Bilsky v. Sun Insurance Office, Limited

Decision Date02 July 1935
Docket NumberNo. 23381.,23381.
Citation84 S.W.2d 171
PartiesSARAH BILSKY AND PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, A CORPORATION, (PLAINTIFFS) APPELLANTS, v. SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LIMITED, A CORPORATION, (DEFENDANT) RESPONDENT.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Audrain County. Hon. William C. Hughes, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Cullen, Fauntleroy & Edwards, Clem Storckman, Cullen Coil, Rodgers & Buffington, Wendell Berry and Williams, Nelson & English for appellants.

(1) In an action on a policy of fire insurance, the burden is upon the defendant to prove that the loss and damage claimed falls within the exception of loss by explosion. Stephens v. Fire Asso., 139 Mo. App. 369; Rossini v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. (1920) (Cal.), 188 Pac. 564; German American Ins. Co. v. Human (1908), 42 Colo. 156, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 77, 94 Pac. 27; Fire Asso. of Phila. v. Evansville Brewing Asso. (1917), 73 Fla. 904, 75 So. 196; New Hampshire F. Ins. Co. v. Rupard (1920), 187 Ky. 671, 220 S.W. 538; Hall v. American Ins. Union (Mo. App.), 27 S.W. (2d) 1076; Turner v. National Benev. Soc., 224 Mo. App. 463; Waters v. Bankers' Life Ass'n of Des Moines, 226 Mo. App. 1188; Stofer v. Dunham (Mo.), 208 S.W. 641. (2) A defense based on circumstantial evidence must form a connecting link pointing to a single conclusion and such evidence must exclude with reasonable certainty the existence of an antecedent fire. Stephens v. Fire Asso., 139 Mo. App., l.c. 379; Reynolds v. Casualty Co., 274 Mo. l.c. 96; Exchange Bank of Novinger v. Iowa State Ins. Co. (Mo. App.), 265 S.W., l.c. 856; Clement on Insurance, p. 123; Joyce on Insurance, Vol. 3, p. 2532, par. 2493; Joyce on Insurance, Vol. 3, p. 2707, par. 2771; New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Rupard (Ky.), 220 S.W., l.c. 541; State ex rel. v. Haid, 325 Mo. 107, 28 S.W. (2d) 98. (3) The burden is not sustained where the loss and damage may have resulted from either of two causes and the party having the burden of proof has not sustained same unless such party shows, with reasonable certainty, which was the proximate cause. Hamilton v. Frisco, 300 S.W. 787, 325 Mo. 107; Cregger v. City of St. Charles, 224 Mo. App. 232, 11 S.W. (2d) 750; Kerns v. Dykes, 226 Mo. App. 912, 48 S.W. (2d) 183; O'Dell v. National Lead Co. (Mo. App.), 253 S.W. 397; Weber v. Milling Co. (Mo. App.), 242 S.W. 985; Candle v. Kirkbridge, 117 Mo. App. 412; Raney v. La Chance, 96 Mo. App. 479; Smart v. Kansas City, 91 Mo. App. 586; State ex rel. Bush v. Sturgis, 281 Mo. 598, 9 A.L.R. 1315; Graefe v. St. Louis Transit Co., 224 Mo. 232, 123 S.W. 825; State ex rel. v. Haid, 325 Mo. 107, 28 S.W. (2d) 97, l.c. 102. (4) The burden of proof upon the defendant is not sustained where inference is piled on inference and the jury is left to speculation and conjecture as to the cause of the loss and damage. Swearinger v. R.R., 221 Mo. 644, 120 S.W. 773; State ex rel. v. Cox, 298 Mo. 427, 250 S.W., l.c. 551; Hamilton v. Ry. Co. (Mo.), 300 S.W. 787; Fire Asso. v. Evansville Brewing Asso. (Fla.) 75 So., l.c. 198; Rossini v. Security Mutual Fire Ins. Co. (Cal.), 189 Pac. 811; O'Connor v. Queen Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 388, 122 N.W. 1038; Hansen v. Le Mars Mutual Ins. Asso., 193 Ia. 1, 186 N.W. 468. (5) The giving of instruction 3 on behalf of the defendants constitutes reversible error in that it is not supported by the evidence, is speculative and argumentative and is a comment on the evidence and singles out items of the evidence. 