]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.’ ” Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d at 1437 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505). But “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The Court will consider Defendant's motion with this standard of review in mind.

III. DiscussionA. The Motor Carrier Exemption to the FLSA

The FLSA establishes that,

[e]xcept as otherwise provided in [29 U.S.C. § 207], no employer [may] employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce ... or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce ... for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of

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