Bing v. United States
| Decision Date | 19 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 23-231 |
| Parties | TEDRIKA L. BING, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Claims Court |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
TedDrika L. Bing, pro se, Seabrook, S.C. [1]
Augustus Golden, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice Washington, D.C., for defendant. Appearing with him on the briefs were Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Patricia M. McCarthy Director, and Franklin E. White, Jr., Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
Ms. TedDrika L. Bing filed her complaint in this court on February 13, 2023. Compl., ECF No. 1. Ms. Bing alleges that the Navy Federal Credit Union (“NFCU”) violated 1) the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x, 2) the Fair Credit Billing Act (“FCBA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j ( the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f), [2] 3) the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p, the 4) Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and 5) the statute involving Conspiracy Against Rights, 18 U.S.C. § 241. Compl. at 1. She alleges five counts including 1) violation of the right of recission, 2) failure to provide notice for validation of debt, [3] 3) failure to correct billing errors, 4) unfair practices including conspiracy against rights, and 5) aggravated identity theft. Compl. at 4-7. Ms. Bing requests monetary damages of $50,000 and non-monetary relief. See Compl. at 9. [4] She asks the court to instruct NFCU to rescind the security interest on her credit card, eliminate her credit card balance, unfreeze her debit card and the associated account and mobile app, keep the length of her credit card history on file, report to all consumer reporting agencies that her accounts are in good standing, and acknowledge its violations in writing. Compl. at 9. Finally, Ms. Bing asks the court to "[a]ward [her] relief that the court [d]eems appropriate . . . to [redress] [her] injury . . . under the FCRA, FDCPA[,] [and] FCBA" and to "prevent [additional] unlawful acts" by NFCU. See Compl. at 9. Ms. Bing filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis with her complaint. Mot. for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, ECF No. 2. For good cause shown, the court granted Ms. Bing's motion. Order of Feb. 17, 2023, ECF No. 7.
In response, the government has moved to dismiss Ms. Bing's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC"). Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction ("Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss"), ECF No. 9. The government contends that Ms. Bing has failed to identify a jurisdictional basis for her claims. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 1. Specifically, the government avers that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because Ms. Bing's complaint brings suit against NFCU, which is a private organization and "not an instrument or agency of the United States." Id. at 1. The government also argues that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the alleged violations of criminal law, civil rights law, and statues that have their own remedial framework as well as her requests for non-monetary relief. Id. at 6-8. Ms. Bing filed her response to defendant's motion to dismiss on May 2, 2023. Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Resp."), ECF No 11. The government filed its reply to Ms. Bing's response on May 12, 2023. Def.'s Reply in Supp. of its Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction ("Def.'s Reply"), ECF No 12. The government's motion to dismiss is ready for disposition.
Ms. Bing applied for a line of credit at NFCU, which the credit union opened on June 7, 2019. Compl. at 2. It was an open-ended credit plan. Compl. at 2. On July 22, 2021, she submitted a letter of recission for that line of credit to NFCU. Compl. at 2. The Navy Federal Credit Union subsequently informed Ms. Bing of her continued responsibility to pay her debt. Compl. at 2. Ms. Bing alerted NFCU that it was ignoring her decision to rescind the line of credit. Compl. at 2. Regardless, NFCU continued to apply late fees and interest payments to Ms. Bing's account and did not inform credit bureaus of Ms. Bing's decision to rescind her line of credit. Compl. at 2.
On August 24, 2021, Ms. Bing filed a complaint with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB"). Compl. at 3. The Navy Federal Credit Union responded to Ms. Bing's CFPB complaint, stating that her decision to rescind "did not release [her] from the repayment obligations." Compl. at 3. The Navy Federal Credit Union closed the line of credit, reporting a balance of $20,593.72. Compl. at 3. Ms. Bing then filed multiple complaints against NFCU with CFPB, the National Credit Union Administration ("NCUA"), State Attorney General, and Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). Compl. at 3. [6] During this time, Ms. Bing also asked NFCU to provide her with her "original indebtedness form" and offered to pay her balance if NFCU could provide the requested form. Compl. at 3. [7] Later in 2022, NFCU denied Ms. Bing access to and froze her account, [8] transferred funds to a closed account without her consent, declined a debit card transaction, withheld her 2021 state tax return, declined payments despite receiving monthly deposits, and applied late and overdraft fees to the account despite there being money in it. Compl. at 4.
In January 2023, NFCU sent "private mail publicly" that showed that Ms. Bing attempted to make or made a transfer of funds to a closed account. Compl. at 4. Ms. Bing subsequently filed a complaint against NFCU for aggravated identity theft with NCUA. Compl. at 4. Ms. Bing received additional "private mail publicly" showing that her account was permanently closed, her balance was $20,372.36, and she was responsible for her balance. Compl. at 4. Ms. Bing avers that NFCU has not verified her balance in the way she asked. Compl. at 4. [9]
"Jurisdiction must be established as a threshold matter before the court may proceed with the merits of this or any other action." OTI America, Inc. v. United States, 68 Fed.Cl. 108, 113 (2005) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1998)). The court must dismiss a claim over which it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See RCFC 12(b)(1); RCFC 12(h)(3). A plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over her claim. Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In determining whether jurisdiction exists, the court must accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995). While filings by pro se plaintiffs are "to be liberally construed" and are "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)), this leniency "with respect to mere formalities does not relieve them of jurisdictional requirements." Landreth v. United States, 797 Fed.Appx. 521, 523 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
The Tucker Act confers this court jurisdiction over "any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). This court possesses jurisdiction over claims against the United States, not over claims against private parties, local, county, or state agencies, or the United States' officers or any other individuals, for example. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588-89 (1941); Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623-24 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Moore v. Pub. Defs. Off., 76 Fed.Cl. 617, 620 (2007); Stephenson v. United States, 58 Fed.Cl. 186, 190 (2003). Regardless of whether a plaintiff names the United States as the defendant, the court has jurisdiction over the claim only if the United States is in fact implicated by the plaintiff's allegations. See May Co. v. United States, 38 Fed.Cl. 414, 416 (1997). In addition, because the Tucker Act does not establish substantive rights, a plaintiff seeking to establish this court's jurisdiction under the Act must "identify a substantive right for money damages against the United States separate from the Tucker Act itself." Todd v. United States, 386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
For jurisdiction to exist, Ms. Bing must have alleged a "claim against the United States." See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); RCFC 4 Rules Committee Note, 2002 Revision ("only the United States is properly the named defendant"); RCFC 10(a) (). Instead, Ms. Bing alleges a claim against NFCU. Ms. Bing contends that her claims are directed at the United States because NFCU is required to comply with federal laws, is regulated by the United States, including FTC and SEC, and is chartered with and insured by NCUA. See Pl.'s Resp. at 1-2. The government emphasizes that Ms. Bing's claims are against NFCU which is a private entity and therefore is not part of the United States government. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 5; Def.'s Reply at 1-3.
Because Ms. Bing alleges claims against NFCU, which is not part of the United States, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this suit. Ms. Bing's complaint alleges that NFCU...
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