Birth v. Crabtree
| Decision Date | 10 March 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 97-538-HA.,CV 97-538-HA. |
| Citation | 996 F.Supp. 1014 |
| Parties | Bruce David BIRTH, Petitioner, v. Joseph CRABTREE, Warden, Federal Correctional Institution, Sheridan, Oregon, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Stephen R. Sady, Chief Deputy Federal Public Defender, Portland, OR, for Petitioner.
Kristine Olson, United States Attorney, District of Oregon, Kenneth C. Bauman, Assistant United States Attorney, Portland, OR, for Respondents.
This matter comes before the court on Petitioner Mr. Bruce Birth's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Respondent's Answer (construed by this court as a motion to dismiss the petition) and Petitioner's reply. Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenges the ruling by the United States Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") finding him ineligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B).
Upon consideration of the parties briefs, the relevant law, and the record herein, the court rules that (1) Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is ripe for judicial consideration; (2) Petitioner does not have a liberty interest in a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B); (3) the BOP has the statutory authority to promulgate program statements that deny inmates with detainers lodged against them eligibility for the DAT program; and (4) Petitioner is not entitled to a sentence reduction. Accordingly, Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus will be denied.
Petitioner, a citizen of Canada, is serving a 120-month sentence at the Federal Correctional Institution in Sheridan, Oregon ("FCI Sheridan") for the distribution of cocaine in excess of 500 grams in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(A)(1). Joseph Crabtree, Respondent, is the warden at FCI Sheridan.
On June 4, 1996, Petitioner entered the BOP's drug and alcohol treatment program ("DAT program") authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e). The BOP advised him in 19961 that he was ineligible for a sentence reduction because of an Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") detainer lodged against him.2 The bases of the BOP's refusal to find Petitioner eligible for such a reduction are BOP Program Statements 5330.10 (May 25, 1995) and 5162.02 (July 24, 1995) (amended April 26, 1996). These program statements specifically exclude all inmates from receiving a one-year reduction in their sentence if they have an INS detainer lodged against them because such inmates cannot be transferred to a Community Corrections Center ("CCC") and thereby complete the community-base treatment phase of the DAT program.
As a preliminary matter, this court notes Respondent's argument that this court's jurisdiction to review Petitioner's petition for eligibility is extremely limited. Respondent cites Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir.1986) for the proposition that, "where Congress has specifically committed the agency [action] to discretion by law, federal courts possess limited jurisdiction [over agency action]." See Respondent's Answer at 16.
Petitioner does not contest this assertion. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recently addressed the scope of review this court has in reviewing a BOP determination of eligibility under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). In Davis v. Crabtree, 109 F.3d 566, 568 (9th Cir.1997), the court stated the BOP has broad discretion to determine eligibility, but is not immune to judicial review. Id. The Davis court explained that,
[The court] may review the BOP's interpretations for consistency with the plain language of the statute. Furthermore, Bureau of Prison program statements, including the ones adopted to implement § 3621(e)(2)(B), are not subject to the rigors of the Administrative Procedure Act and are, therefore, only entitled to some deference.
Davis v. Crabtree, 109 F.3d 566, 568 (9th Cir.1997).
Also, in Downey v. Crabtree, 100 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.1996), the court wrote the BOP has broad discretion to adopt reasonable definitions of terms under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). The Downey court explained that despite this broad discretion, the courts "have responsibility to resolve issues of statutory construction." Id. at 666. Accordingly, this court holds that this court has jurisdiction to review the BOP determination of petitioner eligibility for the DAT program.
Next, this court must determine the following: (1) whether Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is ripe for judicial consideration; (2) whether Petitioner has a liberty interest in a reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e); (3) whether the BOP has the statutory authority to promulgate program statements that deny inmates with detainers lodged against them eligibility for the DAT program; and (4) whether Petitioner is eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B).
The first issue before the court is whether the court may review a BOP's prospective eligibility determination prior to the prisoner's successful completion of the DAT program.3 Respondent argues that based on this court's orders in Bowser v. Crabtree, Civil Action No. 96-44-HA and Contreras-Palomares v. Crabtree, Civil Action No. 96-1715-HA, the present petition should be denied and this action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Specifically, Respondent argues that Petitioner must successfully complete the 500-hour residential phase of the DAT program before he can petition this court to review a determination of eligibility for the DAT program by the BOP. Therefore, Respondent concludes that since Petitioner has not completed the 500-hour residential phase of the DAT program, his petition for writ of habeas corpus is not yet ripe for consideration.
This court has previously determined that successful completion of the DAT program is not a prerequisite to seeking judicial review of a BOP prospective eligibility determination. See Johnson v. Crabtree, Civil Action No. 97-37-HA (D.Or. Dec. 1, 1997) (J. Haggerty). Rather, in Johnson, the court held that a prisoner may seek judicial review once the BOP renders its decision regarding prospective eligibility. Id. at 4-5.
In the present case, the BOP advised Petitioner that he was ineligible for a reduction in his 120-month guideline sentence on November 12, 1996. Accordingly, Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is ripe for consideration.
Petitioner argues that the BOP's decision finding him ineligible for a sentence reduction implicates due process. Specifically, Petitioner argues that BOP denial of benefits conferred by Congress under that 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) creates a protectable liberty interest since it affects the duration of his confinement. Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals in Cort v. Crabtree, 113 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir.1997) stated that a statute identical to that 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), "creats [sic] a right to consideration for early release that is valuable and entitled to protection." See Petitioner's Reply at 13.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed precisely this issue in Jacks v. Crabtree, 114 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 1997). In that case, the court rejected the claim that 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) creates a due process liberty interest in a sentence reduction. Id. at 986. As a consequence, this court holds that Petitioner does not have a liberty interest in a reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B).
Petitioner contends that a BOP program statement that denies inmates with INS detainers lodged against them eligibility for the DAT program would frustrate the operation of the authorizing statute. Specifically, Petitioner argues that the requirement that a prisoner satisfy all three components of the program is inconsistent with the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). Petitioner cites Cort v. Crabtree for the proposition that the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) is to provide prisoners with an incentive to complete the DAT program. Thus, Petitioner argues that since the community-based treatment phase of the DAT program during the last six months of his sentence leaves no time in custody remaining to be reduced, it therefore "defies common sense." See Reply at 3.
On September 13, 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 which, inter alia, directed the BOP to "make available appropriate substance abuse treatment for each prisoner the [BOP] determines has a treatable condition of substance addition or abuse." 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). As an incentive for prisoners to obtain treatment while in custody, Congress vested the BOP with the authority to reduce the "period a prisoner convicted of a nonviolent offense remains in custody after successfully completing a treatment program... but such reduction may not be more than one year from the term the prisoner must otherwise serve." 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B).
Section 3621 was enacted without an explicit requirement that the prisoner complete a community-based treatment phase to be eligible for a sentence reduction. However, the BOP is permitted to promulgate Bureau Program Statements to assist its staff in interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). See Downey, 100 F.3d at 665.4
After 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) was enacted, the BOP promulgated Program Statement 5330.10, which established requirements for the DAT program and includes community transitional services, or a community-based treatment phase,...
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