Bishop Randall Hospital v. Hartley

• Decision Date: 30 October 1916
• Docket Number: 857
• Citation: 160 P. 385,24 Wyo. 408
• Parties: BISHOP RANDALL HOSPITAL v. HARTLEY
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

160 P. 385

24 Wyo. 408

BISHOP RANDALL HOSPITAL v. HARTLEY

No. 857

Supreme Court of Wyoming

October 30, 1916

ERROR to the District Court, Fremont County; HON. CHARLES E WINTER, Judge.

Action by Elroy C. Hartley against the Bishop Randall Hospital, for damages for personal injuries caused by the alleged neglect of a nurse. From a judgment for plaintiff defendant brings error. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Reversed.

Edgar H. Fourt, for plaintiff in error.

Plaintiff in error is a charitable institution. The fact that patients who are able to pay are charged for care cannot affect its character as a charitable institution. The common law is the rule of decision, where not inconsistent with the laws of the state. (C. S. 1910, Section 3588; Cowhic v. Shingle, 6 Wyo. 87; Johnson v. Hovey, 76 P. 1089, 1092.) It is the policy of the state to foster charity, a principle founded upon the history of the common law, dating from a very remote period. The courts protect charitable endowments from the maladministration of trustees, and take care that the objects of the trust are duly pursued. (American Printing House v. Board, 104 U.S. 711, 26 L.Ed. 902; Jones v. Habersham, 107 U.S. 179, 27 L.Ed. 401; Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall. 119, 16 L.Ed. 502; Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. 465, 16 L.Ed. 701; Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S. 163, 27 L.Ed. 397; Ould v. Washington, 95 U.S. 303, 24 L.Ed. 450.) The common law and the powers of the courts as applied to charitable uses apply in this state. Charitable institutions are fully defined by the decisions. (Jackson v Phillips, 14 Allen, 556; Dartmouth College v Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 10 Am. D., pages 113-114; U P. Ry. v. Artist, 60 F. 365; Schloendorff v. N. Y. Hospital, 105 N.E. 92; McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hospital, 21 Am. R. 529; Little v. City of Newbury Port, 96 N.E. 1032; Bullard v. Chandler, 5 L. R. A. 104 and note; Powers v. Hospital, 109 F. 294.) One receiving an injury from the acts of servants of a charitable institution at a time when is he accepting benefits of the charity cannot recover damages for such injury; provided due care is used in selecting such service. See 5 R. C. L., Section 121; Eighmy v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 27 L. R. A. 296; Carter v. Whitcomb, 74 N.H. 482, 69 A. 779; Downs v. Harper Hospital, 25 L. R. A. 602; Nebraska Sanatarium, &c. Assn., 92 Neb. 162, 137 N.W. 1120, Am. Ann. Cas. 1913 E. 1127 and note. The court erred in refusing to direct a verdict for defendant. The court erred in giving instruction No. 1 and in refusing to give the instruction requested by plaintiff in error denying its status as a charitable institution. (U. P. Ry. v. Artist, supra; Sackett, P. 352, Par. 2, Sec. 9; Downs v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555; Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 A. 898, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 141.)

T. S. Talliaferro, Jr., for plaintiff in error.

Plaintiff in error is a charitable institution organized under Chapter 280, Comp. Stats. 1910, and maintained by charitable donations. It is without capital stock and pays no dividends. It is of the class limited to holdings of real property to the value of $ 50,000.00. The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in this suit; the theory that the hospital corporation is liable because a bill was rendered to plaintiff is erroneous. It was shown that all persons were received whether they were able to pay or not; those able to pay were expected to do so. It was shown by the evidence that the institution is maintained by donations and that the superintendent is paid from that source. The hospital cannot be held to account for the negligence of a nurse. (Scholendorff v. New York Hospital, 211 N. Y., Page 125.) There was neither allegation nor proof of negligence in the selection of the nurse.

John Dillon, for defendant in error.

