Bilodeau v. Maffei

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Citation: Bilodeau v. Maffei, 309 Mass. 237, 34 N.E.2d 687 (Mass. 1941)
• Decision Date: 28 May 1941
• Parties: LEO BILODEAU v. ANGELA MAFFEI, administratrix.

309 Mass. 237

34 N.E.2d 687

LEO BILODEAU v. ANGELA MAFFEI, administratrix.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk. April 8,

May 28, 1941

May 2, 1941.

Present: FIELD, C.

J., LUMMUS, QUA DOLAN, & COX, JJ.

Damages, For tort. Proximate Cause.

In an action for false imprisonment, evidence that the plaintiff was arrested as he was starting for a place where he had been promised work and was released the same morning, and that when he went to that place

"that day" he found that someone else had been employed, would not have warranted a finding that loss of the promised job was proximately connected with the defendant's wrongful conduct, and such loss could not be considered in assessing damages.

TORT, originally against James Maffei and after his death defended by the administratrix of his estate. Writ in the Superior Court dated December 5, 1933.

The action was tried before Brogna, J. T. A. Moran, for the plaintiff.

C. C. Steadman & H.

M. Dracos, for the defendant, submitted a brief.

COX, J. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $1 in this action of tort for false imprisonment. It is said in the bill of exceptions that everything necessary for their consideration is stated therein. The only recital of evidence is that of the plaintiff and is as follows: As he left his house to go to work, he was arrested and taken to court. He was released "the same morning." When he went to work "that day his job was gone." The boss had employed someone else for "that job." He had not worked at "this job as yet," and was not employed at the time of the arrest, but he had "this job to go to." He had been "promised this job at a dollar an hour by a fellow named Brown." He did not work or get work for a long time thereafter. The judge instructed the jury, subject to the plaintiff's exception, to "Pay no attention to the promised job as an element of damage," and gave as his reason for this instruction that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant the jury in finding a binding contract for a job, and that, even if there were a binding contract, this was not a proper element of damage to be considered "because this is not an action for interference with contract nor for loss of contract, it is an action for false imprisonment." He gave "further proper instructions on other elements of damages." Subject to the plaintiff's exception, he refused to instruct the jury that "If by the arrest the plaintiff failed to get work he otherwise would have obtained, he is entitled to recover for such loss," and that the "pecuniary value of time lost in consequence of the unlawful act is a proper element of damage." These are the only exceptions that have been argued by the plaintiff.

The jury, by its verdict, established liability. In an action of this character, the defendant is liable for such damages as are the direct result of his wrongful conduct, see Meagher v Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281 , 285, and damages such as the law could imply from the facts alleged and proved, may be recovered. Antokol v. Barber, 248 Mass. 393 , 395. It is an obvious consequence of an unlawful arrest that a plaintiff is deprived of some portion of his time. It is unnecessary to consider whether the plaintiff should have alleged, as special damages, the facts that could have been found from his testimony, as that evidence was received and remained in the case.

The instruction of the judge to the jury to pay no attention to the promised job as an element of damage is not erroneous, even if the reasons given are. Wheeler v. Tarullo, 237 Mass. 306 , 309 and cases cited. We are of opinion that there was no error in this instruction. The case of Brown v. Cummings, 7 Allen 507, was for assault and battery with an allegation that by reason thereof the plaintiff lost a position to which he was about to be appointed. He testified that being disabled by the assault and battery, he soon afterwards withdrew his application for the position. It was held that the evidence was too remote and should have been excluded. The court said at page 509, "We do not see how the loss of an office can be proximately connected with an assault and battery as its cause. There must be intervening events which make the connection more or less remote; and it is difficult to see how the result can happen without the addition of independent causes also. It is somewhat like the case of a merchant who should offer to prove that, in consequence of an assault and battery, he was unable to go to his store, and thereby lost the opportunity to close a particular bargain which would have been profitable." And it was pointed out that one of the intervening...