Bills v. Va. Dep't of Educ.
| Decision Date | 02 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 6:21-cv-51 |
| Citation | 605 F.Supp.3d 744 |
| Parties | Jennifer BILLS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
Caleb Dyer, Rory Jude Bellantoni, Brain Injury Rights Group, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.
Amy Elizabeth Hensley, Sandra Snead Gregor, Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, VA, for Defendants Virginia Department of Education, James F. Lane.
David W. Hearn, Wade Travis Anderson, Sands Anderson, PC, Richmond, VA, Jason Henry Ballum, Reed Smith LLP, Richmond, VA, for Defendants Chesterfield County Public Schools, D. Mervin B. Daugherty, Ed.
David W. Hearn, Sands Anderson, PC, Richmond, VA, for Defendants Chesapeake Public Schools, Dr. Jared Cotton.
John Francis Cafferky, Joshua Herman Ontell, Michael Kwang-Min Kim, Blankingship & Keith, P.C., Fairfax, VA, for Defendants Virginia Beach City Public Schools, Alexandria City Public Schools, Loudoun County Public Schools, Amherst County Public Schools, Dr. Gregory C. Hutchings, Jr., Dr. Scott A. Ziegler, Dr. Aaron C. Spence.
This case arises out of several Virginia school boards’ decisions to institute remote learning during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiffs are the parents of five students who attend or attended public schools in the six school systems named as defendants: Alexandria, Amherst County, Chesapeake, Chesterfield County, Loudoun County, and Virginia Beach.1 (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 26–31). The complaint also names as defendants the superintendents of those school systems in their official capacities, the Virginia Department of Education, and Dr. James. F. Lane, the former statewide Superintendent of Public Instruction for Virginia, in his official capacity. (Id. at ¶¶ 25, 49–54). The complaint alleges that Defendants failed to provide students with disabilities a free appropriate public education (FAPE) as is required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) during the pandemic. Plaintiffs allege specifically that Defendants violated the IDEA and an assortment of other state and federal laws by requiring remote education for all students, including both disabled and non-disabled students, during the early stages of the pandemic. (Id. at ¶¶ 194–360).
In scattershot fashion, the complaint lists ten causes of action, including violations of:
(Id. ).
As a remedy, Plaintiffs request a declaratory judgment, an injunction, nominal damages, punitive damages, a statutory fee application, attorneys’ fees, costs, the assignment of a RICO special monitor to audit and oversee Defendants’ expenditures, and compensation in the form of an additional year of education or more for each student or a voucher to address the alleged loss of educational time. (Id. at pp. 57–60).
Defendants have moved the Court to dismiss all ten counts. (Dkt. 25, 28, 30, 36). They argue that the Court should dismiss each count in the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and/or 12(b)(6). They argue that Plaintiffs do not have Article III standing, that they have not exhausted their administrative remedies, that their claims against some defendants are barred by the 11th Amendment, and that Plaintiffs have not stated facts to support a plausible claim under several of the causes of action. (See Dkt. 26, 29, 31, 37).
The Court will dismiss the Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice. Although Plaintiffs have Article III standing, they have not adequately exhausted their administrative remedies under Counts One through Eight, as is required by the IDEA, and they have failed to state plausible claims for relief under Counts Nine and Ten. In addition, Defendants VDOE and Lane are entitled to sovereign immunity for some of the claims against them.
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enables a party to move for dismissal by challenging a court's subject matter jurisdiction. A court must dismiss a case where the court finds subject matter jurisdiction lacking. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving jurisdiction. Smith v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. , 290 F.3d 201, 205 (4th Cir. 2002). In determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, the court must evaluate the allegations in the complaint as "mere evidence," and so may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the motion challenging jurisdiction into a summary judgment motion. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. R. Co. v. United States , 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). The court should grant a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss "only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co. , 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint to determine whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim. The complaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), with all its allegations taken as true and all reasonable inferences drawn in the plaintiff's favor, King v. Rubenstein , 825 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2016). A motion to dismiss "does not, however, resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Id. at 214.
Although the complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A court need not "accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts" or "accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments."
Simmons v. United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC , 634 F.3d 754, 768 (4th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). This is not to say Rule 12(b)(6) requires "heightened fact pleading of specifics," instead the plaintiff must plead "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ().
All four motions to dismiss raise standing issues. Defendants argue that there is no redressable injury such that declaratory or injunctive relief would be warranted because none of the defendant school systems are still doing remote learning. (See Dkt. 26, 29, 31, 37).
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the judicial power of the federal courts to "cases" and "controversies," and thus, "restricts it ... to redress[ing] or prevent[ing] actual or imminently threatened injury to persons caused by private or official violations of the law." Summers v. Earth Island Inst. , 555 U.S. 488, 492, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ). "[T]o satisfy Article III's standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (1) that they have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc. , 528 U.S. 167, 180–81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (citing Lujan , 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 ).
Injunctive relief is "unavailable absent a showing of irreparable injury, a requirement that cannot be met where there is no showing of any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again." Thomas v. Salvation Army S. Terr. , 841 F.3d 632, 638 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons , 461 U.S. 95, 111, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) ). " ‘Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief ... if unaccompanied by any continuing present adverse effects.’ " Lujan , 504 U.S. at 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citing Lyons , 461 U.S. at 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660 )
Here, Plaintiffs filed the suit in October 2021, when the defendant school boards were providing only in-person instruction. Previously, in March 2021, the General Assembly passed, and Governor Northam signed into law, Senate Bill 1303, which required school boards in Virginia to offer in-person instruction. (Dkt. 29 at 9). Thus, Defendants argue that the issue is non-redressable—that even were Plaintiffs to succeed on the merits, no injunction the Court could provide could redress the injury because the school boards are all back to in-person learning. (Dkt. 26 at 6–7; Dkt. 29 at 7–10; Dkt. 31 at 24–26; Dkt. 37 at 6–8).
But the Court notes that Plaintiffs are seeking nominal damages (...
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Simpson-Vlach v. Mich. Dep't of Educ.
... ... Adams , No. 20-4128, ... 2022 WL 4352040 (2d Cir. Aug. 31, 2022), petition for ... cert. docketed , No. 22-840 (March 3, 2023); Bills v ... Va. Dep't of Educ. , 605 F.Supp.3d 744, 757 (W.D. Va ... 2022), appeal docketed , No. 22-1709 (4th Cir. July ... 6, 2022); ... ...