Binderup v. Holder
| Decision Date | 25 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 13-cv-06750 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | DANIEL BINDERUP, Plaintiff v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General of the United States; and B. TODD JONES, Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Defendants |
APPEARANCES:
ALAN GURA, ESQUIRE
DOUGLAS T. GOULD, ESQUIRE
On Behalf of Plaintiff
Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice
ZANE DAVID MEMEGER, ESQUIRE
United States Attorney
ANNETTA FOSTER GIVHAN, ESQUIRE
Assistant United States Attorney
On Behalf of Defendants
OPINIONSUMMARY OF DECISION............................................ 3
JURISDICTION................................................... 6
VENUE.......................................................... 6
PROCEDURAL HISTORY............................................. 6
STANDARD OF REVIEW............................................. 9
FACTS......................................................... 11
Parties.................................................... 11
Facts Underlying Plaintiff's Claims ........................ 12
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES.................................... 14
DISCUSSION.................................................... 15
Plaintiff's Statutory Claim (Count One) .................... 15
"Punishable by".......................................... 16
Rule of Lenity........................................... 26
Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance..................... 28
Plaintiff's Constitutional Claim (Count Two) ............... 34
Barton......................................... 45
Dutton......................................... 51
The Barton Framework Controls........................ 55
Analysis of As-Applied Challenge......................... 58
No History of Violence............................... 58
Not a Statutory Rapist............................... 65
Defense Exhibits......................................... 72
CONCLUSION.................................................... 84
This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment filed February 20, 2014 ("Defendants' Motion"), and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed March 10, 2014 ("Plaintiff's Motion").
For the reasons expressed below, I grant Defendants' Motion in part, dismiss it as moot in part, and deny it in part. I grant Plaintiff's Motion in part and deny it in part. I grant summary judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff on Count One of the Complaint filed November 21, 2013. I grant summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants on Count Two.
Plaintiff Daniel Binderup brings this federal civil rights action pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, against defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General of the United States, and defendant B. Todd Jones, Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.
In 1998, plaintiff pled guilty to one count of Corruption of minors in violation of section 6301 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301. Under Pennsylvania law, Corruption of minors is classified as a misdemeanor of the first degree. As such, it is punishable by aterm of imprisonment of not more than five years. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 106, and 6301.
Under federal criminal law, it is a crime for a person "who has been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" to, among other things, "possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).1 This is colloquially referred to as the federal "felon-in-possession" offense.2
In Count One of his Complaint, plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief barring defendants from enforcing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) against him because his prior Pennsylvania state conviction does not fall within the scope of § 922(g)(1)'s prohibition.
Because, as discussed further below, plaintiff was convicted of an offense "punishable by" that is, subject to a maximum possible penalty of five years imprisonment, he is subject to § 922(g)(1)'s prohibition notwithstanding the fact that Pennsylvania law labels Corruption of minors as a misdemeanor. Accordingly, I grant Defendants' Motion, deny Plaintiff's Motion, and enter summary judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff on the statutory claim in Count One. Therefore, I dismiss Defendants' Motion as moot to the extent it seeks to dismiss Count One.
In Count Two of his Complaint, plaintiff seeks a declaration that, as applied to him,3 § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and, as in Count One, injunctive relief barring defendants from enforcing § 922(g)(1) against plaintiff.
As further discussed below, plaintiff distinguishes himself from those individuals traditionally disarmed as the result of prior criminal conduct and demonstrates that he posesno greater threat of future violent criminal activity than the average law-abiding citizen. Therefore, he prevails on his as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) on Second-Amendment grounds under the framework for such claims set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011).
Accordingly, I grant Plaintiff's Motion, deny Defendants' Motion, and enter summary judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff on the constitutional claim in Count Two.
This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because plaintiff's claims each present a substantial federal question.
Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(B) and (C) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, and plaintiff resides, in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, which located within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 118, 1391.
Plaintiff initiated this federal civil-rights declaratory action by filing his Complaint on November 21, 2013.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment was filed February 20, 2014.4
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition"), were each filed.
On April 10, 2014, with leave of court, Defendants' Combined Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss or For Summary Judgment ("Defendants' Combined Opposition and Reply Brief") was filed.6
On June 6, 2014, plaintiff filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority concerning the Opinion of the United States Supreme Court issued on June 2, 2014 in Bond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2077, 189 L.Ed.2d 1 (U.S. 2014).
Oral argument on the within motions was held before me on June 16, 2014. At the close of oral argument, I took this matter under advisement. Hence this Opinion.
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to seek summary judgment with respect to a claim or defense, or part of a claim or defense. Rule 56(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); National Association for the Advancement of Colored People "NAACP" v. North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2012).
For a fact to be considered material, it "must have the potential to alter the outcome of the case." Id. (citing Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006)). Disputes concerning facts which are irrelevant or unnecessary do not preclude the district court from granting summary judgment. Id.
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court must view the facts and record evidence presented "in the light most favorable to the non[-]moving party." North Hudson, 665 F.3d at 475 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007)).
If the moving party shows that there is no genuine issue of fact for trial, "the non-moving party then bears the burden of identifying evidence that creates a genuine dispute regarding material facts." Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).
Where a defendant seeks summary judgment, the plaintiff cannot avert summary judgment with speculation, or by resting on the allegations in his pleadings, but rather he must present competent evidence...
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