Plaintiff in error has not shown a right of exemption as a charitable institution. (Tucker v. Mobile Assn., 68 So. 4, 13 R. C. L. 947.) Organization under Chapter 280, Comp. Stats. 1910, is not conclusive as to the character of plaintiff in error as a charitable institution. A hospital might be organized for profit under that chapter. Reference is found to payment of dividends in Section 4212 of the chapter. The omission of a provision for stock and shares is a negative fact. Under Section 4217 of the chapter by-laws might be adopted at any time creating shares and providing terms upon which shares should be held. Section 4219 provides for dividends at any time. It was shown by the evidence that all patients received by the hospital were given a bill when discharged, although some service was rendered free. The evidence did not show the institution to be a public charitable hospital. The rule that public charitable institutions are exempt from liability for the torts of their agents has been greatly modified by modern decisions. (Bruce v. Central M. E. Church, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 78; Powers v. Mass. Hospital, 65 L. R. A. 372.) The earlier cases held that funds of a charitable institution were trust funds and could not be devoted to the payment of damages for the negligence of servants. The rule has been almost entirely abrogated. The reasons for the exemption heretofore given to charitable institutions are fictitious, unreal and illogical, as is shown by the decision in Hewett v. Womens Hospital, 7 L. R. A. 496. There is a distinction between a person paying for services rendered and a person receiving the benefits of a charity without pay. But we contend that the evidence does not show plaintiff in error to be a public charitable institution at the time of the torts complained of.

BEARD, JUSTICE. POTTER, C. J., concurs. SCOTT, J., did not participate in this decision.

OPINION

BEARD, JUSTICE.

In this case the defendant in error, Hartley, recovered a judgment in the district court against plaintiff in error, Bishop Randall Hospital, a corporation, on account of a personal injury sustained by him while he was a patient in said hospital and which injury he claims was caused by the negligence of one of the hospital nurses who was caring for him. From that judgment the hospital brings error.

Two questions are presented for determination. First: Is Bishop Randall Hospital a charitable institution? Second: If so, is it liable for an injury to a patient caused by the negligence of one of its nurses, in the absence of allegation and proof of negligence of its officers or managers in the selection of such nurse?

There is practically no conflict in the evidence or controversy as to the facts in the case, and they are briefly stated, that defendant in error, Hartley, fell on the sidewalk in Lander and broke a bone in his hip. He was taken to his room where he remained for about a week when he was taken to the hospital. He employed his own physician, but whether before or at the time he was taken to the hospital does not appear, nor does the evidence disclose by whom or at whose direction he was taken there. Upon his arrival at the hospital he was put under the influence of an anaesthetic for the purpose of reducing the fracture. A bed was prepared for him in which hot water bottles were placed to warm it and when he was put in the bed the hot water bottles were removed to the corners of the bed and were left along the edge of the bed. In some manner, not explained in the evidence, one of the bottles got under his shoulder and caused the burn and injury complained of. He was unconscious from the influence of the anaesthetic when placed in bed and so remained until after he was burned. The hospital is a corporation organized and existing under the provisions of Chapter 280, Compiled Statutes 1910, which authorizes the formation of corporations for one or more or all of fifteen different purposes, the eighth purpose mentioned being, "To establish and maintain hospitals and infirmaries for the cure of the sick." Such corporation is empowered to sue and be sued, to contract and be contracted with in pursuance of its powers; to purchase or receive by gift, or otherwise, personal estate, such as may be necessary or proper for the purposes of such corporation, and to dispose of the same; to purchase or receive by gift, grant, devise or otherwise, real estate, such as may be necessary or proper for the purposes of the corporation, not exceeding fifty thousand dollars in value. Such corporation is not required to have any capital stock. The objects of this corporation as set forth in its articles of incorporation are: "(1) To found, establish and maintain a hospital at the town of Lander, in the county of Fremont in the State of Wyoming, and branches thereof at other points in said state as may hereafter be determined for the cure of the sick. (2) To provide surgical aid and nursing for patients suffering from injuries and medical aid and nursing for sick persons who cannot be properly cared for at their homes. (3) To visit the sick and suffering in their homes and afford them relief. (4) To receive and give proper care to persons who are convalescent. (5) To instruct and train women in the duties of nursing and attending upon the sick and disabled." The articles further provide that the business and government of the corporation shall be directed by a Board of Trustees, not exceeding thirteen in number, of whom four shall always be, the Protestant Episcopal Bishop of the Missionary District or Diocese of Wyoming, or that part thereof in which is situated the town of Lander, and the Rector and Church Wardens of Trinity Church, Lander. The Bishop shall be president of the Board, ex-officio. The other members of said Board (after the first year) shall be elected by the Vestry of said Trinity Church. The Rector of said Trinity Church shall always be the Warden and Chaplain of said hospital, and the...