Birnbaum v. Hall

• Decision Date: 24 December 1951
• Docket Number: No. C. A. 2735.,C. A. 2735.
• Citation: 101 F. Supp. 605
• Parties: BIRNBAUM v. HALL et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

101 F. Supp. 605

BIRNBAUM v. HALL et al.

No. C. A. 2735.

United States District Court E. D. South Carolina, Columbia Division.

December 24, 1951.

Nelson, Mullins & Grier, Columbia, S. C., for plaintiff.

Wise, Whaley & McCutchen, Columbia, S. C., for defendants.

WYCHE, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff Helen Birnbaum sues the defendants Ernest W. Hall and Lola E. Hall for injuries sustained by her as the result of a collision between the automobile of the defendants and that of the plaintiff.

The case is before me on motion of the defendants for an order permitting them to amend their answer by setting up an additional defense as follows: "That defendants plead as a bar to this action a judgment heretofore rendered in the State of New York, adjudging that the accident set forth in the complaint in this action was due to, on information, advice and belief, the negligence, willfulness and wantonness of the plaintiff herein in the operation of the automobile which she was driving at the time, in which in the State of New York, Mary Reichener, Jeannette Krause and Adele Kane, et al., passengers in the automobile of the plaintiff herein, recovered judgment against the plaintiff herein for the sum of Thirty Five Thousand ($35,000.00) Dollars for alleged injuries received by them while passengers in the automobile being driven by the plaintiff herein at the time set forth in the complaint in the action, and that such judgment was affirmed by the New York Supreme Court by decision reported in Teichner v. Birnbaum, 105 N.Y.S.2d at page 989."

It is the contention of the plaintiff that the judgment referred to in the proposed defense cannot be a bar to the plaintiff's action, and therefore, states no valid defense. Ordinarily, the court on motion to amend will not pass on the sufficiency of the amended pleading unless the insufficiency thereof is obvious on its face. Ledbetter v. Farmers Bank & Trust Co., 4 Cir., 142 F.2d 147, 149; Stephens v. Reed, 3 Cir., 121 F.2d 696, 699. The question before me, therefore, depends upon whether the judgment which is set up by the defendants' proposed amendment would constitute a bar to the maintenance of the present suit.

The present action is one for personal injuries and property damage sustained by the plaintiff Helen Birnbaum as a result of the defendants' car colliding with that of the plaintiff. This was not the subject matter of the suit brought in the State of New York. That case was a suit by the passengers in the present plaintiff's car against her for personal injuries suffered by them. The subject matter of this case is, therefore, different. The only point of similarity between the two cases is that they both grow out of the same collision.

Where the second action is based upon the same claim, demand or cause of action, the judgment in the first action estops the parties to that action, and their privies, from again raising, not only the questions at issue in that case but also such questions as might have been litigated in the first action. Where, however, the two suits do not involve the same claim, demand or cause of action, the judgment in the former case is conclusive only as to matters actually litigated and determined by the judgment. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 24 L.Ed. 195; Lyerly v. Yeadon, 199 S.C. 363, 375, 19 S.E.2d 648.

If the defendants are entitled to set up the New York judgment as a bar to the present action it would have to be through the operation of that phase of the doctrine of res judicata usually called collateral estoppel. See, Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 3 Cir., 120 F.2d 82, 139 A.L.R. 1; Gleaton v. Southern Ry. Co., 212 S.C. 186, 46 S.E.2d 879; Restatement, Judgments, Chap. 3, Introductory Note.

The rule of res judicata, as generally applied by the courts, precludes any of the parties to an action, or any of their privies from again litigating any of the questions which were in issue in a former action. Thus, the general rule is that the plea is available only to the parties to the prior action, or their privies, and that the estoppel of the judgment must be mutual. Therefore, it is well settled that, with certain exceptions herein noted, the doctrine of res judicata does not operate to affect strangers to the judgment. A judgment to which a party is a stranger does not operate either against or in favor of such person. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111 at page 127, 32 S.Ct. 641, 642, 56 L.Ed. 1009, 1021, Ann.Cas.1913E, 875; Mack Mfg. Co. v. Mass Bonding & Ins. Co., 114 S.C. 207, 232, 103 S.E. 499; 30 Amer. Jur., § 220, page 951; 50 C.J.S. Judgments, § 820, p. 382. There are some cases, however, which recognize apparent exceptions to this rule. See, 50 C.J.S. Judgments, § 820(c), page 384. A number of these exceptions where, among others, the relationship involved is that of master and servant, indemnitor and indemnitee and lessor and lessee, are set forth and discussed in the Restatement of the Law of Judgments, Sections 94-111.

There are some decisions which seem to indicate that in a Federal Court the judgment of a State Court will be accorded the same, but no greater, effect as res judicata than would be given it by the court of the State in which the judgment is rendered. National Lead Co. v. Nulsen, 8 Cir., 131 F.2d 51, 56; Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 3 Cir., 120 F.2d 82, 139 A.L.R. 1. I am of the opinion that, since this is a diversity case, the plea of res judicata must be determined in accordance with the laws and policy of the State of South Carolina. Hartmann v. Time, 3 Cir., 166 F.2d 127, 1 A.L.R.2d 370. However, since I am convinced that the plea of res judicata asserted by the defendants herein would not be allowed either under the law of South Carolina or that of New York, it is not necessary to decide which law would be controlling had they been in conflict.

The defendants contend that the defense sought to be set up by them by their proposed amendment, should be allowed under the case of Good Health Dairy Products Corporation v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E. 2d 758, 112 A.L.R. 401. In that case the vehicles involved were an automobile owned by Mary C. Emery and operated by her son, William E. Emery, and a truck owned by Good Health Dairy Products Corporation and operated by Edward Vandeville. William E. Emery sued Vandeville and Good Health Dairy Products Corporation for personal injuries and recovered judgment against both. In another action brought by Good Health Dairy Products Corporation and Vandeville against William E. Emery and Mary C. Emery, the defendants Emery sought to invoke the judgment which William E. Emery had recovered in the prior action as a res judicata of the issues sought to...