22 Corpus Juris, p. 84; Glick v. R.R., 57 Mo. App. l.c. 104; Swink v. Anthony, 96 Mo. App., l.c. 426; Zumwalt v. Chicago & Ill. R.R. (Mo.), 266 S.W. 726; Henry v. Mo. Ins. Co. (Mo.), 68 S.W. (2d), l.c. 856; Burton v. Holman, 288 Mo., l.c. 82-83, 231 S.W. 630; Lohmeyer v. Cordage Co., 137 Mo. App., l.c. 628, 630, 631; Landrum v. R.R., 132 Mo. App., l.c. 721; Sturtevant v. Ford (Mo.), 288 S.W. l.c. 65-66; Disbrow v. Ice, Storage & Fuel Co., 138 Mo. App., l.c. 60. (6) Instruction 4 ignores terms of policy as to damage by fire to insured property after explosion. Cohen v. Insurance Co., 96 Mo. App., l.c. 317, 318. (7) Where the mortgage clause provided that no act or negligence of the mortgagor should invalidate the insurance as to the interest of the mortgagee, an explosive substance ignited by any means is a fire hostile to the interest of such mortgagee and the mortgagee may recover for the resulting loss and damage. Gordon v. Northwestern National Ins. Co. (Mo. App.), 77 S.W. (2d) 512; Cole v. Ins. Co., 265 Mich. 246, 251 N.W. 400; Pennsylvania Co. v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 7 Fed. Supp. 701; Hobbs v. Northern Assurance, 12 Canada Supplement 631; Kniseley v. Leathe (Mo.), 178 S.W. 453, 461. (8) The conduct of defendants' counsel in stating in his opening statement that he would prove motive and in constantly, during said trial, attempting to prove motive after such evidence had been excluded by the Court, and in arguing before the jury evidence as to motive which had been excluded by the court, constituted reversible error. Barnes v. St. Joseph, 139 Mo. App. 545; Norton v. Ry. Co., 40 Mo. 642; MacDonald & Co. v. Cash & Hainds, 45 Mo. App., l.c. 80; Haynes v. Town of Trenton, 108 Mo. 123; Baer v. Martel (Mo.), 55 S.W. (2d) 482; Trent v. Painting Co., 141 Mo. App., l.c. 452; Marble v. Walters, 19 Mo. App. 134; Brown v. Railroad Co., 66 Mo. 599; Massengale v. Rice, 94 Mo. App. 430; Warren v. Giudice (Mo. App.), 9 S.W. (2d) 541; Gibson v. Zeibig, 24 Mo. App. 65; Koch v. Hebel, 32 Mo. App. 103. (9) Testimony tending only to show an intentional fire, remote facts and circumstances relating to the movements of plaintiff and her husband, were improperly admitted, and such testimony, plus the prejudicial arguments based on such testimony, deprived plaintiffs of a fair trial. Northland v. Ross, 92 U.S., l.c. 283; Manning v. Ins. Co., 100 U.S. 693; Brauer v. U.S., 299 Fed., l.c. 13; Xenia v. Stewart, 114 U.S., l.c. 231; Turner v. Hand, 3 Wall. Jr. (C.C.) 112, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14257; Boyd v. Glucklich, 116 Fed. 131; Yaggle v. Allen, 48 N.Y. Supp. 227; The Ship Henry Ewbank, 1 Sum. 400 (U.S.), 11 Fed. Cas. No. 6376; Pawley v. Steam Gauge Co., 131 N.Y. 100, 29 N.E. 999; Smith v. Lawrence, 98 Maine 92, 56 Atl. 455; Menn. v. State (Wis.), 112 N.W. 38; Wilkinson v. Payne, 4 Tr. 468; Nations v. U.S., 52 Fed. (2d) 97. (10) Defendants' instruction (d) is erroneous in that it ignores the prima facie case made by the plaintiffs, is a comment on the evidence and presents a theory that the explosion was caused by an independent fire or source other than the one consuming the building and the contents. O'Connor v. Queen Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 388, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.), 