Bishop v. Bishop
| Decision Date | 29 September 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 16245,16245 |
| Citation | 350 S.W.2d 578 |
| Parties | Edmund M. BISHOP, Jr., Appellant, v. Mary E. BISHOP, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Wynne, McKenzie, Stroud, Jaffe & Tinsley, Morris I. Jaffe and Henry Baer, Dallas, for appellant.
Cantey, Hanger, Johnson, Scarborough & Gooch, and J. A. Gooch, Fort Worth, for appellee.
The appeal involves the propriety of the judgment of the trial court with respect to the property disposition incident to divorce. Involved was personal property only. From our analysis of the state of the record it appears undisputed by the parties that said property was originally a part of the separate estate of the husband, and that the trial court resolved the issue of whether or not there had been a gift thereof to the wife during coverture against the contentions of the husband.
The parties were married in December of 1957. They lived together in Dallas, Texas, until time of their first separation in April of 1958. The wife, appellee herein, moved to Fort Worth and moved such furniture as was her separate property before the marriage from Dallas to Fort Worth. Appellant remained in the Dallas home and either completed the furnishing begun, or completely refurnished the same at an expense approximating $30,000. Funds utilized in acquiring the furniture came from the appellant's separate estate.
Although there seems to have been periodic occasions when the appellee returned to the home in Dallas for a few days at a time, the parties' complete reconciliation did not occur until January of 1959. In early 1959 the furniture in the Dallas premises was moved to Fort Worth to a newly acquired house which was the appellee's separate property. Therefter, in August of 1959, the final separation occurred, appellant moving out of the Fort Worth home and leaving appellee in possession of said premises and the furniture therein. Appellee was also left in possession of a Cadillac automobile which appellant had purchased for her, with title in his own name, a few months after the parties were married. After the final separation the appellant ceased to support the appellee.
A suit was filed and decree of divorcement was granted in April of 1960, with jurisdiction retained to try the issue upon the division of property. Trial of this issue followed in August, 1960. Judgment entered thereupon awarded the automobile and the furniture to appellee, and appellant brought the questions involved before this court on appeal.
We believe it obvious from the circumstances of the case that the furniture and automobile remained the separate property and estate of the appellant. Although there were no findings of fact and conclusions of law requested or filed in this case, it is not to be doubted that the trial court deemed the testimony sufficient to establish that the appellant had made a gift of both the furniture and the automobile to the appellee at times prior to the final separation of the parties, and that its award of same to appellee was based upon such an erroneous premise.
About the time of the last reconciliation of the parties in early 1959 and when the parties planned to move the furniture to the new home in Fort Worth, appellant stated to appellee that 'When we move to Fort Worth and you get the house in Fort Worth * * * I am going to deed you this furniture.' No deed or other formal transfer of the furniture was ever effected. Appellee further testified that appellant, both before and after the time the furniture was purchased, was constantly saying that the furniture was hers, and that it belonged to her, etc. Further, that upon one occasion appellant stated, 'Mama, now you have a whole beautiful houseful of furniture and this house, if we don't--whatever happens between us.'
We do not consider evidence of this character sufficient to raise an issue of fact or support a finding that a gift had been effected. The whole of the evidence in the record relied upon by appellee to establish her title by gift consisted of the acts and...
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Estate of Elliott v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, Dockets Nos. 5731-69— 5736-69.
...incapable of actual delivery, or where the situation of the parties or circumstances of the case will not admit of it.’ Bishop v. Bishop, 350 S.W.2d 578, 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); see also Harmon v. Schmitz, 39 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931). Here the bonds could easily have been deliver......
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Bishop v. Bishop
...for rehearing, Associate Justice Renfro filed a dissenting opinion stating only that he would affirm the judgment of the trial court. 350 S.W.2d 578. We are met on the outset by respondent's motion to dismiss the application for writ of error for want of jurisdiction. Since this is a divorc......