Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Washington

• Citation: 192 Ala. 617,69 So. 65
• Decision Date: 13 May 1915
• Docket Number: 29
• Parties: BIRMINGHAM RY., LIGHT & POWER CO. v. WASHINGTON.
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

69 So. 65

192 Ala. 617

BIRMINGHAM RY., LIGHT & POWER CO. v. WASHINGTON.

No. 29

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 13, 1915

Appeal from City Court of Birmingham; John H. Miller, Judge.

Action by Mary Washington against the Birmingham Railway, Light &amp Power Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Transferred from Court of Appeals under Acts 1911, p. 449, § 6.

Tillman Bradley & Morrow, E. Crampton Harris, and P.P. Waldrop, all of Birmingham, for appellant.

McQueen & Ellis, of Birmingham, for appellee.

SAYRE J.

Appellee brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been received while a passenger on one of appellant's street cars.

Appellant was entitled under the evidence to the general charge as to count 2 of the complaint. This count ascribed appellee's injury to the negligence of the conductor. Appellee according to testimony adduced on her behalf, was in the act of leaving the car by way of the front platform and steps when an untimely movement of the car caused her to fall to the street. The evidence shows without dispute that to the motorman was assigned the duty of looking after the safety of passengers while in the act of entering or leaving the car by way of the front, while the conductor, stationed at the other end of the car, cared for passengers entering and leaving by way of the rear; that the conductor would give the signal to go on when the way was clear at his end; but that it was the duty of the motorman not to move the car on such signal until passengers were safely off or on at his end. This is a reasonable, prudent method of managing the transportation of passengers in street cars, and we see it in operation every day. In this case the conductor, while the car was standing gave a signal for it to move forward, but the car between him and the motorman was crowded, and there is nothing going to show that he actually knew that a movement of the car would endanger any one at the front, or that the signal meant anything more than that the motorman should move the car when the way was clear in front. The conductor must be charged with a general superintendence of the movement of his car; but there is no reason why he may not without negligence, in the circumstances shown and within the limitation described, leave to the motorman, who is in a better position to know, the duty of moving the car upon his own observation...