Bishay v. Ricciuti, C. A. 1:21-CV-11227-JJM
Court | United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts |
Parties | BAHIG F. BISHAY, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL D. RICCIUTI, in his individual capacity; DIANA L MALDONADO, in her individual capacity; AMY LYN BLAKE, in her individual capacity; JAMES R. LEMIRE, in his individual capacity; KIMBERLY S. BUDD, in her individual capacity; FRANK M. GAZIANO, in his individual capacity; DAVID A. LOWY, in his individual capacity; ELSPETH B. CYPHER, in her individual capacity; SCOTT L. KAFKER, in his individual capacity! DALILA WENDLANDT, in her individual capacity; SERGE GEORGES, JR., in his individual capacity; DANIEL M. RABINOVITZ; CLIFF G. ANDERSON; JOHN K. WELLS; CATHERINE J. SAVOIE; DAVID J. REIER; NICHOLAS J. NESGOS; THE HAMILTON COMPANY; and ARENT FOX LLP, f/k/a POSTERNAK, BLANKSTEIN & LUND, Defendants. |
Docket Number | C. A. 1:21-CV-11227-JJM |
Decision Date | 15 December 2021 |
BAHIG F. BISHAY, Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL D. RICCIUTI, in his individual capacity; DIANA L MALDONADO, in her individual capacity; AMY LYN BLAKE, in her individual capacity; JAMES R. LEMIRE, in his individual capacity; KIMBERLY S. BUDD, in her individual capacity; FRANK M. GAZIANO, in his individual capacity; DAVID A. LOWY, in his individual capacity; ELSPETH B. CYPHER, in her individual capacity; SCOTT L. KAFKER, in his individual capacity! DALILA WENDLANDT, in her individual capacity; SERGE GEORGES, JR., in his individual capacity; DANIEL M. RABINOVITZ; CLIFF G. ANDERSON; JOHN K. WELLS; CATHERINE J. SAVOIE; DAVID J. REIER; NICHOLAS J. NESGOS; THE HAMILTON COMPANY; and ARENT FOX LLP, f/k/a POSTERNAK, BLANKSTEIN & LUND, Defendants.
C. A. No. 1:21-CV-11227-JJM
United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
December 15, 2021
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., United States District Court Chief Judge.
Bahig F. Bishay filed a fourteen count Complaint against the seven justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, [1] three judges of the Massachusetts Court of Appeals, [2] an associate justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court[3] (collectively referred to as "state court judges"), six attorneys, [4] a law firm, [5] and The Hamilton Company. Mr. Bishay alleges violations of his Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, sections 1983 and 1985 of the United States Code, the Massachusetts Constitution, and various state statutes. Mr. Bishay has filed many lawsuits in both state and federal court, arising from his financial troubles decades ago.[6]
II. FACTS[7]
Mr, Bishay and his family were evicted from their home in 2008, following an eviction order granted to Harvard 45 Associates, LLC ("Harvard").[8] Harvard hired a company to move the Bishay's belongings out of the house after they were evicted. An attorney paid the mover, National Investigations, Inc. ("National"), a check for $17, 000 from The Hamilton Company.
Mr. Bishay brought a civil action seeking damages for National's failure to return his property after the eviction. Mr. Bishay alleged that National seized and then improperly discarded his property during the eviction. He also brought claims against Allied Finance Adjusters Conference, Inc. ("Allied") because it had indemnified National. After discovery and dispositive motions, all that remained were claims and counterclaims between Mr. Bishay and National.
Mr, Bishay and National then agreed to resolve their claims and moved for final judgment. The Superior Court denied the motion, finding the proposed judgment to be unjust and unlawful. That Court found that Mr. Bishay and National
had colluded to obtain a final judgment that would allow them to seek payment from the other defendants, who were not party to the agreement-proceeds that Mr, Bishay and National would then share. After the Superior Court's denial of the motion for final judgment, Mr. Bishay and National filed an agreement for judgment, but the Superior Court rejected the agreement for the same reasons. The Superior Court disposed of all claims and dismissed Mr. Bishay's Complaint.[9]
In his Complaint, Mr. Bishay alleges that Defendant judges and lawyers: conspired to violate his constitutional rights (negligently, intentionally, and fraudulently); caused him financial harm; committed mail fraud; obstructed justice; aided and abetted to violate his rights; engaged in RICO violations; and otherwise denied him his constitutional rights under the color of state law. ECF No. 1 at 17-19.
All Defendants move to dismiss. ECF Nos. 16, 19, 47, and 49.
III. MOTIONS TO DISMISS
A. State Court Judges
Mr. Bishay's claims against the state court judges fall into seven categories: (1) negligence in the performance of their judicial duties; (2) intentional torts in the performance of their judicial duties; (3) mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 63 and 1341;
(4) obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503; (5) violations of the Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (6) theft of property; and (7) a claim for civil relief under RICO. ECF No. 1 at 17-19.
The state court judges move to dismiss the Complaint on the basis of judicial immunity and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), as well as the Complaint's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). ECF No. 47. Mr. Bishay objects. ECF No. 51. After review of the Complaint and pleadings, this Court has determined that any of the three reasons asserted by the state court judges require this Court to dismiss the Complaint. This Court will therefore simply address the strongest basis for dismissal: judicial immunity.
"As early as 1872, the [Supreme] Court recognized that it was 'a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences . . . ."' Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871)) (alteration in original).
For that reason the Court held that judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly. Later we held that this doctrine of judicial immunity was applicable in suits under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the legislative record gave
no indication that Congress intended to abolish this long-established principle.
Id. at 355-56 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Bishay's allegations against the state court judges are precisely the judicial acts that the United States Supreme Court and all lower courts have consistently held are subject to absolute immunity. Each of the judges sued here were performing an essential judicial function, exercising the judicial authority vested in them with jurisdiction over the subject matter, such that they are entitled to absolute immunity for those acts.
Thus, state court judges' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. ECF No. 47.
B. Arent Fox LLP Defendants, The Hamilton Company, and Individual Lawyer
The Defendant law firm Arent Fox and three of its attorneys, [10] The Hamilton Company, and three additional lawyers[11] have also moved to dismiss Mr. Bishay's Complaint. ECF Nos. 16, 19, and 49. They base their motions on many grounds including Rooker-Feldman (again pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)), res judicata and collateral estoppel, and Fed. Rs. Civ. P. 8(a), 9(b), and 12(b)(6). Each of these
reasons provides an independent basis for dismissal; taken together, they represent overwhelming reason for dismissal of all counts against all remaining Defendants.
1. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
"Federal district courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction to review final determinations of a state-court judicial proceeding." Bishay v. Supreme Jud. Ct. of Mass., No. CV 18-12610-LTS, 2019 WL 1005490 at *1 (D. Mass. Feb. 28, 2019), aff'd sub nom. Bishay v. Supreme Jud. Ct. of Commonwealth of Mass., No. 19-1257, 2019 WL 4409351 (1st Cir. Aug, 29, 2019) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)); see also Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) ("[U]nder what has come to be known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments."). This doctrine "squarely applies when a plaintiff insists that [a federal court] must review and reject a final state-court judgment," even when the complaint avoids explicitly asking the district court to do so. See Davison...
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