Bisciglia v. Kenosha Unified School Dist. No. 1, 1
| Citation | 45 F.3d 223 |
| Decision Date | 19 January 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. 93-2850,1,93-2850 |
| Parties | , 97 Ed. Law Rep. 124 Anthony F. BISCIGLIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KENOSHA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, William M. Neiman, Barbara Ervin, James Metallo, Roger Lemnus, Mary Jonker, Sally Yule-Mengo and Joyce Rehlke, in their official capacities as members of the Kenosha Unified School DistrictSchool Board, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
William E. McCardell, Monica Burkert-Brist, DeWitt, Porter, Huggett, Schumacher & Morgan, Madison, WI, for plaintiff-appellant.
Ronald J. Kotnik, Lathrop & Clark, Madison, WI, Raymond J. Pollen, Mary B. Castino, Timothy F. Mentkowski, Crivello, Carlson, Mentkowski & Steeves, Milwaukee, WI, for defendants-appellees.
Before CUDAHY and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAMS, District Judge. *
This appeal arises out of plaintiff-appellant Anthony Bisciglia's ("Bisciglia") lawsuit against Kenosha Unified School District No. 1 ("School District") and members of the Kenosha Unified School District No. 1 School Board ("School Board") for their alleged failure to provide due process in connection with plaintiff's then-impending termination hearing. Five months after the case was removed to the district court, Bisciglia responded to defendants' motion for summary judgment and imposition of attorney's fees by seeking leave to file an amended complaint alleging a single claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 for discrimination based upon his Italian ethnicity. Defendants' motion was granted and plaintiff's motion was denied. Bisciglia appeals the award of Rule 11 sanctions against him and the denial of his motion for leave to amend. We affirm in part, and reverse in part.
Bisciglia has been the Superintendent of Schools for the School District since 1989, and was employed pursuant to an employment contract which was to expire on June 30, 1994. However, on August 11, 1992, Bisciglia was informed that certain School Board members wanted him relieved of his duties and that a special meeting would take place on August 26, 1992 to consider his continued employment as Superintendent. 1
Eight days before the scheduled hearing, Bisciglia received an eleven-page synopsis of the allegations against him and 294 supporting documents. On August 21, 1992, plaintiff was informed by the School Board's counsel that the scheduled hearing could result in his unilateral discharge.
After his requests for a postponement of the hearing were denied, Bisciglia filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Kenosha County, Wisconsin on August 25, 1992, alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith, and a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for denial of due process. In particular, Bisciglia claimed that he was denied adequate notice to prepare for his hearing and deprived of an impartial tribunal. He sought a writ of prohibition restraining the School Board from taking further action against him until further order of the court, an order appointing an impartial tribunal to evaluate his performance, damages, and attorney's fees.
At the same time that the complaint was filed, Bisciglia moved for a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") to postpone the August 26, 1992 hearing. On August 25, 1992, Judge Bastianelli granted the TRO restraining the School Board from taking any action or conducting the hearing concerning Bisciglia's employment, and set an August 28, 1992 hearing date to determine whether a writ of prohibition should issue.
Subsequently, on September 10, 1992, a substituted state court judge, Judge Mueller, heard oral argument on whether the TRO should continue. On September 18, 1992, the court denied plaintiff's request for further injunctive relief in a written opinion. Noting that the School Board had a statutory right and duty to consider the dismissal of its administrators, the court determined: "On the record before it, and under existing case law, this court cannot find that the Board has demonstrated a bias that would disqualify it under the due process clause from meeting to consider the employment status of the plaintiff." (Record on Appeal at 10). However, in reaching that conclusion, the court agreed that the original notice to Bisciglia was "questionable," but determined that the one month that had elapsed in the interim had afforded plaintiff adequate time to prepare.
On September 22, 1992, defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Two months later, the School Board conducted a public hearing on Bisciglia's employment. The hearing took place on November 4, 5, 12 and 13 and was adjourned on Nov. 13, 1992 without the School Board taking any further action.
On December 1, 1992, the School Board president lost a recall election. The next day, defendants moved for summary judgment, sanctions and attorney's fees on the grounds that plaintiff's complaint was not legally viable when filed and had become frivolous over the passing months. On December 5, 1992, the School Board vice-president voluntarily resigned. Three days later, the newly reconstituted School Board dropped all charges against Bisciglia and extended his contract for another year to June 30, 1995.
On February 5, 1993, after several court-approved extensions of time, Bisciglia filed a brief in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment and sanctions, and a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff argued that there was no basis for sanctions and that the summary judgment motion should be denied as moot in light of his proposed amended complaint alleging only a single claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 for unlawful discrimination. In support of the motion, Bisciglia attached an affidavit explaining that the charges against him had been dropped, and that the original lawsuit had been filed in good faith because he believed that it was the only way to prevent the predetermined termination of his employment at a hearing by a biased tribunal. Plaintiff also swore that he was bringing the discrimination claim because more facts had been brought to light about certain board members' bias against him based upon his Italian ethnicity.
On July 2, 1993, the court granted summary judgment in defendants' favor after determining, inter alia, "[i]f it was not clear from the start, it certainly was clear after Judge Mueller issued her decision on the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order that this was a non-justiciable dispute." Bisciglia v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 149 F.R.D. 588, 590 (E.D.Wis.1993). For that same reason, the district court also reasoned that sanctions should be awarded under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 11"), stating "Bisciglia's continued efforts in pursuing his causes of action were not warranted by law because they, at that point in time, simply did not exist and hence were non-justiciable." 2 (Id. at 591). Finally, the district court denied Bisciglia's motion to amend on the grounds that Section 1981 provides relief only for discrimination based upon race.
We employ a discretionary standard of review to the award of sanctions and denial of leave to amend the complaint. "We review a district court's decision to impose Rule 11 sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard." Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Barosh, 22 F.3d 113, 118 (7th Cir.1994). The decision whether to grant or deny leave to amend is also within a district court's sound discretion, and is therefore, reviewed under that same standard. See Villa v. City of Chicago, 924 F.2d 629, 632 (7th Cir.1991).
"We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment, viewing the record and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Star Fin. Bank, 35 F.3d 1186, 1189 (7th Cir.1994).
Bisciglia argues that the district court erroneously awarded sanctions, should not have dismissed his complaint on summary judgment, and abused its discretion in denying his motion for leave to amend the complaint. We address each of these arguments in turn.
Bisciglia contends that Rule 11 sanctions were improperly imposed against him because his state court complaint cannot provide a basis for the imposition of sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In short, plaintiff argues that since he did not oppose defendants' motion for summary judgment by filing frivolous papers in federal court, there can be no Rule 11 sanctions based upon the filing of his allegedly frivolous complaint in state court. Additionally, Bisciglia claims that Rule 11 sanctions cannot be imposed based upon an alleged failure to update or amend his original state court complaint. We agree.
At all times relevant here, Rule 11 provided in pertinent part:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name.... The signature ... constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of the litigation.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. 3 In Schoenberger v. Oselka, 909 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir.1990), this court made clear that "Rule 11 only provides sanctions for papers signed and filed in the federal court." Id. at 1087; see also Burda v. M. Ecker Co., 954 F.2d 434, 440 n. 7 (7th Cir.1992) (...
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