501, 133 Am. St. Rep. 1081, 122 N.W. 1038, 1122, 17 Ann. Cas. 1118; Case v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 13 Ill. 676; Way v. Abington Mut. F. Ins. Co., 166 Mass. 67, 32 L.R.A. 608, 55 Am. St. Rep. 379, 43 N.E. 1032; Russell v. German F. Ins. Co., 100 Minn. 528, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 326, 111 N.W. 403; Ellis v. Norwich Union F. Ins. Soc., 259 Mass. 450, 156 N.E. 696; Scripture v. Lowell Mut. F. Ins. Co., 10 Cush. 356, 57 Am. Dec. 111; City of New York Ins. Co. v. Guggenheim (Tex. Civ. App.), 7 S.W. (2d) 588; Pappadakis v. Netherlands F. & L. Ins. Co., 137 Wash. 430, 49 A.L.R. 402, 242 Pac. 641; Cabbell v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co., 218 Mo. App. 31, 260 S.W. 490; Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 219 Ala. 208, 122 So. 23; Renshaw v. Mo. Ins. Co., 103 Mo. 595, 15 S.W. 945. (11) A spark is a fire, and when such agency is produced by a device or contrivance not calculated or designed to give off sparks, it is not a friendly fire, and a combustion or explosion resulting therefrom is a fire within the meaning of the term as used in a fire insurance policy. International Dictionary, (2 Ed.); Renshaw v. Ins. Co., 103 Mo. 595; Cole v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 265 Mich. 246, 251 N.W. 400; Hobbs v. Northern Assur. Co., 12 Canadian Supreme Ct. 631; Cabbell v. Milwaukee Mech. Ins. Co., 218 Mo. App. 31, 260 S.W. 490; Pappadakis v. Netherlands Fire & L. Ins. Co., 242 Pac. 641, 137 Wash. 430; O'Connor v. Queen Ins. Co., 140 Wisc. 388, 122 N.W. 1038; Way v. Abington Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 166 Mass. 67, 43 N.E. 1032, 32 L.R.A. 608; Heffron v. Ins. Co., 132 Pac. 580, 20 Atl. 598; German-American Ins. Co. v. Hyman, 42 Colo. 156, 94 Pac. 27, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 77; Trans-Atlantic F. Ins. Co. v. Dorsey, 56 Md. 70, 40 Am. Rep. 403; United etc. Ins. Co. v. Foote, 22 Ohio St. 340, 10 Am. Rep. 735; Hall v. National F. Ins. Co., 115 Tenn. 513, 112 Am. St. Rep. 870, 92 S.W. 402, 5 Ann. Cas. 777; Scully v. Bremen County Ins. Co. (Iowa), 245 N.W. 280; Curtis v. Indemnity Co., 37 S.W. (2d) 616; Rossini v. St. Paul Ins. Co. (Calif.), 188 Pac. 564; Githens v. Great Amer. Ins. Co. (Iowa), 207 N.W. 243. (12) The policy provision relating to an explosion expressly assumes a liability where fire ensues and is not limited by the condition in which the explosion leaves the building. Dows v. Faneuil Hall Ins. Co., 127 Mass. 346, 34 Am. Rep. 384; 13 A.L.R. 883, l.c. 892; 65 A.L.R. 934, l.c. 935; 56 A.L.R. 1068, l.c. 1072; Leonard v. Orient Ins. Co., 109 Fed. 286. (13) Evidence of motive or intent is not admissible for any purpose unless specially and directly pleaded. Walker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 234 Pac. 542, 114 Or. 545; Morley v. Liverpool etc. Ins. Co., 92 Mich. 590, 52 N.W. 939; National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Cannon & Byers Millinery Co. (Ky.), 255 S.W. 154; Stockwell v. Equitable Ins. Co. (Cal.), 25 Pac. (2d) 873; Perth Amboy Garage Co. v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. (N.J.), 164 Atl. 284; Vukmanovich v. State Assur. Co. (Mont.), 264 Pac. 933; Miller v. Firemans Ins. Co., 206 Mo. App. 475; Fager v. Union Assurance Co., 189 Mo. App. 464; Bennett v. National Union Ins. Co. (Mo. App.), 80 S.W. (2d), l.c. 919.

Taylor, Chasnoff & Wilson, Fry, Hollingsworth & Francis, J.H....

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