Bimbow v. State
Decision Date | 29 August 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 2--873A187,2--873A187 |
Citation | 315 N.E.2d 738,161 Ind.App. 338 |
Parties | Richard BIMBOW, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
George A. Purvis, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., David A. Miller, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant-Appellant Richard Bimbow (Bimbow) appeals from a trial court conviction of Assault and Battery with Intent to Kill, claiming insufficiency of evidence as to specific intent, failure of proof as to sanity, and error in denying his motion to employ an additional psychiatrist of his own choosing at State expense.
We affirm.
The facts in evidence most favorable to the trial court's verdict are:
On October 27, 1971, at approximately 12:45 P.M., Bimbow walked into the Harbor Light Mission Center and demanded money from the director of the Center's Alcoholic Rehabilitation Program, Mr. Donald Diercks (Diercks). Bimbow had been a participant in the program.
Upon being informed by Diercks that he did not 'have any money coming', Bimbow's response was, 'I'm going to kill you.' Pulling a knife from his pocket, he assaulted Diercks cutting him from the left ear to the throat and stabbing him in the right arm.
After a struggle Bimbow was finally subdued by five men who were participants in the Center's program, while two other participants ran to the street and hailed a passing police car. Bimbow, still struggling, was handcuffed and placed under arrest.
At the trial on December 14, 1972, two policemen testified they observed a paring knife lying a few feet from Bimbow, the blade covered with blood, and that Bimbow was agitated and smelled of alcohol.
Diercks also identified the knife as the weapon used in the assault and Bimbow as his assailant.
Evidence presented by Bimbow indicated that he had been a patient in a mental institution for sixteen years and had been released only a few months prior to this episode. He admitted being an alcoholic and had consumed 'a couple of drinks' before going to the Center on October 27, 1971. He did recall going to the Center because he needed money to report for a job and that he got angry and hit Diercks, but did not remember having a knife. He also stated his memory of the accident was vague due to a beating he allegedly received from the five men at the Center who subdued him after his assault on Diercks.
Bimbow entered a plea of insanity and pursuant to I.C.1971, 35--5--2--2, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 9--1702 (Burns Supp.1973), the trial court appointed two psychiatrists to examine Bimbow to ascertain his sanity at the time of the commission of the crime as well as his competency to stand trial.
At the competency hearing prior to trial both psychiatrists testified that Bimbow had sufficient comprehension to understand the charges against him, the proceedings of the court, and the ability to assist his counsel in preparation of a defense. The trial court found Bimbow to be sufficiently competent to stand trial.
Also prior to trial, Bimbow filed a Motion to Appoint Additional Psychiatrists, which was subsequently overruled by the Court.
Bimbow was found guilty by the trial court of Assault and Battery with Intent to Kill and received a sentence of not less than two nor more than fourteen years.
Bimbow's subsequent Motion to Correct Errors was granted as to the issue of his sanity at the time of the alleged offense (previously the two psychiatrists had only testified as to his competency to stand trial). He again filed a Motion for Permission to Employ Medical Experts which was overruled.
At the sanity hearing of March 28, 1973, the same two court appointed psychiatrists appeared as witnesses and testified as to the sanity of Bimbow at the time of the assault on Diercks. The court found Bimbow sane at the time of the commission of the crime and guilty as charged and reinstated the sentence entered at the first trial.
ISSUE ONE.
Was the evidence insufficient to support a conviction of Assault and Battery with Intent to Kill because Bimbow was incapable of forming the specific intent to kill?
ISSUE TWO.
Is the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's determination that Bimbow was sane at the time the offense was committed and its determination that Bimbow had sufficient comprehension to stand trial?
ISSUE THREE.
Did the trial court err in overruling Bimbow's motions for the appointment and employment of additional psychiatrists and medical experts?
AS TO ISSUE ONE, Bimbow contends that the State failed to prove that he entertained a specific intent to kill due to his history of mental illness, alcoholism, his admission to drinking at the time of the offense, and the superficial injuries inflicted upon Diercks.
The State argues that the degree of intoxication at the time of the crime is a question of fact for the trial court to determine and that the severity of the inflicted wounds has no bearing upon the specific intent of the assailant to inflict those wounds.
AS TO ISSUE TWO, Bimbow contends that the State presented insufficient evidence at the two sanity hearings to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was sane.
The State argues that the issue of legal insanity is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court, and based upon the evidence presented at the two mental competency hearings, the court properly found Bimbow to be sane at the time of the offense.
AS TO ISSUE THREE, Bimbow contends that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling his motions for appointment of medical experts of his own choosing due to Bimbow's long history of mental illness and discharge from a mental hospital only a few months before the crime.
In response, the State argues that the trial court complied with the statutory requirements of I.C.1971, 35--5--2--2, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 9--1702 (Burns Supp.1973) and contends that Bimbow has failed to show how his rights were prejudiced by the court's rulings.
ISSUE ONE.
CONCLUSION--It is our opinion that there was substantial evidence of probative value that Bimbow was capable of forming the specific intent to kill necessary to support a conviction of Assault and Battery with Intent to Kill.
I.C.1971, 35--13--2--1, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 10--401a (Burns' Supp.1973), defines 'assault and battery with intent to kill' as follows:
'Assault or assault and battery with intent to kill.--Whoever with intent to kill another human being perpetrates an assault or assault and battery upon the other human being, shall upon conviction be imprisoned in the state prison for not less than two (2) nor more than fourteen (14) years.'
Bimbow, recognizing his unfortunate affliction, maintains he was intoxicated to such an extent that he was incapable of forming a specific intent to kill Diercks.
Intoxication may be, it is true, a defense to a crime involving specific intent, but only when the accused is so intoxicated as to render him incapable of forming the required specific intent. Preston v. State (1972), Ind., 287 N.E.2d 347; Storie v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 301, 258 N.E.2d 849.
In Davis v. State (1968), 249 Ind. 373, 232 N.E.2d 867, the rule was stated by Chief Justice Arterburn to be:
(emphasis added) 249 Ind. at 376--377, 232 N.E.2d at 869. See also Parsons v. State (1973), Ind.App., 304 N.E.2d 802; Emler v. State (1972), Ind., 286 N.E.2d 408; Daniels v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 376, 274 N.E.2d 702; Buckley v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 621, 261 N.E.2d 854; New v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 307, 259 N.E.2d 696; Day v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 399, 241 N.E.2d 357.
So the degree of intoxication becomes important and the degree of intoxication is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact. Mattingly v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 632, 142 N.E.2d 607 speaks directly to this point:
(emphasis supplied)
236 Ind. at 636--637, 142 N.E.2d at 609. See also, Cotton v. State (1965), 247 Ind. 56, 211 N.E.2d 158; Eastin v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 101, 117 N.E.2d 124.
The only evidence of Bimbow's intoxication was his testimony in which he stated that he had 'a couple of drinks' before going to the Center and had alcohol on his breath.
It can hardly be said that these two statements evinced such a state of intoxication as would render Bimbow incapable of specifically intending to kill Diercks.
Interestingly, he did recall that he went to the Center to get money to report for a job and remembered he got angry and hit Diercks.
Bimbow's history of mental illness and sixteen year incarceration in a mental institution were additional factors to be weighed by the trial court in determining the existence of specific intent:
Arnett v. State (1969), 251 Ind. 685, 689, 244 N.E.2d 912, 914.
See also, Marx v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 455, 141 N.E.2d 126.
Bimbow's own testimony, the testimony of the two psychiatrists, and the circumstances surrounding the attack on...
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