Birdsall v. Miller
Decision Date | 01 June 2015 |
Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:14 CV 2408 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Parties | DEAN BIRDSALL, Petitioner v. MICHELLE MILLER, Warden Respondent |
Petitioner Dean Birdsall filed the above-captioned Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. Petitioner is currently incarcerated in the Belmont Correctional Institution, serving a sentence of 7 to 25 years for rape, and one count of escape. Although the Petition contains multiple grounds for relief, they are all based on Petitioner's contention that his conviction on escape charges violated ex post facto laws. Petitioner seeks unconditional release from prison. For the reasons explained below, all of the Petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted. The Court will accordingly deny the Writ.
Petitioner was convicted of rape in Medina County, Ohio in 1994. He was sentenced to an indefinite term of incarceration of 7 to 25 years. He did not appeal that conviction or sentence. He was paroled after serving 13 years.
In 2010, while on parole, Petitioner was charged in Richland County, Ohio with one count of failure to register as a sexually oriented offender, and one count of escape. He entered into a plea agreement in April 2011 wherein he agreed to plead no contest to the charge of escape in exchange for the state's agreement to dismiss the other charge. The parties jointly recommended a sentence of 6 years for the escape conviction to run concurrent to the 7 to 25 year sentence he received for rape. The trial court accepted the plea and recommendation and sentenced Petitioner to 6 years to run concurrent with his sentence for rape.
Petitioner did not file a timely direct appeal of that conviction. He filed a Motion for Delayed Appeal in the Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the Motion on August 22, 2012.
Petitioner did not file a timely appeal of that decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio. Instead, he filed a Motion for Delayed Appeal on December 21, 2012. The Supreme Court denied the Motion on February 6, 2013. See State of Ohio v. Birdsall, No. 2012-2144 (Ohio S. Ct. filed Dec. 21, 2012).
Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found two discernable arguments in the Petition:
See Birdsall v. Miller, No. 13 BE 10, 2013 WL 3463417 (Ohio App. 7th Dist. June 28, 2013). The Court held that these grounds could have been raised on direct appeal, and because Petitioner had an adequate remedy at law, denied the writ. The Court also noted that if it had ruled on the merits, the claims would have been denied. Id. at 2.
Petitioner filed a second Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court of Ohio on November 14, 2013. He asserted four grounds for relief:
Birdsall v. Miller, No 13-1804 (S. Ct. Ohio filed Nov. 14, 2013). The Supreme Court denied the Petition on March 12, 2014. Petitioner requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Supreme Court responded on January 29, 2015 by reiteratingthat the Petition was denied and stating Petitioner was on parole and parole constitutes detention for purposes of escape under R.C. 2921.34.
Petitioner has now filed the within Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He asserts four grounds for relief:
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254, was signed into law on April 24, 1996 and applies to habeas corpus petitions filed after that effective date. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); see Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210 (2003); Barker v. Yukins, 199 F.3d 867, 871 (6th Cir. 1999). The AEDPA was enacted "to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences. . . , and 'to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism."' Woodford, 538 U.S. at 206 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 436 (2000)). Consistent with this goal, when reviewing an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. Wilkins v. Timmerman-Cooper, 512 F.3d 768, 774-76 (6th Cir. 2008). The Petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A federal court, therefore, may not grant habeas relief on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in any state court unless the adjudication of the claim either: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Wilkins, 512 F.3d 768, 774 -76 (6th Cir. 2008).
A decision is contrary to clearly established law under §2254(d)(1) when it is "diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, or mutually opposed" to federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). In order to have an "unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law," the state-court decision must be "objectively unreasonable," not merely erroneous or incorrect. Id. at 409. Furthermore, it must be contrary to holdings of the Supreme Court, as opposed to dicta. Id. at 415.
A state court's determination of fact will be unreasonable under §2254(d)(2) only if it represents a "clear factual error." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 528-29 (2003). In other words, a state court's determination of facts is unreasonable if its finding conflict with clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Id. "This standard requires the federal courts to give considerable deference to state-court decisions." Ferensic v. Birkett, 501 F.3d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 2007). AEDPA essentially requires federal courts to leave a state court judgment alone unless the judgment in place is "based on an error grave enough to be called 'unreasonable.'" Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir. 1998).
To continue reading
Request your trial