Bird v. John Chezik Homerun, Inc., s. 97-3527
| Citation | 152 F.3d 1014 |
| Decision Date | 21 October 1998 |
| Docket Number | 97-3529,Nos. 97-3527,s. 97-3527 |
| Parties | Melissa R. BIRD, Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. JOHN CHEZIK HOMERUN, INC.; NKC Motors, Inc., Appellants/Cross-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Randall D. Thompson, Kansas City, Missouri, argued (Tammy N. Etem and Robert J. Luder, on the brief), for appellants/cross-appellees.
Bernard E. Brown, Kansas City, Missouri, argued (Judith Popper, on the brief), for appellee/cross-appellant.
Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and PANNER 1, District Judge
Defendant John Chezik Homerun, Inc., dba John Chezik Honda ("Chezik"), appeals from a judgment in favor of plaintiff Melissa Bird ("Bird") on her claim for common law fraud. The jury awarded Bird $6,900 in actual damages and $35,000 in punitive damages. Bird cross-appeals the trial court's denial of her motion for a new trial, or for entry of judgment as a matter of law, on her claim for violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 407.010-407.1020 ("Merchandising Practices Act"). The jury found that Chezik had committed multiple violations of the Merchandising Practices Act, but awarded Bird no damages on that claim. Bird also cross-appeals the trial court's refusal to give her proposed instruction on actual damages. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Bird bought a late-model used car from Chezik. Chezik's salesman told Bird that "the only thing wrong with the car is that the pop can holder is broken." The salesman also told Bird that it was a one-owner vehicle which was traded in because the original owner was upgrading to a newer vehicle. None of that was true. Bird subsequently learned that the car not only had multiple prior owners but had been totaled in a head-on collision. A salvage company purchased the wreck and sold it to a dealer, who then patched it up and sold it at a wholesale auction where it was purchased by Chezik.
At trial, Chezik denied any knowledge of the car's tainted past. However, the jury heard testimony that the damage was poorly repaired and would have been readily apparent to an experienced mechanic or car salesman. Chezik's manager, who participated in the sale, had been in the used car business for over two decades and frequently bought cars at the wholesale auction. The car was given a thorough inspection by Chezik's mechanic before being placed on the lot for sale.
Bird paid Chezik $7,671 for the car. She also paid $805 in fees and taxes to title the car, and $2,544.94 to finance the car. There was expert testimony that the vehicle would have been worth $8,725 if it had been as represented, but in its true condition was worth only its salvage value of $1,800, a difference of $6,925.
The jury found for Bird on Count I, common law fraud, and awarded actual damages of $6,900 and punitive damages of $35,000. The jury returned a special verdict which On Count II, the jury returned a special verdict which found that Chezik had violated the Merchandising Practices Act by "misrepresenting" that the car (a) "was a one-owner vehicle," (b) "had been traded in because its prior owner wanted to upgrade his car," and (c) "had nothing wrong with it except a pop can holder." The jury also found that Chezik had violated the Merchandising Practices Act by "concealing (representing by silence)" that the car "had sustained prior wreck damage." In addition, the jury found that Chezik had violated the Merchandising Practices Act "with respect to the charging of" a " 'title, filing and document fee.' " However, the jury then found that plaintiff had suffered no actual damages as a result of these misrepresentations. The trial court refused to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury on this count.
specifically found that Chezik "fraudulently misrepresent[ed]" that the car (a) "was a one-owner vehicle," (b) "had been traded in because its prior owner wanted to upgrade his car," and (c) "had nothing wrong with it except a pop can holder." The jury also found that Chezik "fraudulently conceal[ed] (represent[ed] by silence) that the [car] had sustained prior wreck damage."
Count III alleged breach of express and implied warranties and violation of the Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310. The jury found for Chezik on this count and Bird has not appealed.
Both sides filed post-trial motions, which the trial court denied in a thorough 78-page opinion.
Chezik's arguments were fully considered and rejected by the trial court, and there is little that we can add to its detailed opinion. The evidence at trial was adequate to support both the jury's verdict in favor of Bird and the award of punitive damages. $35,000 in punitive damages was neither excessive under the circumstances nor disproportionate to the amount of damages sustained. The trial court did not err by admitting evidence of two other instances in which Chezik allegedly sold used cars to consumers without disclosing that the vehicles had been seriously damaged in a wreck. This testimony was admissible to show that the sale to Bird was neither an isolated incident nor inadvertent. Knowledge and intent were elements of the fraud claim and also were relevant to Bird's prayer for punitive damages. The trial court considered whether the incidents were sufficiently similar to be probative of the point for which they were offered, and weighed the probative value of this evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice or confusion. We decline to disturb the trial court's reasoned judgment.
Chezik's final assignment of error is that the trial court should have excluded testimony from the buyers of two other wrecked cars that Chezik sold because those witnesses "were barred from [testifying] by their previous settlement of claims against John Chezik Honda." Brief for Appellant at 8. We disagree. Even assuming that those settlement agreements purported to prohibit the signatories from testifying in another proceeding, those agreements were not binding upon Bird or the trial court, neither of which was a party to those settlement agreements. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998).
On Count I, common law fraud, the jury specifically found that Chezik had made certain misrepresentations and awarded Bird $6,900 in actual damages and $35,000 in punitive damages. On Count II, the Merchandising Practices Act, the jury again found that Chezik had made those same misrepresentations, plus...
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