Binkley v. State
Decision Date | 11 July 1968 |
Citation | 434 S.W.2d 336,1 Tenn.Crim.App. 214 |
Parties | Norman D. BINKLEY, Plaintiff-in-Error, v. STATE of Tennessee, Defendant-in-Error. |
Court | Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals |
James H. Bateman, Nashville, for plaintiff in error.
George F. McCanless, Atty. Gen., Thomas E. Fox, Deputy Atty. Gen., Clark H. Tidwell, Asst. Dist. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for defendant in error.
The defendant below, Norman D. Binkley, and one James Vernon Warfield were jointly indicted for an attempt to commit grand larceny. The trial resulted in the conviction of each. In accordance with the jury's verdict, the trial court fixed the defendant's punishment at one to three years in the penitentiary and that of his codefendant, Warfield, at a fine of $50 and eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Davidson County Workhouse. Both filed motions for new trial which were overruled and prayed appeals to this court. Warfield has withdrawn his appeal, and the record is before us only with respect to the defendant, Binkley.
The defendant contends first that his conviction was based on the uncorroborated testimony of his codefendant, Warfield.
The defendant, Warfield, and Bobby Taylor were employees at the Morris Furniture Company Warehouse in the City of Nashville. These three and the defendant's brother rode to work that day in Warfield's Chevrolet automobile. Warfield asked the defendant to bring his mechanic's tools to help install a gear shift during the noon hour.
They moved the car into the warehouse building at noon on the day in question, November 1, 1966. After they had worked on it for some time, Taylor asked permission of the warehouse supervisor, Mr. Oliver Duke, to take the car to the Sure-Fit Company for additional work. The defendant days that they had purchased Ford parts which would not fit Warfield's automobile. Mr. Duke gave this permission. The defendant had partly raised the door to let Taylor back the car out. At this time, Mr. Duke raised the trunk lid and found several items of property belonging to the furniture company. This included three shotguns, three rifles, a clock radio and an electric knife. The trunk had been open a short time before and Mr. Duke saw that no merchandise was in it then.
Mr. Duke asked the defendant if he knew anything about the merchandise in the car or from where it came. The defendant did not reply but walked away. Both Taylor and Warfield denied any knowledge of the property. The defendant and Warfield were arrested and charged with the offense; Taylor was never charged.
The defendant testified that he was under the car during the time it was in the warehouse and had no knowledge of how the merchandise got in the trunk compartment. He says he did not want to get involved. When asked by the supervisor where the property came from, he testified: 'He asked me where it came from and I just walked off,' cause it was there. It's none of my business where it came from. I don't get paid to do detective work.'
In testifying in his own behalf, Warfield said that he saw the defendant putting two long boxes in the trunk of the car shortly before Mr. Duke found them. He denied any part of the offense.
In their investigation, the Metropolitan Police Department found three latent fingerprints on the cartons, only one of which proved to be of sufficient quality to be usable. This fingerprint was identified as that of the defendant, but he was an employee of the warehouse with the duty of handling and storing merchandise, as well as loading it for shipment. The presence of his fingerprint on a carton cannot be considered as corroborating Warfield's testimony.
Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that slight circumstances may furnish the necessary corroboration of an accomplice's testimony. Alexander v. State, 190 Tenn. 260, 229 S.W.2d 331; Garton v. State, 206 Tenn. 79, 332 S.W.2d 169.
In Stanley v. State, 189 Tenn. 110, 222 S.W.2d 384, the Court said:
'(1) The sufficiency of evidence required to corroborate an accomplice is well set forth in Clapp v. State, 94 Tenn. 186, 30 S.W. 214, 217, as follows:
'(2, 3) This Court has likewise held that rather slight circumstances may be sufficient to furnish necessary corroboration. Winfree v. State, 174 Tenn. 72, 123 S.W.2d 827. The sufficiency of corroborating evidence where the testimony of an accomplice is in the main depended upon, depends upon the particular facts of each case. The weight of this testimony, that is, of the accomplice, corroborating the accomplice are ordinarily questions for the jury to determine. ...
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