Bini v. City of Vancouver

Decision Date28 October 2016
Docket NumberCASE NO. C16–5460 BHS
Citation218 F.Supp.3d 1196
Parties Guido BINI, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF VANCOUVER, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Washington

Derek Angus Lee, Angus Lee Law Firm, PLLC, Vancouver, WA, Patrick Ross Moberg, Jerry J. Moberg, Jerry Moberg & Associates PS, Ephrata, WA, for Plaintiff.

Daniel G. Lloyd, Jonathan James Young, Sara E. Baynard–Cooke, Vancouver City Attorney's Office, Vancouver, WA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

BENJAMIN H. SETTLE, United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on the motion to dismiss (Dkt. 9) of City of Vancouver ("City") and Officer Sandra Aldridge ("Officer Aldridge") (collectively "Defendants"). The Court has considered the pleadings filed in support of and in opposition to the motion and the remainder of the file and hereby grants the motion in part and denies it in part for the reasons stated herein.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 9, 2016, Plaintiff filed his complaint against Defendants claiming violations of constitutional rights actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a violation of Washington's Criminal History Privacy Act (RCW 10.97), malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, and negligence. Dkt. 1. On September 1, 2016, Defendants filed their motion to dismiss. Dkt. 9. On September 19, 2016, Plaintiff responded. Dkt. 11. On September 23, 2016, Defendants replied. Dkt. 13.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In early 2014, Officer Aldridge was monitoring jail communications between Plaintiff and Garrett Smith. Dkt. 1 at 2. Plaintiff and Garrett Smith were critical of Officer Aldridge and her investigation into Garrett Smith's criminal activity, which ultimately resulted in Garrett Smith's conviction for second degree assault and second degree attempted murder of his wife, Sheryl Smith. Id. ; Dkt. 9–1.

Around the time police arrested Garret Smith, Plaintiff's girlfriend published and maintained a webpage called "Garret's Voice." Dkt. 1 at 3. The website was highly critical of Officer Aldridge, the Vancouver Police Department, and their work on Garrett Smith's case. Id. Based on the content of the website and Plaintiff's jail communications with Garrett Smith, Officer Aldridge started investigating Plaintiff for cyberstalking in violation of RCW 9.61.260. Id.

On March 29, 2014, Officer Aldridge went to Plaintiff's home and issued a warning regarding the webpage. Id. The webpage was not removed or changed. Id. at 4. At some unspecified time, Officer Aldridge issued a "Be on Look Out" warning (the "BOLO"), a probable cause statement, and a criminal complaint for Plaintiff's arrest in the police computer system. Id. at 5. On May 7, 2014, Officer Aldridge arrested Plaintiff for felony cyberstalking in violation of RCW 9.61.260(3). Id. at 4. Felony cyberstalking under RCW 9.61.260(3) requires a previous conviction of a crime of harassment as defined under RCW 9A.46.060 as a mandatory element, while cyberstalking as a gross misdemeanor under RCW 9.61.260(1) does not. RCW 9.61.260. Plaintiff has not been convicted of a crime of harassment as defined under RCW 9A.46.060. Dkt. 1 at 4.

Plaintiff alleges that Officer Aldridge knew that Plaintiff had not previously been convicted of a crime of harassment and that she withheld this information from the prosecutor and the court to obtain the probable cause determination. Id. Plaintiff spent an unspecified number of days and nights in jail. Id. On May 12, 2014, the County Prosecutor's Office moved to drop the charge against him for felony cyberstalking. Id.

After the charges were dropped, Officer Aldridge continued to pursue prosecution of Plaintiff. Id. On July 3, 2014, Officer Aldridge met with the Vancouver City Attorney to ask that the City prosecute Plaintiff. Id. The City Attorney declined, and stated he would revisit the issue after Officer Aldridge made a supplemental report. Id. at 5. He also said that if the City pursued the matter, it would only request a court summons and not an arrest warrant. Id.

