Bilyeu v. Plant

Decision Date20 September 1966
Docket NumberGen. No. 66--19
Citation220 N.E.2d 513,75 Ill.App.2d 109
PartiesEarl BILYEU, Perry Bilyeu, and Elizabeth Thomas, Plaintiffs- Appellants, v. Grace PLANT and Unknown Owners, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

John R. Sprague, Ronald A. Niemann, Belleville, for appellants.

Ralph A. Vandever, Hillsboro, for appellees.

GOLDENHERSH, Presiding Justice.

Plaintiffs, Earl Bilyeu, Perry Bilyeu, and Elizabeth Thomas, appeal from the judgment entered by the Circuit Court of Bond County, denying to plaintiffs any of the relief sought in their amended complaint.

Plaintiffs and defendant are the surviving brothers and sisters, and the only heirs, of Harry M. Bilyeu, deceased, who died on July 2, 1959.

Plaintiffs' amended complaint is in three counts. In Count I plaintiffs allege that in 1912 Harry M. Bilyeu took record title to certain described real estate, that a mortgage on said real estate was foreclosed, that the receiver for a Joint Stock Land Bank conveyed the real estate to Frank Doll and Chris Doll by deed dated July 19, 1937, and recorded on August 12, 1937; that the Dolls, and the spouse of one of them, conveyed the real estate to defendant, Grace Plant, by warranty deed dated July 30, 1937 and recorded August 12, 1937, that defendant held title to said real estate under a resulting trust for her brother, Harry M. Bilyeu, because he furnished the consideration for the conveyance with the intent that the resulting trust arise from the transaction; that since the death of Harry M. Bilyeu, and in violation of the resulting trust, she claims complete and sole ownership of the real estate, that during the entire period that defendant has held apparent record title to the real estate, the said Harry M. Bilyeu remained in possession thereof, that because of the resulting trust, the defendant's interest in the real estate is apparent and not real.

As to Count I, plaintiffs pray that the court decree that defendant held record title in trust for Harry M. Bilyeu, that the plaintiffs and defendant be decreed to be the owners of the real estate, and that defendant have no right, title or interest therein superior to that of plaintiffs.

In Count II, plaintiffs repeat many of the above allegations, and allege further that defendant abused a confidantial or fiduciary relationship, and pray that the court decree that she held title by virtue of a constructive trust.

In Count III, plaintiffs allege that Harry M. Bilyeu was in continuous, open, notorious possession of the real estate for more than 20 years, and while in such continuous, open, notorious possession, under color of title, paid taxes thereon for more than 7 years, and pray that the court decree that Harry M. Bilyeu was vested with title by virtue of such adverse possession.

The answer admits many of the allegations, denies that Harry M. Bilyeu furnished the consideration for the conveyance to defendant, denies the creation of a resulting trust, denies a fiduciary relationship or any abuse thereof, admits Harry M. Bilyeu was in possession of the real estate but states that it was not adverse to defendant, and was with her permission.

The parties stipulated that Harry M. Bilyeu acquired title to the real estate in 1912, that a mortgage on the real estate was foreclosed, that on the dates, and by means of the instruments, described in the amended complaint, it was conveyed to the Dolls, and by the Dolls to defendant, that the real estate taxes for the years 1937 through 1957 were paid by Harry M. Bilyeu, that income tax returns filed by Harry M. Bilyeu show he reported income from the real estate until his death, that in 1958, Harry M. Bilyeu paid the premium for fire and extended coverage on the house, in 1956 paid for corn insurance, and in 1957 paid for seed.

Chris Doll, called by plaintiffs, testified that Frank Doll was deceased, that he had knowledge of the subject real estate since 1912, and had known Harry M. Bilyeu since 1920, that Harry M. Bilyeu lived on the farm since at least 1920, that the total acreage of the farm occupied by Harry M. Bilyeu was 170 acres, of which 140 acres were in cultivation, that from 1920 until 1937, he and his brother were tenants on the farm, that a mortgage on the farm was foreclosed, that he and his brother, after discussion with Harry M. Bilyeu, bought the farm from the receiver for the Joint Stock Land Bank, that it was their intention, as discussed with Harry M. Bilyeu, to keep 90 acres, that Harry M. Bilyeu told the Dolls to convey the balance of the farm to defendant, that his deceased brother made the financial arrangements and he did not know whether defendant gave his brother any money, that she (the defendant) gave him no money, that after the conveyance to defendant, Harry M. Bilyeu continued to occupy the house on the farm until his death; that Harry M. Bilyeu, or his employees farmed the land, that part of it was fenced, and that Harry M. Bilyeu maintained and repaired the improvements. He and his brother were paid $2,500.00, but he had no knowledge as to where Harry M Bilyeu obtained the money. When asked whether he received any money, Mr. Doll answered, 'No, that arrangement was made at the bank.'

