Bills v. State
| Decision Date | 01 May 1918 |
| Docket Number | No. 23345.,23345. |
| Citation | 119 N.E. 465,187 Ind. 721 |
| Parties | BILLS v. STATE. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Johnson County; Wm. E. Deupree, Judge.
Floyd J. Bills was convicted of seduction, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Walter J. Nieble, of Edinburg, and Wm. Featherngill and Ivory J. Drybread, both of Franklin, for appellant. Ele Stansbury, of Indianapolis, Elmer E. Hastings, of Washington, Ind., and Dale F. Stansbury, of Indianapolis, for the State.
Appellant was convicted of the crime of seduction as defined by section 2354, Burns 1914. By that section of the statute the crime of seduction is defined as follows:
“Any male person who, under promise of marriage, shall have illicit carnal intercourse with any female of good repute for chastity, under the age of twenty-one years, shall be deemed guilty of seduction.”
[1] Appellant assigns as error: (1) That the facts stated in the affidavit do not constitute a public offense; and (2) that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a new trial. Appellant did not question the sufficiency of the affidavit by a motion to quash for any defect which was pointed out. Under previous decisions of this court he thereby waived the right to question its sufficiency by an assignment of error in this court. Robinson v. State (1912) 177 Ind. 263, 266, 97 N. E. 929;Hay v. State (1912) 178 Ind. 478, 98 N. E. 712, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 135.
[2] Under his motion for a new trial s9everal questions are presented for review. The decision of the questions presented depend on the construction to be given to the statute on which the prosecution is based. Appellant proceeded at the trial on the theory that it was necessary for the state to prove that the prosecuting witness was a girl of chaste character at the time of the alleged seduction. By evidence offered he sought to prove conduct on the part of the prosecuting witness indicating that she was not chaste, and several instructions were presented by which the court was requested to instruct the jury in accordance with appellant's theory of the law. The court refused to adopt appellant's theory, and accordingly excluded the offered evidence and refused the tendered instructions. In the admission and rejection of evidence and by its instructions the court proceeded on the theory that the question as to whether or not the prosecuting witness was in fact chaste at the time of alleged seduction was not in issue, but that the real point in issue under the statute was her reputation for chastity. There is a distinction in meaning between character and reputation. A person's character depends on the attributes which he in reality possesses, while his reputation depends upon the attributes which the people generally in the community believe him to possess. It is possible that a woman may be of good repute for chastity, when she is not, in fact, chaste. It must be presumed that the Legislature advisedly employed the words “of good repute for chastity,” instead of the words, “of chaste character,” or other words expressive of chastity as a reality. It is argued that the meaning of the word “seduce” is to draw aside from the path of virtue or rectitude, and that a woman cannot be enticed or drawn aside from the path of virtue unless she is at the time honestly pursuing such a course and is in fact virtuous. The logic of the propositions is apparent, and numerous cases are cited to support it. It must be borne in mind, however, that this prosecution is based on a statute which defines the elements of the crime with such certainty as to leave no room for construction. Under this statute, if the female is of good repute for chastity, and under 21 years of age, a male person who has carnal intercourse with her, induced by a promise of marriage, is guilty of the offense defined.
In many of the states the statutes provide that the female shall be “of previous chaste character.” Under such a statute specific acts of unchastity may be shown. Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203, 84 Am. Dec. 177; Polk v. State, 40 Ark. 482, 48 Am. Rep. 17; People v. Brewer, 27 Mich. 134.
The rule, however, is different in states having statutes similar to ours. In such states the evidence must be confined to the general reputation of the prosecuting witness for chastity; evidence of specific acts being excluded. State v. Bryan, 34 Kan. 63, 8 Pac. 260;Bowers v. State, 29 Ohio St. 542;Foley v. State, 59 N. J. Law, 1, 35 Atl. 105;Lyons v. State, 52 Ind. 426;Williams v. State ex rel., 3 Ind. App. 350, 29 N. E. 1079. In the...
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