Billman v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, No. 94-2605
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
Writing for the Court | Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and CUMMINGS and BAUER; POSNER |
Citation | 56 F.3d 785 |
Docket Number | No. 94-2605 |
Decision Date | 05 June 1995 |
Parties | Jason BILLMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
Page 785
v.
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Seventh Circuit.
Decided June 5, 1995.
Page 787
Allen E. Shoenberger, Jean-Claude Mazzola, Law Student (argued), Loyola University School of Law, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff-appellant Jason Billman.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., David L. Steiner (argued), Office of Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, IN, for defendant-appellee Indiana Dept. of Corrections.
David L. Steiner, Deputy Atty. Gen., Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Office of Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, IN, for defendants-appellees H. Christian Debruyn, Commission, Charles B. Miller, Superintendent, Mr. Love, Unit Team Manager, Unknown Correctional Officers.
Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and CUMMINGS and BAUER, Circuit Judges.
POSNER, Chief Judge.
Jason Billman, an inmate of an Indiana state prison, attempted to bring suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against the prison system, prison officials, and guards, seeking damages for the infliction upon him of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the principles of which have been held to bind the states by virtue of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He asked for leave to file his complaint in forma pauperis. The district court denied leave, and dismissed the suit with prejudice, on the ground that the suit was frivolous. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). This ruling was, at the very least, a technical error. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992), all that section 1915(d) authorizes the district court to do if it determines that the suit is frivolous is to deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The plaintiff can then try to scrape together the funds required for filing a paid suit, and if he succeeds, and refiles the suit, the question of dismissal on the pleadings will be evaluated under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The judge's error was substantial and not merely technical if the suit was not frivolous; and although the Supreme Court has ruled that the standard of appellate review of a determination of frivolousness under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d) is the deferential "abuse of discretion" standard, Denton v. Hernandez, supra, 504 U.S. at 34, 112 S.Ct. at 1734, this cannot be understood entirely literally. En route to determining that a claim is frivolous, the district court must determine whether it is legally insufficient, an issue purely of law on which appellate review is plenary. See, e.g., Johnson v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 107 (1st Cir.1991); cf. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982). Where discretion in a meaningful sense enters is where--and this is also involved in this case--the district court, having decided that the complaint is legally insufficient, also decides that the suit is so hopeless that the plaintiff should be prevented from trying to save it by amending the complaint. Denton v. Hernandez,
Page 788
supra, 504 U.S. at 31-35, 112 S.Ct. at 1733-34; DeTomaso v. McGinnis, 970 F.2d 211, 213-14 (7th Cir.1992); Smith-Bey v. Hospital Administrator, 841 F.2d 751, 758 (7th Cir.1988). For that is the practical effect of denying leave to file suit in forma pauperis, unless the plaintiff can find the money to file a paid suit.The complaint, drafted by inmate Billman without assistance of counsel, lists five defendants. One is the Indiana Department of Corrections. Three are named individuals; they are the head of that department, the warden of Billman's prison, and a "unit team manager" in the prison. The fifth defendant is an "unknown correctional complex officer." The complaint alleges that Billman was raped by his cellmate, Darrell Crabtree; that "prison officials and guards did not properly protect ... Billman even though they knew from prior conduct of Darrell Crabtree of his propensity to rape other inmates"; at no time did they tell Billman "about his roommates [i.e., about Crabtree's] prior conduct [in] raping other inmates at other prisons"; they did nothing "to help Billman when [the rape] was going on inside the cell house"; having been told after the rape that "he had to take a[n] AIDS test because Crabtree had been diagnosed as having the AIDS virus and Billman may have contracted the virus from Crabtree, ... Billman has to live with [being] test[ed] every 90 days to see if the virus has been transmitted to the victim"; "Billman has had to go to a psychological group because of the rape and the fear of having AIDS virus"; and "the prison officials did a report on Crabtree and found he had did this to Billman [i.e., raped him] and they did nothing but transfer Crabtree to another prison." The complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
The complaint is the entire record of the case and we must therefore assume that the facts alleged in it--which are in no wise fantastic or unbelievable--are true. Fairly construed, with proper allowance for the fact that Billman is not a lawyer, the complaint alleges that employees of the prison system, knowing that Crabtree had a history of raping his cellmates and was HIV-positive, nevertheless placed Billman in the same cell without warning him of the danger he faced, and that they did nothing to interrupt the rape while it was in progress. We take it that Billman did not contract HIV. He would know by now (in fact within no more than six months after the rape), since he was being continually tested. But the fear caused by the rape itself, and the additional fear of contracting HIV until...
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