Officer Aldridge did not remove the BOLO, Probable Cause Statement, or Criminal Complaint from the police system after Plaintiff was released on May 12, 2014. Id. at 5. On October 27, 2014, three other city police officers arrested Plaintiff pursuant to the information that Officer Aldridge failed to remove from their computer system. Id. On the way to the Jail, the other officers contacted Officer Aldridge to inform her that they had arrested Plaintiff under the outstanding BOLO. Id. Officer Aldridge informed the other officers that Plaintiff had already been arrested and that the information should have been removed from their system. Id. The officers then immediately returned Plaintiff to his home. Id. On November 10, 2014, the City Attorney reached a decision not to file charges against Plaintiff for cyberstalking. Id. at 6.

On March 25, 2015, Officer Aldridge faxed to Sheryl Smith's attorney two non-redacted police incident reports she had authored for her investigation and arrest of Plaintiff. Id. Officer Aldridge sent the reports to assist Sheryl Smith's attempt to renew an anti-harassment order against Plaintiff. Id. The incident reports included non-redacted personal identifiers, including Plaintiff's date of birth, physical description, driver's license number, address, and phone number. Id.

At some unspecified time, Plaintiff filed complaints with the City of Vancouver Police Department regarding Officer Aldridge and the above described facts. Id. The City of Vancouver has taken no action regarding his complaints. Id.

III. DISCUSSION
A. 12(b)(6) Standard

Motions to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under such a theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't , 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Material allegations are taken as admitted and the complaint is construed in the plaintiff's favor. Keniston v. Roberts , 717 F.2d 1295, 1301 (9th Cir. 1983). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint does not require detailed factual allegations but must provide the grounds for entitlement to relief and not merely a "formulaic recitation" of the elements of a cause of action. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

"As a general rule, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." Lee v. City of Los Angeles , 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court, however, may consider documents not attached to the complaint "if the documents' authenticity ... is not contested and the plaintiff's complaint necessarily relies on them." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Also, "under Fed. R. Evid. 201, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record." Id. at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Municipal Liability

The City moves to dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against it. Dkt. 9 at 5–9. The City argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support a theory of municipal liability for the acts of Officer Aldridge. Id.

"While local governments may be sued under § 1983, they cannot be held vicariously liable for their employees' constitutional violations." Gravelet–Blondin v. Shelton , 728 F.3d 1086, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013). To state a claim against a municipality under § 1983, a Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that the execution of a policy, custom, or practice was the "moving force" that resulted in the deprivation of his constitutional rights.1 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 691–92, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

There are three established scenarios in which a municipality may be liable for constitutional violations under § 1983. "First, a local government may be held liable ‘when implementation of its official policies or established customs inflicts the constitutional injury.’ " Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa , 591 F.3d 1232, 1249 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Monell , 436 U.S. at 708, 98 S.Ct. 2018 ). Second, Plaintiff can prevail on a § 1983 claim against the City by identifying acts of omission, such as a pervasive failure to train its employees, "when such omissions amount to the local government's own official policy." Id. Finally, the City "may be held liable under § 1983 when ‘the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority’ or such an official ‘ratified a subordinate's unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.’ " Clouthier , 591 F.3d at 1250 (quoting Gillette v. Delmore , 979 F.2d 1342, 1346–47 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support a theory of municipal liability under § 1983.

1. Implementation of Official Policy or Practice

Plaintiff has alleged no customs or policies that, when implemented, acted as the moving force behind Officer Aldridge's conduct. "A ‘policy or custom’ must generally be one adopted and expressly set forth, but a municipal policy ‘may [also] be inferred from widespread practices or evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officers were not discharged or reprimanded.’ " Morales v. Fry , C12–2235–JCC, 2014 WL 1230344, at *13 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 25, 2014) (quoting Nadell v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't. , 268 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2001) ). At the pleading stage, Plaintiff must plead "sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself" and "factual allegations that ... plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief ...." See AE ex rel....

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