Billingsley v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry.

• Decision Date: 18 April 1912
• Citation: 177 Ala. 342,58 So. 433
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: BILLINGSLEY v. NASHVILLE, C. & ST. L. RY.

58 So. 433

177 Ala. 342

BILLINGSLEY v. NASHVILLE, C. & ST. L. RY.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 18, 1912

Appeal from Gadsden City Court; James A. Bilbro, Judge.

Suit by John C. Billingsley against the Nashville, Chattanooga & St Louis Railway for personal injury. Judgment for defendant and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

The facts made by the complaint are that plaintiff was a passenger on a street car, operated by the Alabama City, G. &amp A. Ry. Co., and that he was injured in a collision by a train of defendant with the street car on which he was a passenger at a grade crossing. Count 2 alleges the injuries to have been willful and wanton and intentionally caused by the defendant's servants or agents while acting within the line and scope of their employment.

The charges refused are as follows: To the plaintiff: (73) "The court charges the jury that if they are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the defendant's servants or agents were guilty of any wantonness as charged in the complaint, then the jury may assess such punitive damages against the defendant as in their sound discretion they may deem necessary to make an example of the defendant and to deter others from such conduct in the future, not exceeding the amount charged in the complaint." (75) "The court charges the jury that if they are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the defendant's servants or agents were guilty of wanton conduct as charged in the complaint then, however wanton, willful, or intentional may have been the conduct of those in charge of the street car, such conduct can afford the defendant no defense in this suit." (77) "The court charges the jury that if they are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the conduct of the servants of the defendant, while acting within the line and scope of their employment as charged in the complaint, was of such a nature as to warrant the infliction of punitive damages, then the jury may assess punitive damages against the defendant in this case."

The following charges were given for the defendant: (35) "The court charges the jury that if they find that the employés of the defendant in charge of the freight train caused the train to come to a stop within 100 feet of the street crossing, and if they further find that, while the train was standing within 100 feet of the crossing after having been so stopped, those in charge of the said train saw the street car approaching at a greater distance than 100 feet from the crossing, then those in charge of the freight train had a right to assume that those in charge of the street car would come to a full stop within 100 feet of the crossing, and not proceed until they knew the track was clear." (66) "The court charges the jury that if they find that the employés of the defendant in charge of the freight train caused the train to come to a full stop within 100 feet of the street car crossing, and if they further find that this occurred while the approaching street car was more than 100 feet from the crossing, then those in charge of the freight train had the right to assume that those in charge of the street car would come to a full stop within 100 feet of the crossing, and not proceed until they knew that the track was clear." (69) "The court charges the jury that those in charge of defendant's train had a right to presume that those in charge of the electric car would bring it to a standstill before going on the crossing, and unless it reasonably appeared that this would not be done, then the defendant would not be guilty of negligence in going on the crossing, and the verdict of the jury should be for the defendant."

Denson & Denson, of Birmingham, for appellant.

Walker & Spragins, of Huntsville, and Goodhue, Brindley & White, of Gadsden, for appellee.

ANDERSON J.

While there was a conflict in the evidence as to whether or not the plaintiff was injured in the collision, yet, if he was injured, it was at a crossing, as covered by section 5474 of the Code of 1907, and section 5476 places the burden on the defendant of acquitting itself of negligence when an injury is inflicted at the place in question. So. R. R. Co. v Smith, 163 Ala. 186, 50 So. 390; N. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace,...