Biscoe v. State
| Decision Date | 15 March 1887 |
| Citation | 8 A. 571,67 Md. 6 |
| Parties | BISCOE v. STATE. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from circuit court, Charles county.
D R. Magruder and B. H. Camalier, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. Roberts, L. A. Wilmer, and D. C Hammett, for appellee.
The confession made by the prisoner to Morgan, the committing magistrate, was not a free and voluntary confession, and it ought not, therefore, to have been permitted to go to the jury. The confession was made under the following circumstances: The prisoner was committed to jail for the murder of Capt. Dixin, and the magistrate seemed to think it was his duty to get from the prisoner an admission or confession of some kind as to his guilt. For this purpose he went to see the prisoner no less than five times, and at each of these interviews the prisoner denied he had anything to do with the killing of the deceased. Finally, at the fifth interview, Morgan said he had read a statement in a newspaper "that a Captain Evans had seen the deceased on his vessel on the trip on which he was killed, and that there was only one other man on board." Upon making this statement the prisoner seemed to hesitate, and Morgan then said to him "that it would be better for him to tell the truth, and have no more trouble about it," and thereupon the prisoner made the confession which was offered in evidence. Mr. Morgan further says that in all these interviews he told the prisoner he could make him no promises.
Now all agree that a confession is not admissible in evidence against the prisoner unless it was freely and voluntarily made. There is no difficulty in regard to the rule itself. The trouble is in the application of the rule to the facts of each particular case; that is, whether it was a free and voluntary confession, or whether it was procured by the influence of another, under a hope of favor or advantage if made, or fear of harm or disadvantage of some kind if withheld. It is not, of course, an easy matter to measure in all cases the force of the influence used, or to decide as to its precise effect upon the mind of the prisoner. Much, very much, we may add, depends upon the age, the experience, the intelligence, and character of the prisoner. And it may be that courts, leaning to the side of mercy, have in some cases excluded confessions when it is difficult to see how the alleged inducement had any influence on the mind of the prisoner. As was said by Baron PARKE in Baldry's Case, 2 Denison, Cr. Cas. 430: "That the rule has been extended quite too far, and that justice and common sense have frequently been sacrificed at the shrine of mercy."
We have no disposition to extend the rule beyond the sound and well-established principles on which it is founded; and, tested by these principles, the confession in this case is, we think, clearly inadmissible. The prisoner was in the custody of the law, and although pressed time and again to make a confession, and pressed, too, by one in authority, he persisted in denying his guilt; and it was not until he was told that it would be better for him to tell the truth, and have no more trouble about it, that the confession was made. Here, then, was an inducement, and one, too, of the strongest kind, held out to him. The witness, it is true, says he told the prisoner he could make no promises. But what does this amount to when, in the next breath, we find him saying to the prisoner that it would be better for him to tell the truth, and thereby have no more trouble about the matter. It was in fact saying to the prisoner: "If you will tell me the truth, it will not only be better for you, but you shall have no more trouble about the matter."
In Garner's Case, 2 Car. & K. 920, the witness told the prisoner "that it would be better for him to tell the truth." PATTES...
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