Bishop v. Children's Ctr. For Developmental Enrichment
| Decision Date | 15 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:08-cv-766 |
| Parties | COURTLAND BISHOP, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE CHILDREN'S CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENTAL ENRICHMENT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' First and Second Causes of Action ("Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment") (ECF No. 53), Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 54), and Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 57). For the reasons the follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants' motion.
Plaintiffs Courtland and Michelle Bishop and their minor son C.B. reside in the Worthington, Ohio School District ("Worthington Schools"). In 2002 Worthington Schools placed C.B. at Oakstone Academy ("Oakstone") after he was identified as a child with disabilities under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act ("IDEIA"),1 20U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Oakstone is a school that educates autistic children in an environment with typically developing children. C.B.'s typically developing twin was also enrolled at Oakstone.
Defendant the Children's Center for Developmental Enrichment ("CCDE") is a private, non-profit corporation that is organized under Ohio law for charitable and educational purposes. CCDE operates Oakstone. Rebecca Morrison, Ph.D., is CCDE's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") and is named as a defendant in this action in her individual and official capacities.
Oakstone provided educational services to C.B. pursuant to his Individualized Education Plan ("IEP") until August 2005. On August 29, 2005, the first day of school for the 2005-2006 school year, the Bishops accompanied C.B. to CCDE. When the Bishops discovered that C.B. had been placed in an all-day preschool class they refused to allow C.B. to stay in that classroom. The Bishops believed that the classroom assignment was not in compliance with C.B.'s IEP. The Bishops were upset and Mr. Bishop used foul language to express his feelings about the placement. CEO Morrison was attending to a family emergency that day and was not present at the school. CCDE Administrator Nanci Morris suggested that the Bishops take C.B. home and wait for Morrison to call. The Bishops followed Morris' suggestion. On August 31, 2005, Morrison left a telephone message at the Bishop's home stating that C.B. "does not have a placement at Oakstone preschool [and] has been referred back to the [Worthington School] district[.]" (ECF No. 42-1 at 40.)
The parties disagree as to the ramifications of these occurrences. The Bishops contend that Morrison expelled C.B. after the Bishops refused to place C.B. in a classroom that was notin compliance with C.B.'s IEP. Defendants claim that C.B.'s classroom assignment was in compliance with the IEP, and when the Bishops refused to place C.B. in that classroom they effectively withdrew C.B. from CCDE.
On October 25, 2005, the Bishops filed a Complaint Notice and Request for Due Process Hearing with the Ohio Department of Education regarding what they believe was C.B.'s expulsion from Oakstone. Prior to the hearing, the Bishops withdrew this complaint and hearing request.
On May 30, 2006, the Bishops, individually and as next friends of C.B., filed an action in this Division of this District, Case No. 06-cv-404 ("Bishop I"), alleging that, as a result of C.B.'s expulsion from Oakstone, Worthington Schools, the Ohio Department of Education, and CCDE violated: (1) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("Rehabilitation Act or Section 504"); (2) the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 ("ADA"); (3) the IDEIA; and, (4) the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"). Plaintiffs also claimed that Defendants were liable for breach of contract and tortious interference with contract. Bishop I was assigned to United States District Judge Algenon L. Marbley. On March 5, 2007, Judge Marbley granted Defendants' motion to dismiss for Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust their available administrative remedies.
On August 14, 2007, after dismissal of Bishop I, the Bishops filed an administrative due process complaint against Worthington Schools, the Ohio Department of Education, and CCDE. CCDE challenged the sufficiency of the due process complaint. The District Level Hearing Officer ("DLHO"), however, found the complaint sufficient on August 27, 2007. CCDE thenmoved for dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and for untimely or improper service. On October 16, 2007, the DLHO found service adequate, but concluded that the complaint against CCDE failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The Bishops requested state level review and CCDE filed its appeal/cross appeal of the decision denying CCDE's motion to dismiss for failure to provide legally required notice. These administrative appeals resulted in two decisions. In the first decision, the State Level Review Officer ("SLRO") denied the Bishops' appeal, affirming the dismissal of CCDE from the due process proceedings by "Final Decision and Entry" dated January 25, 2008. In the second decision, issued on March 17, 2008, the SLRO denied CCDE's appeal/cross appeal ("Final Decision and Entry as to CCDE"), which had the effect of finalizing the administrative process with regard to CCDE. See CCDE v. Machle, No. 2:08-cv-817, slip op. (S.D. Ohio March 6, 2009) ( that the Final Decision and Entry as to CCDE was a final and appealable administrative decision). The administrative appeal process continued thereafter as to the Bishops and Worthington Schools. The administrative process culminated in a Final Decision and Entry issued on June 12, 2008.
On August 8, 2008, the Bishops, individually and as next of friends of C.B., filed the instant action alleging claims for relief under the Rehabilitation Act, Section 1983, the ADA, and Ohio law ("Bishop II"). On March 6, 2009, this Court granted summary judgment to CCDE in Bishop II. (ECF No. 16.) The Court determined that Plaintiffs' federal law claims were subject to a two-year statute of limitations period and that Plaintiffs' claims for relief accrued on August 31, 2005, rendering them barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Court declined toexercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims.
On August 25, 2008, CCDE filed an action for attorney fees and for reversal of certain aspects of the Final Decision and Entry as to CCDE. See CCDE v. Machle, No. 2:08-cv-817. On March 6, 2009, this Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss that action. CCDE v. Machle, No. 2:08-cv-817, slip op. (S.D. Ohio March 6, 2009) (ECF No. 33.) CCDE appealed that decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on April 4, 2009. On July 19, 2010, the Sixth Circuit affirmed this Court's decision.
On April 2, 2009, Plaintiffs appealed Bishop II to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. (ECF No. 18.) On August 26, 2010, the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in which it found that this Court correctly determined that "Plaintiffs had until August 31, 2007, to file their claims under the Rehabilitation Act or §1983, and the district court correctly concluded that the claim accrued and the statutory period began running on August 31, 2005." Bishop v. Children's Ctr. for Developmental Enrichment, 618 F.3d 533, 537 (6th Cir. 2010). The court, however, concluded that Plaintiffs' federal law claims were not barred by the statute of limitations because they were subject to minority tolling. Id. The Sixth Circuit, therefore, reversed and remanded the federal law claims and also determined that, "[s]ince the district court will once again have federal claims before it, we remand the state law claims to the district court to allow it to determine whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in light of this change in circumstances." Id. at 538.
On October 15, 2010, the Sixth Circuit issued its mandate in Bishop II. (ECF No. 26.) Thereafter, this Court conducted a status conference on October 26, 2010.
On October 26, 2010, the Court issued an order memorializing the status conference andindicating that "[a]ll parties were represented and agreed to" the schedule setting forth discovery and dispositive motions deadlines, the final pretrial conference, and the trial. (ECF No. 30.) Although the agreed scheduling order established April 21, 2011 as the date to file dispositive motions, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' two state law claims on January 16, 2011 ("Defendants' First Motion for Summary Judgment"). (ECF No. 42.) On August 8, 2011, this Court granted Defendants' motion as it related to Plaintiffs' tortious interference with contract claim and denied the motion as it related to Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim. (ECF No. 55.) On August 18, 2011, Defendants filed a motion to reconsider that decision (ECF No. 59), which is scheduled for a non-oral hearing on October 7, 2011 (ECF No. 60).
Defendants timely filed Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment, in which it moved for judgment as a matter of law on the remaining federal claims that are before the Court. That motion is ripe for review.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court may therefore grant a motion for summary judgment if the nonmoving party who has the burden of proof at trial fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element that is essential to that pa...
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