Bishop v. Holy Cross Hospital of Silver Spring

• Decision Date: 08 February 1980
• Docket Number: No. 584,584
• Citation: Bishop v. Holy Cross Hospital of Silver Spring, 410 A.2d 630, 44 Md.App. 688 (Md. App. 1980)
• Parties: Kathleen L. BISHOP v. HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL OF SILVER SPRING et al.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 688

44 Md.App. 688

410 A.2d 630

Kathleen L. BISHOP v.HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL OF SILVER SPRING et al.

No. 584.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 8, 1980.

Melvin L. Schneider, College Park, and James E. Davitt, Silver Springs, for appellant.

David A. Levin, Upper Marlboro, with whom was Alan R. Siciliano, Upper Marlboro, on the brief, for appellee, Holy Cross Hospital.

Albert D. Brault, Rockville, with whom were Brault, Graham, Scott & Brault, Rockville, on the brief, for other appellee.

Argued before THOMPSON, COUCH and MacDANIEL, JJ.

MacDANIEL, Judge.

The appellant, Kathleen L. Bishop, filed a Declaration in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, alleging that certain acts by the appellees, Holy Cross Hospital of Silver Spring and John B. Umhau, Jr., were medical malpractice and that, as a proximate result of those acts, she sustained certain injuries.The appellant sought punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages.

Both appellees filed Motions Raising Preliminary Objections.They contended that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to consider the appellant's claim because the appellant had failed to present her claim to the Health Claims Arbitration Office, as required by this State's Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute(§§ 3-2A-01 through 3-2A-09 of the CourtsArticle of the Annotated Code of Maryland).A hearing was held on April 11, 1979, and the trial judge sustained the motions.

For the purposes of this case, the applicable statutory sections are as follows.Section 3-2A-02 provides:

" § 3-2A-02.Exclusiveness of procedures.

(a) Claims and actions to which subtitle applicable.All claims, suits, and actions, including cross claims, third-party claims, and actions under Title 3 Subtitle 9 of this article, by a person against a health care provider for medical injury allegedly suffered by the person in which damages of more than $5,000 are sought are subject to and shall be governed by the provisions of this subtitle.An action or suit of that type may not be brought or pursued in any court of this State except in accordance with this subtitle.An action in which damages of $5,000 or less are sought is not subject to the provisions of this subtitle."(Emphasis added.)

Section 3-2A-05 provides, in part:

" § 3-2A-05.Arbitration of claim.

(d) Determinations.The arbitration panel shall first determine the issue of liability with respect to a claim referred to it.If the arbitration panel determines that the health care provider is not liable to the claimant or claimants the award shall be in favor of the health care provider.If the arbitration panel determines that a health care provider is liable to the claimant or claimants, it shall then consider, assess, and apportion Appropriate damages against one or more of the health care providers that it has found to be liable."(Emphasis added.)

Section 3-2A-06 provides for judicial review of any claims.

The appellant now argues that the trial court erred in ruling that it did not have jurisdiction over her claim.She contends that the Health Claims Arbitration Panel has no authority to award punitive damages and that, therefore she had no adequate administrative remedy and was entitled to bring her suit directly in the circuit court.We disagree.

The principles of statutory construction which must guide us are clear.In Greenbelt Consumer v. Acme Mkts., 272 Md. 222, 226, 322 A.2d 521, 524(1974), the Court of Appeals said:

". . . the cardinal rule requires that the legislative intent be discovered and carried out.This purpose must be discerned from the words the Legislature chose to employ unless there exists an ambiguity or obscurity, in which case we need to look elsewhere.M.T.A. v. Balto. Co. Revenue Auth., 267 Md. 687, 695, 298 A.2d 413(1973). . . ."

In Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805, 99 S.Ct. 60, 58 L.Ed.2d 97(1978), the Court of Appeals discussed the basic provisions of the Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute.The Court said at 279-80, 385 A.2d at 60-61:

"The arbitration penal determines whether the health care provider is liable to the claimant and if so the extent of the damages, and incorporates in its award an assessment of costs, including arbitrators' fees, § 3-2A05(d) & (e); if no party rejects the award, it becomes final and binding, is filed by the director with the appropriate circuit court, and when confirmed by that court constitutes a final judgment.§ 3-2A05(h).Neither party, however, is in any way bound to accept the award; it may be rejected for any reason within ninety days.§ 3-2A06(a).If a party desires to contest the decision of the panel, he must file an action in the appropriate court during the ninety-day period to nullify the award, § 3-2A06(b) & (f), and jury trial may be elected by either party.§ 3-2A06(b).Any contention that an award should be vacated on the ground of corruption, fraud, partiality or the like, SeeMd.Code(1974), § 3-224(b)(1)-(4) of the CourtsArticle, is to be decided by the court prior to trial.§ 3-2A06(c).Unless the award is thus vacated, it is admissible as evidence at the trial and presumed to be correct,...