Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp.

• Decision Date: 22 July 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-1856,93-1856
• Citation: 30 F.3d 507,65 Fair.Empl.Prac.Cas. 669
• Parties: 65 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 669, 63 USLW 2131 Patricia BIRKBECK, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Alan Birkbeck, Deceased; J.C. Richardson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MARVEL LIGHTING CORPORATION; Bruce T. Fennessey, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 507

30 F.3d 507

65 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 669, 63 USLW 2131

Patricia BIRKBECK, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Alan Birkbeck, Deceased; J.C. RichardsonPlaintiffs-Appellants, v.MARVEL LIGHTING CORPORATION; Bruce T. FennesseyDefendants-Appellees.

No. 93-1856.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued May 9, 1994.

Decided July 22, 1994.

ARGUED: Ray P. McClain, Charleston, SC, for appellants.Lovic Alton Brooks, IIIConstangy, Brooks & Smith, Columbia, SC, for appellees.

ON BRIEF: Herbert W. Louthian, Louthian & Louthian, Columbia, SC, for appellants.

Kristine L. Thompson, Constangy, Brooks & Smith, Columbia, SC, for appellees.

Before WILKINSON and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and DUPREE, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion.Judge WILKINSON wrote the opinion, in which Judge MICHAEL and Senior Judge DUPREE joined.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

In this casewe must decide whether the district court appropriately granted judgment as a matter of law to defendants in an Age Discrimination in Employment Act case.See29 U.S.C. Sec. 621 et seq.Because we find that plaintiffs lacked any substantial evidence of age bias and because defendants demonstrated that their actions were a legitimate response to difficult economic circumstances, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

PlaintiffsAlan Birkbeck and J.C. Richardson both held salaried, supervisory positions at Marvel Lighting Corporation in Mullins, South Carolina.Marvel is a privately owned company that manufactures light bulbs.Birkbeck was the manager of the aluminizing department, and Richardson served as a production supervisor.In March 1989, Marvel discharged both plaintiffs.Bruce Fennessey, a Marvel vice-president, was primarily responsible for the layoff decisions.At the time of the layoffs, Birkbeck was 62 years old and Richardson was 55.

Both plaintiffs filed suit against Marvel in South Carolina federal court.The complaint, which was subsequently amended to add Fennessey as a defendant, alleged that the defendants had "negligently, recklessly, or willfully deprived Plaintiffs of equal employment opportunities" because of their age.This action, Birkbeck and Richardson argued, violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,29 U.S.C. Sec. 621 et seq.(the "ADEA").

The case was tried to a jury in April 1993.At trial, Birkbeck and Richardson claimed that they were both performing adequately at the time of the discharge, and noted that they were two of the oldest supervisors working on the plant floor.Plaintiffs also claimed that statistical evidence showed that the layoffs at Marvel disproportionately impacted older workers.Birkbeck testified that, at one point several years before the layoffs, Fennessey had told him, "there comes a time when we have to make way for younger people," and argued that this comment demonstrated age bias.Birkbeck further contended that his termination was related to the fact that his pension would have vested in three years.Richardson maintained that younger supervisors with poorer performance records were retained in the same position he had held.

Defendants responded that economic necessity dictated the company's actions and that the firings had nothing to do with age.Marvel argued that it was in the midst of a price war with larger competitors in its industry, and maintained that the entire aluminizing department, including Birkbeck, had been laid off.It also argued that Richardson's job had been consolidated with another supervisory position, and that the supervisor who had been retained in that position was himself 53 years old.

The jury ultimately found in favor of both plaintiffs and awarded $113,755.65 to Richardson and $60,077 to Birkbeck.However, the jury declined to find that any willful violation of the ADEA had occurred.Defendants then moved for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, and plaintiffs moved for a new trial on the issue of whether there had been a willful violation of the ADEA.