Guy Gillespie, Charles McClain, Henry Hollar and Florence Hollar, testified that Harry M. Bilyeu was in continuous possession of, and farmed the land, from 1920 to the time of his death.

Irving Iberg testified that since 1958, the property had been assessed for real estate taxes, in the name of defendant, that from 1937 to 1957, the land was assessed in the name of Harry M. Bilyeu.

George Clark testified that he was manager of, and had been bookeeper for, a grain elevator, that payments for grain grown on the farm were divided two-thirds to a tenant and one-third to Harry M. Bilyeu.

Charles Woolsey testified that he had known Harry M. Bilyeu since before 1920, that Harry M. Bilyeu had always lived on the farm, that he frequently worked for him, that Harry M. Bilyeu had always paid him, that once when he repaired some windstorm damage, Harry M. Bilyeu told him he was going to send the bill to the insurance company.

Ralph Christian, an insurance salesman, testified that he sold Harry M. Bilyeu fire, windstorm and extended coverage insurance on the house and barn, and that losses were payable to Harry M. Bilyeu.

Ward Reynolds testified that he was formerly County Superintendent of Highways, that he had known Harry M. Bilyeu since 1938, that he had lived on the farm continuously from that time, and that Harry M. Bilyeu had executed a release which was marked for identification, offered, and admitted in evidence. The release grants permission to a road contractor to 'deposit surplus trees and stumps' on the land. He also identified a letter written by him to Harry M. Bilyeu regarding the removal of some fences on the farm.

On cross examination, Mr. Reynolds identified a document, not in evidence, described as a dedication of a right of way for highway purposes executed in 1952 by Harry M. Bilyeu, and an easement, executed on the same date, by defendant and her husband. The easement, not in evidence, is described by the witness as pertaining to land in Section 4.

An inventory of the estate of Harry M. Bilyeu, identified, offered and admitted in evidence, lists lands in Section 3, but none in Section 4. The real estate involved in this case is described as being in Section 4.

N. B. Schaeffer testified that some time after 1953 he sold fire and other insurance to Harry M. Bilyeu covering the buildings on the farm, that the policy named defendant as owner of the property, that Harry M. Bilyeu paid the premiums, and a loss was paid to him. He stated that Harry M. Bilyeu and defendant were always friendly in the years that he knew them, that shortly before Harry M. Bilyeu's death, he was ill and unable to care for himself, and during that period lived with defendant.

Over defendant's objection, the court admitted in evidence a warranty deed dated July 28, 1937, naming defendant and her husband as grantors, and Harry M. Bilyeu, as grantee, conveying the property here involved. It was stipulated by the parties that the signature on the deed is that of defendant's husband. It is not signed by defendant, is not acknowledged, is not recorded, and there is no testimony as to when or by whom it was prepared, or in whose possession it has been since its preparation.

At the close of plaintiffs' case, defendant moved for judgment on all three counts, the court allowed the motion, and entered judgment in favor of defendant.

Plaintiffs contend that the evidence adduced made a prima...

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15 cases
  • Jackson v. Navik
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • April 2, 1976
    ... ... Bilyeu v ... Plant, 75 Ill.App.2d 109, 118--119, 220 N.E.2d 513 ...         ' By use of the phrase, 'weigh the evidence,' in this context, the ... ...
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    ...might conceivably draw differing inferences is established in In re Browning (1961), 23 Ill.2d 483, 179 N.E.2d 14; Bilyeu v. Plant (1966), 75 Ill.App.2d 109, 220 N.E.2d 513; and Kimbrough v. Parker (1951), 344 Ill.App. 483, 101 N.E.2d In Browning, a disbarment action, the court stated: "The......
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