The district court granted the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law in June 1993.The court found both that no ADEA prima facie case had been made out by the plaintiffs and that the defendants had articulated nonpretextual reasons for the actions taken.Regarding Birkbeck, the court found that no ADEA violation had been shown because (1) Marvel shut down the entire aluminizing department and there was no evidence that Birkbeck's position as an aluminizing department manager had been filled by a younger person, (2) Fennessey's statement was a simple "truism" and could not be considered evidence of age discrimination, and (3) there was no evidence that Marvel's actions were related to the fact that Birkbeck's pension benefits would have vested within the next several years.

Regarding Richardson, the district court found that no discrimination could be shown because (1) his supervisory position had been combined with another position, (2) the person who remained in the new position was only two years younger than Richardson, and (3) the statistics regarding the employment pattern at the company "show[ed] a balanced workforce, at least in terms of age, not a policy of discrimination based on age."Finally, the district court found that, even if a prima facie case could have been established, the economic problems Marvel was experiencing demonstrated that "plaintiffs were victims of economic necessity, not illegal discrimination."

Plaintiffs now appeal.

II.

As an initial matter, we must decide whether Fennessey is a proper defendant in this action.The ADEA makes it unlawful for an "employer" to discriminate on the basis of age against its employees.See29 U.S.C. Sec. 623(a).The Act defines the term "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year....The term also means (1) any agent of such a person ..."29 U.S.C. Sec. 630(b).

The few courts that have found individual liability under the ADEA tend to seize on the use of the word "agent" in Sec. 630(b).See, e.g., House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 F.Supp. 159, 160-62(M.D.N.C.1988).They have reasoned that, under the ADEA, those with the authority to make discharge decisions for their employers are individually liable as their employer's "agents."Id. at 161-62.

While plaintiffs urge us to adopt this view, we find its rationale unpersuasive.Section 630(b) restricts the application of the ADEA to those "employers" who employ twenty or more workers.The purpose of this provision can only be to reduce the burden of the ADEA on small businesses.Given this evident limitation, it would be incongruous to hold that the ADEA does not apply to the owner of a business employing, for example, ten people, but that it does apply with full force to a person who supervises the same number of workers in a company employing twenty or more.SeeMiller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587(9th Cir.1993)("If Congress decided to protect small entities with limited resources from liability, it is inconceivable that Congress intended to allow civil liability to run against individual employees.").Such personal liability would place a heavy burden on those who routinely make personnel decisions for enterprises employing twenty or more persons, and we do not read the statute as imposing it.Instead, we read Sec. 630(b) as an unremarkable expression of respondeat superior--that discriminatory personnel actions taken by an employer's agent may create liability for the employer.Seeid. at 587-88;see alsoYork v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360, 362(6th Cir.1982).Employer liability ensures that no employee can violate the civil rights laws with impunity, a safeguard that has proven sufficient with respect to Title VII, the ADEA's closest statutory kin.SeeHarvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227-28(5th Cir.1990)(holding that the similar provisions in Title VII,42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b), mean that individuals acting as employer "agents" will be liable in their official capacities only);Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965, 968(9th Cir.1982)(same).¹We therefore hold that the ADEA limits civil liability to the employer and that Fennessey, as a Marvel employee, is not a proper defendant in this case.

III.

Appellate courts have been cautioned not to immerse themselves in the minutiae of the various proof schemes set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668(1973), and its progeny.The question before us is a straightforward one--whether plaintiffs successfully demonstrated that they were the victims of age discrimination on the part of Marvel.SeeUnited States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403(1983).

Birkbeck and Richardson contend that they both introduced evidence sufficient to prove such discrimination.They note that the district court was required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to them and that their evidence, when so viewed, would have supported the jury's findings.Specifically, plaintiffs contend that the district court failed to place enough weight on their statistical evidence, was too dismissive of the comment made by Fennessey, and ignored other testimony which was supportive of their claim.

We cannot agree.When viewed in its entirety, this case is plainly one about economic problems causing layoffs, not one of animus leading to the discharge of employees based on age.We agree with the district court that plaintiffs provided only weak evidence of discrimination while defendants presented undisputed evidence that the cutbacks at Marvel were driven by the company's economic difficulties.

A.

We begin by...